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This dissertation argues that the British philosopher, novelist and social critic William 
Godwin (1756-1836) used literary depictions and discussions of book-reading to negotiate 
public debates about the nature of the human mind. It takes an intellectual-historical 
approach to Godwin’s representation of communications media, using this to illuminate the 
wider cultural significance of book-reading in Romantic-period Britain. I ultimately claim 
that for Godwin, the book-object became a literary presence and a conceptual tool by which 
he expressed and defended his belief in the reality and necessity of intellectual perfectibility.  
My first three chapters set the groundwork for this argument by exploring Godwin’s 
treatment of ‘The Matter of the Reader’ (Chapter One), ‘The Ethics of Novel-Reading’ 
(Chapter Two), and ‘The Discipline of Reading’ (Chapter Three). As Godwin engaged with 
debates about materialism, literary form and education, he negotiated inherited ambivalence 
about the nature of the human mind and the conditions necessary for its vitality. Godwin’s 
writing about reading exposes a fundamental tension that runs throughout his corpus: he 
consistently invested confidence in the mind and idealised its operation, yet was 
simultaneously preoccupied by theorising major threats to its development.  
My final two chapters argue that Godwin’s writing about the book as a material medium 
provided an ongoing response to this tension. I show that his comparative evaluations of 
‘Social Media’ (Chapter Four) and his literary rendering of books in terms of ‘Bodies and 
Monuments’ (Chapter Five) were contributions to debates about the powers of truth, death, 
and cultural memory. I conclude that Godwin used the book-object as a gesture of faith in 
the necessary perfection of human minds. 
This dissertation remaps Godwin’s contribution to British culture by drawing attention to the 
crucial role book-reading played in his philosophy, fiction, essays and correspondence. In 
doing so, it highlights a rich vein of enquiry opened up by the growing ‘interdiscipline’ of 
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Books are the depository of every thing that is most honourable to man. Literature, taken in all its 
bearings, forms the grand line of demarcation between the human and the animal kingdoms. He that 
loves reading, has every thing within his reach. He has but to desire; and he may possess himself of 
every species of wisdom to judge, and power to perform.1  
 
Book-reading has a powerful and peculiar presence in the writing of William Godwin, the notorious 
British philosopher, novelist and social critic. As my opening quotation from The Enquirer (1797) 
shows, he invested its practice with authority to distinguish between different kinds of being. It 
operates here as a ‘grand line of demarcation’ not only between ‘the human and the animal 
kingdoms’, but also between different human persons: ‘He that loves reading’ is implicitly set against 
he who does not, endowed with superiority of mind (‘wisdom to judge’) and body (‘power to 
perform’). The contrast is explicit in the essay from which these comments are taken, and functions as 
a way of interrogating the forces that condition human life. As he distinguishes the ‘man of talent’ 
from the ‘dull man’, Godwin outlines multiple ways in which temperament, education and social 
environment may threaten one’s potential to assume the former’s bookish mode of being. The activity 
of book-reading becomes a locus of both anxiety and hope for Godwin, something that troubles his 
aspirations for human life as much as it defines them. 
The tensions inherent to this essay are not unique; in fact, they represent a consistent feature of 
Godwin’s work. He repeatedly interrogated, theorised and symbolised both the activity of reading and 
the medium of the printed codex, and this preoccupation cuts across the generic variety of his fifty-
year corpus. Books are as integral to his discussion of human nature in Thoughts on Man (1831) and 
The Genius of Christianity Unveiled (1836) as they are to his writing of the 1790s. Yet despite 
increasing recognition of Godwin’s seminal position as a literary practitioner and educational theorist, 
his discussions and depictions of media have been largely overlooked. This thesis starts from the 
conviction that we will not fully understand Godwin as a figure of cultural history unless we confront 
them. 
My argument is that Godwin used depictions and discussions of book-reading to negotiate public 
debates about the human mind. I claim that for Godwin, the book-object became a literary presence 
and a conceptual tool by which he expressed and defended his belief in the reality and necessity of 
intellectual perfectibility. In other words, he wrote about books in certain ways in order to examine 
and justify his theory of intellectual progressivism: to confront the challenges it faced and to 
                                                      
1 William Godwin, ‘Of an Early Taste for Reading’, The Enquirer: Reflections on Education, Manners, and 
Literature. In a Series of Essays, in Political and Philosophical Writings of William Godwin, ed. by Mark Philp, 
Pamela Clemit, and Martin Fitzpatrick, 7 vols (London: Pickering & Chatto, 1993) V, pp. 73-289 (p. 95) 
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propound it as an ideal for his times. This dissertation thus remaps Godwin’s contribution to British 
culture by drawing attention to the crucial role that book-reading played in his philosophy, fiction, 
essays and correspondence. To date, there has been no systematic enquiry into the place of books and 
reading in his work. As I undertake this task, I also hope more generally to highlight a rich vein of 
enquiry that has been opened up by the growing ‘interdiscipline’ of media history: the cultural 
figuration of books and reading.2  
That book-reading has an important place in literary and intellectual history might seem obvious, 
especially given the proliferation of media histories over the last few decades (many of which focus 
upon the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries). The majority of these accounts, however, prioritise 
material and economic history at the expense of the artistic, literary and intellectual contexts in which 
those material conditions played out. Within histories of reading, in particular, one finds a sense that 
cultural representations of reading are inferior to or a secondary part of reading’s ‘actual’ history – 
even that they can obscure its history.3 Yet there is a limit to the knowledge we can acquire from 
materially oriented reading histories, partly because past reading is not a material thing; we can access 
objects, but we cannot access temporal, emotional and intellectual experiences with those objects, 
only records and representations of some of those experiences. If we treat such representations simply 
as means to ends, the significance of reading for the culture under study remains elusive and our 
accounts lack explanatory power. Indeed, we may miss the cultural ideology that inevitably underlies 
our own historiographical enterprises. Communications media and their associated practices have 
long functioned as symbols, stories and concepts, and in this capacity have shaped material history as 
much as they have been shaped by it. As Ina Ferris and Paul Keen argue, ‘Books signify in several 
dimensions, from their traditional role as vehicles for the signifiers we call writing […] to their 
function as social signifiers in themselves […] to their overarching symbolic power’.4 Alberto 
Manguel’s suggestive study of metaphors for reading, The Traveler, the Tower, and the Worm (2013), 
                                                      
2 For media history as an ‘interdiscipline’ see Leslie Howsam, ‘Thinking Through the History of the Book’, 
Mémoires du livre, 7.2 (2016), n.p. <http://id.erudit.org/iderudit/1036851ar> [accessed 23 May 2018], originally 
delivered as the keynote address to the 23rd Annual Conference of the Society for the History of Authorship, 
Reading and Publishing. 
3 See Leah Price, ‘Reading: the State of the Discipline’, Book History, 7.1 (2004), 303-20 (p. 313); William St. 
Clair, The Reading Nation in the Romantic Period (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 6; James 
Raven, Helen Small and Naomi Tadmor, ‘Introduction’ to The Practice and Representation of Reading in 
England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 13-14. A salient exception to this rule are studies 
of reading through the lens of gender, which recognise the interdependence of historical practice and cultural 
ideology as perpetuated via text and image (e.g. Jacqueline Pearson’s Women's Reading in Britain, 1750-1835 
and Kate Flint’s The Woman Reader, 1837-1914).  
4 Ina Ferris and Paul Keen, ‘Introduction: Towards a Bookish Literary History’, in Bookish Histories, ed. by Ina 
Ferris and Paul Keen (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), pp. 1-15 (p. 6). This collection contains several 
essays that are exemplary in this regard, including Jon Klancher, ‘Wild Bibliography: The Rise and Fall of Book 
History in Nineteenth-Century Britain’ (pp. 19-40) and Barbara M. Benedict, ‘Reading Collections: The 
Literary Discourse of Eighteenth-Century Libraries’ (pp. 169-95). 
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is one of the few works that attend to this aspect of history, and it shows that the way in which 
societies have represented reading is a matter of importance in itself.5  
One aim of this project, then, is to offer Godwin as an individual case study that responds to this 
scholarly deficit. His writing shows that book-reading, as something discussed, conceptualised and 
symbolised in the literature of Romantic-period Britain, participated in crucial debates about 
knowledge and human nature. Its cultural representation was not simply a reflection of these debates, 
in the sense of bearing witness to them as secondary receptacles, but was integral to them. Indeed, my 
argument involves the contention that Godwin came to view books themselves as essential to the 
mind’s existence, objects that enabled its development and structured its future.  
My concerns should be distinguished from two related lines of enquiry. ‘Reading’ in the sense of 
interpretive theory or hermeneutics has long been of interest to Romantic-period literary scholars, 
partly because the period is posited more generally as a seeding ground for the reading assumptions 
embedded in the modern-day academic discipline of English Literature.6 Informed by the legacies of 
post-structuralism and reader-response theory, this approach concerns the ways in which textual 
meaning may be constructed and complicated by the reader-author relationship. It has recently been 
brought to bear upon Godwin’s work by Tilottoma Rajan, whose Supplement of Reading (1990) and 
Romantic Narrative (2010) tease hermeneutic implications from the writings of the Godwin-Shelley 
circle. Whilst questions of textual interpretation have undoubtedly informed my work, most notably in 
my discussion of the novel form in Chapter Two, my primary focus here is upon Godwin’s 
representation of book-reading as an embodied cultural practice. I have found this sort of book-
reading to be an arresting subject in his work precisely because it points beyond itself: Godwin 
exploits its metonymic potential, its ability to figure and distil the material, social and political 
dimensions of national life that he sought to explore. 
More proximate to my work are studies which explore the implicit presence or consciousness within 
texts of their own nature as material media. The rise of media history has prompted twofold attention 
within literary scholarship: to the conditioning influences of print (and manuscript) culture upon 
literary form on the one hand, and to the ways in which literary texts may encode, signal and interpret 
their own mediatory nature, on the other. Once again, this has resonated especially for scholars of 
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century literature, as exemplified by Andrew Piper’s Dreaming in Books 
(2009) and Christina Lupton’s Knowing Books (2012). My dissertation draws from such interest in 
                                                      
5 Alberto Manguel, The Traveler, the Tower, and the Worm: The Reader as Metaphor (Philadelphia: University 
of Pennsylvania Press, 2013). Cf. Brian Cummings, ‘The Book as Symbol’, in The Oxford Companion to the 
Book, ed. by Michael F. Suarez and H. R. Woudhuysen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 63-65; 
Régis Debray, ‘The Book as Symbolic Object’, in The Future of the Book, ed. by Geoffrey Nunberg (Berkeley 
and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1996), pp. 139-52. 
6 A view indebted to Jerome McGann’s The Romantic Ideology: A Critical Investigation (Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 1985). 
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‘bibliographic poetics’, as Piper describes it, yet does not espouse it only insofar as it reflects back 
again upon the period’s print culture, which is the main concern for Piper as for others (Piper 
concludes that ‘Literature makes books as much as books make literature’).7 Godwin’s work shows us 
that the ‘question of how literature thinks in and about books’ is also pertinent beyond this medial 
self-reflexivity, illuminating a broad range of issues within cultural history. I mostly bracket the self-
referential elements of Godwin’s writing, prioritising instead the more straightforward ways in which 
his depictions and discussions of book-reading intersect with public debates about the nature of the 
mind.  
My project, then, combines the methodologies of historicist literary critics and intellectual historians 
in order to explore what Godwin’s work reveals about the cultural significance of book-reading in 
Romantic-period Britain. It responds to Jonathan Israel’s call for ‘controversialist’ intellectual history, 
a ‘reformed intellectual history presiding over a two-way traffic, or dialectic of ideas and social 
reality, […] focusing less on finished theories […] than on ‘thinking’ and debates’.8 In drawing from 
this approach, I follow many scholars who have sought to establish intellectual history as a viable and 
attractive task; indeed, although Israel critiques the Pocock-Skinner school for honing in upon 
‘discourse’ at the expense of social context and historical detail, the literary contours of my project 
render me sympathetic to such focus. The ‘history of speech and discourse’ to which Pocock drew 
attention in his Virtue, Commerce and History (1985) is one that students of literature are well 
equipped to unearth, as Isabel Rivers has noted.9 Through my study of Godwin, I seek literary access 
to the ‘unresolved arguments’ that Israel places at the helm of social history. 
Godwin particularly lends himself to such a controversialist approach because his life and work were 
bound up so overtly in the ‘unresolved arguments’ of his day. His writing, as I outline below, 
dramatically foregrounds the competing narratives of social progress and corruption that marked out 
this period, showing that they were rooted in urgent and practical debates such as those about 
population growth, industrialization and social unrest.10 As one critic has recently expressed it, 
Much of the challenge and the pleasure of reading the writings of William Godwin lie in 
watching the principles of the Enlightenment wittingly and unwittingly come up against their 
                                                      
7 Andrew Piper, Dreaming in Books: The Making of the Bibliographic Imagination in the Romantic Age 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), p. 11. Cf. Christopher Flint, The Appearance of Print in 
Eighteenth-Century Fiction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), according to which eighteenth-
century novels ‘recorded the self-conscious manipulation of [their] typographical nature’ in order to interrogate 
the period’s developing in print culture (pp. 1-2). 
8 Jonathan I. Israel, Enlightenment Contested: Philosophy, Modernity, and the Emancipation of Man 1670-1752 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 23. 
9 J. G. A. Pocock, Virtue, Commerce and History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 5; Isabel 
Rivers, ‘Literature and the History of Ideas’, in Encyclopaedia of Literature and Criticism, ed. by Martin Coyle, 
Peter Garside, Malcom Kelsall and John Peck (Detroit, MI: Gale Research, 1991), pp. 941-50 (pp. 944-45).  
10 For an overview of these salient issues, see Boyd Hilton, A Mad, Bad, and Dangerous People? England, 
1783-1846 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006). 
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limits. It is this tension, above all else, that his fictional and non-fictional works explore and 
demonstrate.11  
Another way of stating my thesis, then, is that Godwin wrote about books and reading in order to 
navigate the intellectual and social turbulence of his time. Book-reading became a locus through 
which he formulated, expressed and defended his convictions about knowledge, ethics and history. 
When we explore the ‘media consciousness’ of his work, I argue, we illuminate his place within a 
nexus of debates about what gives meaning and value to human existence. 
My project is primarily indebted, of course, to the many existing studies of Godwin’s life and 
writings. The publication of scholarly editions of his work in the 1990s, the digitization of his diary in 
2010, and his growing presence in the course reading lists of universities both testify to and have 
themselves enabled a renaissance of Godwin scholarship in the contemporary academy. My 
understanding of Godwin’s career and its reception has been guided primarily by Mark Philp, through 
his Godwin’s Political Justice (1986), his introductions to the Political and Philosophical Works and 
Collected Novels and Memoirs (the latter co-written with Marilyn Butler), and his entry for Godwin in 
the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (2004). Biographies of Godwin by Don Locke (1980), 
Peter Marshall (1984) and William St Clair (1989) remain useful; Pamela Clemit’s ongoing work on 
Godwin’s letters is enabling ever deeper knowledge of his life, career and self-understanding; and 
Julie Carlson’s recent ‘literary biography’ of the Godwin-Shelley family is valuable as the only 
monograph that explicitly addresses Godwin’s interest in books and reading (though without 
systematic treatment).12  
Drawing from this body of contextual scholarship, my project places books and reading at the centre 
of Godwin’s literary career. It thus most directly modifies and expands upon accounts of Godwin’s 
work that register his significance as an educational theorist: Ralph Burton Pollin’s Education and 
Enlightenment in the Work of William Godwin (1962) continues to be the most thorough, although 
much has been written since that attends to Godwin’s role as an educationist, children’s writer and 
bookseller.13 These works are valuable, but on the whole overlook the foundational importance of 
                                                      
11 Graham Allen, ‘Review of Pamela Clemit (ed.), “The Letters of William Godwin”. Volume II: 1798–1805’, 
Romanticism, 23.1 (2017), 95-100 (p. 95). 
12 See Julie A. Carlson, England’s First Family of Writers: Mary Wollstonecraft, William Godwin, Mary Shelley 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007). 
13 Burton Ralph Pollin, Education and Enlightenment in the Works of William Godwin (New York: Las 
Americas, 1962). Examples of subsequent work include Carlson, England’s First Family; Pamela Clemit, 
‘Godwin’s Educational Theory: “The Enquirer”’, Enlightenment and Dissent, 12 (1993), 3-11; Susan Manly, 
‘William Godwin’s “School of Morality”’, The Wordsworth Circle, 43.3 (2012), 135-42; Robert Anderson, 
‘Godwin Disguised: Politics in the Juvenile Library’, in Godwinian Moments: From the Enlightenment to 
Romanticism, ed. by Robert Maniquis and Victoria Myers (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011), pp. 
125-46; William St Clair, ‘William Godwin as Children’s Bookseller’, in Children and Their Books: A 
Celebration of the Work of Iona and Peter Opie, ed. by Gillian Avery and Julia Briggs (Oxford: Clarendon, 




books and reading to Godwin’s educational theory. It goes without saying that my discussion of 
novel-reading in Chapter Three also draws from and contributes to a longstanding critical discussion 
of Godwin’s fiction, which was instigated during his own lifetime by the essayist William Hazlitt. 
Most useful for my purposes have been Marilyn Butler’s Jane Austen and the War of Ideas (1975) 
and Pamela Clemit’s The Godwinian Novel (1993). Godwin’s own comments about the novel form 
have been a source of growing interest in recent years, yet he is still to be taken seriously as a literary 
critic.14 Chapter Three attempts to show the ethical impetus that kept his theoretical writing about 
fiction (as well as his fictional writing itself) alive and evolving until the very end of his life in the 
1830s.   
 
Godwin and Intellectual Perfectibility 
William Godwin began his literary career in London in the early 1780s, after various unsuccessful 
attempts to work as a Dissenting minister. Given the breadth and variety of his output, he is best seen 
as a ‘man of letters’ rather than simply a novelist or a philosopher. As the unimpressed Critical 
Review put it in 1804: 
The literary raiment of Mr. Godwin is variegated. He wears a grotesque suit, chequered with 
patches, laboriously selected from political, moral, and philosophical romances, dramas, 
novels, and ‘light memorials of the frail and fair.’ Distinguished by this panoply, his 
characteristic energy enlivens the masquerade of modern learning […]15 
Cynicism aside, this reviewer is not alone in identifying a ‘characteristic energy’ behind Godwin’s 
‘panoply’ of writing. Yet the modern-day tendency to carve up Godwin’s corpus into different 
disciplinary categories obstructs access to this continuity, as does the narrative of quality decline that 
dominates twentieth-century accounts of his life. This project is based upon the contention that, 
throughout his fluctuating personal circumstances and his forays across the generic landscape, 
Godwin explored, defended and upheld several foundational convictions across nearly fifty years of 
literary work. In what follows I attempt to trace some of this continuity through a brief overview of 
his career. 
Perhaps the most formative influence upon Godwin’s career was his upbringing in the cultural 
environment of religious Dissent. His father and grandfather were Dissenting ministers, he was 
educated at Hoxton Dissenting Academy, and when he moved to London in the 1780s he became 
                                                      
14 This growing but patchy interest in his theory of fiction is indicated by the fact that the editors of a recent 
collection of essays on the Romantic-period novel use a quote from Godwin to open their introduction, yet leave 
it largely unexplored and decontextualized: see Recognizing the Romantic Novel: New Histories of British 
Fiction, 1780-1830, ed. by Jillian Heydt-Stevenson and Charlotte Sussman (Liverpool: Liverpool University 
Press, 2008). 
15 [Anon.], ‘Review of “Life of Geoffrey Chaucer”’, Critical Review, or, Annals of Literature, 1.1 (January 
1804), pp. 60-65 (p. 60). 
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involved in a predominantly Dissenting literary network. Godwin inherited a cluster of basic 
commitments from the theology, philosophy and social practices of rational Dissent, and these 
remained foundational to his work: most prominently, commitments to private judgment and to 
‘frank’ public discussion, which were understood within a framework of necessity and perfectibility.16 
Political Justice (1793) gave these principles their most powerful and well-known expression, but 
evidence suggests that they preceded the treatise. Godwin himself, in an attempt to chart the 
development of his philosophical principles, dated his commitments to the necessity and perfectibility 
of human lives, the centrality of intellect to ethics, and the immutability of truth (amongst other 
things) to the 1770s and 80s.17 Careful attention to Godwin’s subsequent work also reveals that these 
commitments continued beyond the 1790s. They undergirded his political pamphlets and his essays; 
his educational writings and books for children; his biographies; his novels; his dramas; his writings 
on religion. 
To argue for such continuity is not to deny that Godwin’s writing developed, or that some of his 
views changed. As his earliest biographer William Hazlitt noted with approval, ‘he changes his 
opinions, and changes them for the better’.18 In fact, as Godwin himself attested, his high view of 
individual judgment meant that he considered it a moral duty to keep one’s opinions open to 
revision.19 Most famously, he adapted his work to accommodate the shifting concerns and 
terminology of philosophical debate in the 1790s, becoming more alert to the power of feeling and 
sentiment in the formation of judgment. These changes inflected his work of the later 1790s with a 
more sceptical tone, including his revised editions of Political Justice.20 Yet as his essay ‘Of 
Scepticism’ (1797) shows, he saw such caution (‘rational sceptic[ism]’) to be compatible with his 
basic belief in the reality and accessibility of truth, rather than a threat to it. ‘The sceptic makes bare 
his own bosom to receive the beams of truth’, he claimed.21 The apprehension of truth through private 
judgment was still the cornerstone of his ethical and social theory, and Godwin was at pains to 
                                                      
16 See especially Mark Philp, Godwin’s Political Justice (London: Duckworth, 1986), and Philp’s ‘Introduction’ 
to the Political and Philosophical Writings, I, pp. 7-45. For further discussion of ‘rational’ Dissent and its social 
legacy, see Chapter Three. A broad overview of the concept of perfectibility in Western culture is provided by 
John Passmore in The Perfectibility of Man, 3rd edn (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2000), and Godwin’s 
commitment to intellectual perfectibility situated briefly within ‘British anarchism’ on pp. 277-80, 321-23. 
17 A transcription of Godwin’s ‘Philosophical Principles’ timeline is provided in Philp’s ‘Introduction’ to the 
Political and Philosophical Writings, pp. 17-18; see pp. 21, 24-25 for further detail about areas of continuity in 
Godwin's post-1790s work. 
18 William Hazlitt, ‘The Spirit of the Age’, in The Collected Works of William Hazlitt, ed. by A. R. Waller and 
Arnold Glover, 21 vols (London: J. M. Dent & Co., 1902), IV, pp. 185-368 (p. 212). 
19 See Godwin’s preface to the 1796 edition of Political Justice (An Enquiry Concerning Political Justice: 
Variants, in Political and Philosophical Writings, IV, pp. 6-7) and his ‘Thoughts occasioned by the perusal of Dr 
Parr’s Spital Sermon […] being a reply to the attacks of Dr. Parr, Mr. Mackintosh, The Author of an Essay on 
Population, and others’, in Political and Philosophical Writings, II, pp. 163-208. 
20 See Philp, Godwin’s Political Justice, and the section on reason and feeling in D. H. Monro, Godwin's Moral 
Philosophy: an Interpretation of William Godwin (London: Oxford University Press, 1953), pp. 36-56. 
21 Godwin, ‘Essay of Scepticism’, in Political and Philosophical Writings, V, pp. 302-11 (pp. 302, 309). A 




communicate this throughout the 1790s. ‘[T]he spirit and great outlines of [my] work […] remain 
untouched’, he insisted; the alterations made were ‘not of a fundamental nature’.22  
I address other developments within Godwin’s thought in this dissertation, including apparent 
qualifications to his confidence in the omnipotence of educational environment (see Chapter Three). 
Yet no such adaption, I argue, obscured his overarching conviction that all persons had the innate 
potential to develop true judgment (i.e., in the theory of human perfectibility). This conviction is 
nowhere more evident than in Godwin’s final words to his 1831 Thoughts on Man, which echo and 
sustain those of his 1801 ‘Thoughts occasioned by the perusal of Dr Parr’s Spital Sermon’. Both 
present a view of perfected human nature which is as unashamedly idealistic as that of the first edition 
of Political Justice: ‘human understanding and human virtue will hereafter accomplish such things as 
the heart of man has never yet been daring enough to conceive’.23 
Above all else, Godwin’s work is characterised by an interest in the life of the mind. His fictions, 
essays and histories alike are fuelled by a sense that the intellectual conditions of national life are the 
most important thing to be investigated, critiqued and challenged. Whether discussing political 
structures, childhood education, or literary form, one basic question remains the same: how active (i.e. 
alive) is the mind in this situation? Or, to put it another way, what possibilities for the mind does this 
mode of education, this political structure, or this literary form allow? When it came to history, the 
story of an individual mind at a certain point in time could be understood as a direct window into the 
story of his or her nation, because it demonstrated the extent to which that nation allowed the mind to 
flourish. Godwin certainly appreciated the body; at times he even troubled the distinction between 
body and mind (see Chapter One). Yet he consistently described the mind as the thing that made 
human persons truly human: ‘Be it however where or what it may, [the mind] constitutes the great 
essence of, and gives value to, our existence’.24 
This enduring interest in intellectual vitality stemmed from the centrality of ‘private judgment’ to 
Godwin’s ethical, social and political commitments. Like many Dissenters before him, Godwin 
believed that individual judgment was a perfectible faculty – that it had an innate capacity to 
apprehend truth – and that it would develop necessarily given the free and ‘frank’ dissemination of 
ideas. ‘Man is in a state of perpetual progress’, he argued in Political Justice. ‘If we would arrive at 
                                                      
22 Political Justice: Variants, pp. 7-8. See also his defence of principles ‘fundamental to the system’ of Political 
Justice in the preface to St Leon; A Tale of the Sixteenth Century, in Collected Novels and Memoirs of William 
Godwin, ed. by Mark Philp, Pamela Clemit and Maurice Hindle, 8 vols (London: W. Pickering, 1992), IV, pp. 
10-11. 
23 Godwin, Thoughts on Man, His Nature, Productions, and Discoveries. Interspersed with Some Particulars 
Respecting the Author, in Political and Philosophical Writings, VI, pp. 31-292 (p. 292). Cf. ‘Thoughts 
occasioned by the perusal of Dr Parr’s Spital Sermon’, pp. 207-08. 
24 Thoughts on Man, p. 42. 
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truth, each man must be taught to enquire and think for himself’.25 This process went hand in hand 
with social reform, because for Godwin, people necessarily live out their opinions and beliefs: ‘to 
reform a man is to change the sentiments of his mind’.26 He wrote confidently about this ‘unspeakably 
beautiful’ doctrine of private judgment,27 envisioning a future of increasing intellectual (and thus 
social) perfection.  
Godwin was full of caution, however, when it came to discussing the conditions required for such 
mental development to occur in the present day. He found threats to the vitality of private judgment in 
political structures, educational environments, social practices – even in the substance and nature of 
the mind itself. Political Justice is perhaps more explicit about threats to private judgment than it is 
about the potential of private judgment to bring about good. The work explores the many ways in 
which ‘By its very nature political institution has a tendency to suspend the elasticity, and put an end 
to the advancement of mind’. It considers how religious traditions, social customs, and even 
politically radical organisations pose a similar threat, observing that ‘Every scheme for embodying 
imperfection must be injurious’.28 Godwin believed that reformation of the mind would bring about 
reformation of society, but it often appeared as a chicken-and-egg situation: which came first, and 
how?  
Whilst many critics have noted this tension surrounding Godwin’s conception of social reform, few 
recognise that the problem lay not so much in his theory of transition from one state to another, but in 
his theory of mediation.29 He consistently posited truth as a powerful, objective force; he consistently 
believed that once apprehended, truth was irresistible; but the means of its apprehension was the 
sticking point. How was truth conveyed to the mind, if not through potentially corrupt human 
channels? Textual and aural media, historical customs, individual cognition – all were vital means of 
knowledge, yet all were treated with suspicion. I explore this mediatory conundrum directly in 
Chapter Four, ‘Truth and Social Media’, but each chapter explores it implicitly. Godwin’s obsession 
with the issue was informed and enflamed by his materialist leanings (Chapter One), his literary 
                                                      
25 Political Justice, p. 106; Political Justice: Variants, p. 143. See Philp’s discussion of Godwin’s view of 
private judgment in his Godwin’s Political Justice. For three typologies of ‘private judgment’ in eighteenth-
century religious discourse, see Chapter One of Daniel Patrick L. Huang, ‘“Private judgment” in the Anglican 
writings of John Henry Newman (1824-1945)’, (doctoral dissertation, The Catholic University of America, 
1996) ProQuest Dissertations Publishing. For the generation of ‘perfectibility’ as a more general social 
assumption in eighteenth-century culture, see James Sambrook, The Eighteenth Century: The Intellectual and 
Cultural Context of English Literature, 1700-1789 (London: Longman, 1986), especially pp. 229-33; David 
Spadafora, The Idea of Progress in Eighteenth-Century Britain (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990); and 
Basil Willey, The Eighteenth Century Background: Studies on the Idea of Nature in the Thought of the Period 
(London: Chatto & Windus, 1940). 
26 Political Justice, p. 397. This particular phrase is removed in subsequent editions, but the argument remains 
the same: see Political Justice: Variants, pp. 295-96. 
27 Political Justice, p. 76 (retained in all editions).  
28 Ibid., p. 106 (emphasis mine). 
29 For examples of this ‘transition’ focus, see Peter H. Marshall, William Godwin (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1984), p. 404, and Passmore, The Perfectibility of Man, pp. 278-89. 
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environment (Chapter Two), his educational background (Chapter Three) and his understanding of 
death (Chapter Five). It was ultimately the reason, I argue, why book-reading became such a locus of 
hope and anxiety in his work. 
Godwin’s search for the means of intellectual perfectibility should not be understood only as a 
response to this internal philosophical tension, however. He was engaging with debates about the 
future of the human mind which were neither private nor abstract, even when he articulated himself in 
such terms. He wrote in an historical moment in which the theory of ideas and their transmission was 
highly politicized, and this environment was the implicit focal point for many of his arguments in the 
1790s and early 1800s. Burke’s Reflections on the Revolution (1790) and Paine’s Rights of Man 
(1791) sparked a pamphlet war which testified to the ways in which the intellectual foundations of the 
British political system, including the proper role and scope of public opinion in its formation, were 
being intensely debated. The publication timing of Political Justice, a few weeks after the execution 
of Louis XVI and days after war with France was announced, was in this respect unfortunate, for 
Godwin’s critique of social institutions was inevitably associated with revolutionary uprising. He was 
portrayed by the conservative press as dangerous, discreditable and disloyal until the end of his life 
(and beyond). This hostile context heightened Godwin’s ambivalence concerning the means of 
intellectual advance, for in propounding his belief in necessary perfectibility he was anxious to stress 
that the political implications of this process were both real and powerful (providing hope for the 
future), yet also peaceful and gradualist (providing safety in the present). His 1795 pamphlet 
‘Considerations on Lord Grenville’s and Mr Pitt’s Bills’ exemplifies this dual inflection. It can be 
seen in the very title, for in purporting to be written ‘by a lover of order’ it simultaneously advertises 
the author’s gradualist credentials and establishes the central, unsettling question of the pamphlet: 
whose order? Godwin’s rather conflicted answer is the necessary order of truth (see Chapter Four). 
Godwin’s progressivist framework was also prominently attacked by the political economist Thomas 
Robert Malthus, symbolising how emerging debates about Britain’s rapidly growing population were 
placing cultural narratives of linear social progress under strain.30 Malthus set out to refute Godwin in 
his Essay on the Principle of Population (first published 1798) by demonstrating that social 
improvement had known limits: misery and vice were necessary forces that brought population size 
and food supply into equilibrium. Godwin responded briefly to Malthus in his ‘Thoughts occasioned 
by the perusal of Dr Parr’s Spital Sermon’ (1801), and then at length in his Of Population in 1820. He 
spent many pages disputing Malthus’s statistics, but his most powerful line of argument was that 
                                                      
30 Thomas Robert Malthus, An Essay on the Principle of Population, as it affects the future improvement of 
society, with remarks on the speculations of Mr. Godwin, M. Condorcet, and other writers (London: J. Johnson, 
1798); a substantially revised second edition appeared in 1803. Cf. Philip Connell, Romanticism, Economics 
and the Question of ‘Culture’ (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Catherine Gallagher, ‘The Romantics 
and the Political Economists’, in The Cambridge History of English Romantic Literature, ed. by James Chandler 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 71-100 (pp. 75-76). 
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Malthus’s focus upon bodily desire led him to misunderstand and underestimate the mind. He 
contended that logic, philosophy and historical observation justified the conclusion that the human 
mind was progressive by nature, including its ability to exercise judgment (e.g. in refraining from 
reproduction), foresight (e.g. in planning ahead for crises) and innovation (e.g. in creating solutions to 
new problems): ‘the progressive power of increase in the numbers of mankind, will never outrun the 
progressive power of improvement which human intellect is enabled to develop in the means of 
subsistence’.31 Interestingly, the imagination plays a crucial role in Godwin’s arguments: humankind 
will advance in mind only insofar as they summon the courage to conceive of themselves advancing, 
to imagine its possibility. This exposes one important link in his work between intellectual 
perfectibility and book-reading. Indeed, the interrelation of literature, mind and history became a topic 
of increasing interest to him, as shown by his essays ‘Of the Durability of Human Achievements and 
Productions’ and ‘Of Imitation and Invention’ in Thoughts on Man (see Chapter Five). 
This leads us to another formative context for Godwin’s promulgation of perfectibility – and one 
commonly neglected by his critics – the ‘media consciousness’ of Romantic-period Britain. I return to 
my opening comments, in which I tried to make a case for the sort of ‘bibliographic poetics’ that aims 
to illuminate fields of cultural history beyond media history itself. Historians concur that debates 
about print culture and its development were a major aspect of life and literature in this period, and it 
has even been cast as the first age of media histories, an age of stories about orality and textuality 
which were fuelled by ‘competing narratives of progress and corruption’. As Ferris and Keen put it, 
‘new awareness of the ‘presence’ of books and printed matter […] took increasing hold in the culture 
as the eighteenth century ran its course’.32 Yet Godwin’s contribution to this environment has been 
curiously overlooked, despite the fact that he directly reflected upon it. He told a familiar story about 
the printing press as an agent of change – ‘that glorious instrument for advancing the march of human 
                                                      
31 Godwin, Of Population. An Enquiry concerning the Power of Increase in the Numbers of Mankind, being an 
Answer to Mr. Malthus’s Essay on that Subject, in Political and Philosophical Writings, II, p. 295. For a useful 
gloss on Godwin’s argument here see Monro, Godwin's Moral Philosophy, pp. 81-85. 
32 Ferris and Keen, ‘Introduction: Towards a Bookish Literary History’, pp. 1, 5. Cf. Klancher, ‘Wild 
Bibliography’; Paula McDowell, ‘Towards a Genealogy of ‘Print Culture’ and ‘Oral Tradition’’, in The 
Broadview Reader in Book History, ed. by Michelle Levy and Tom Mole (Peterborough, Ont.: Broadview, 
2015), pp. 395-415 (reprinted from This Is Enlightenment, ed. by Clifford Siskin and William Warner (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2010), pp. 229-46); St Clair, The Reading Nation, pp. 10-12; James Raven, ‘The 
Industrial Revolution of the Book’, in The Cambridge Companion to the History of the Book, ed. by Leslie 
Howsam (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 143-61 (pp. 143, 159); Leslie Howsam, ‘The 
History of the Book in Britain, 1801-1914’, in The Oxford Companion to the Book, ed. by Michael F. Suarez 
and H. R. Woudhuysen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 180; Carla Hesse, ‘Books in Time’, in The 
Future of the Book, ed. by Geoffrey Nunberg (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1996), 
pp. 21-36 (p. 29). 
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improvement’ – but it was imbued with his characteristic ambivalence about the practical nature and 
means of this advance.33 
Godwin had reason and opportunity to reflect upon his media environment. His Herald of Literature 
(1784) was a convincing spoof of the contemporary reviewing scene, and indicates that he was 
attuned to the social and material conditions of literary craft from an early date. He personally 
experienced all the highs and lows of literary fame, becoming a celebrity almost overnight after the 
success of Political Justice and Caleb Williams and experiencing a fall from social grace almost as 
sudden following his Memoirs of Mary Wollstonecraft in 1798. He increasingly reflected upon his life 
in terms of his books, often self-identifying with their public reception (‘I may be a martyr of this 
work’ he wrote of Political Justice in 1824).34 He also clashed with his publishers over the economic 
constraints of book production: his letters show him disputing the material form his works would take, 
including ‘that space between the paragraphs which distinguishes all elegantly printed books’.35 In 
1805 he started a publishing imprint and bookshop with his second wife, which proved a lengthy and 
complex commercial failure, and the Godwins were forced to declare bankruptcy in 1825. This again 
prompted Godwin to reflect upon the media environment in which he was emotionally and financially 
invested, including the disparity, in his experience, between literary labour and the commercial world 
of print. Yet he continued to place his hope in the future of his books, which he believed would 
continue speaking long after he had become ‘a clod in the valley’.36 
My task in this dissertation is to show that Godwin’s literary interest in book-reading was not 
incidental or ephemeral to his key, enduring principles, but that it was essential to them, and more so 
than has hitherto been recognised. In what follows, I argue that Godwin participated in the media 
consciousness of Romantic-period Britain by using depictions and discussions of book-reading to 
examine, justify, and publicise his core belief in intellectual perfectibility. As we take a close look at 
this aspect of his work, we slice through the heart of the debates about the human mind with which he 
spent his life engaging. 
 
Outline of dissertation 
The first three chapters of this dissertation set the groundwork for my argument about print and 
perfectibility by exploring Godwin’s depictions and discussions of the activity of reading. I explore 
his treatment of reading subjects, reading matter and reading advice, demonstrating that in and 
                                                      
33 Thoughts on Man, p. 248; Cf. 'Considerations on Lord Grenville’s and Mr Pitt’s Bills, concerning treasonable 
and seditious practices and unlawful assemblies, by a lover of order', in Political and Philosophical Writings, II, 
pp. 123-62 (p. 155). 
34 Manuscript note as cited in Philp, ‘Introduction’ to Political and Philosophical Writings, p. 23. 
35 The Letters of William Godwin, ed. by Pamela Clemit, 2 vols (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011-2015), 
II (2015), p. 253. 
36 See ‘Of the Length of the Life of Man: A Confession’, in Collected Novels and Memoirs, I, pp. 61-65. 
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through each of these issues Godwin was addressing fundamental questions about the nature of the 
mind and its development. Each chapter provides evidence for my claim that Godwin negotiated an 
ambivalent view of the mind throughout his career. Their different perspectives all reveal ways in 
which he consistently upheld confidence in the mind, at the same time as he anxiously interrogated 
the exact relationship of printed works to ‘the full and free exercise of private judgment’.37 
In Chapter One (‘The Matter of the Reader’), I show that representations of reading in Political 
Justice, Caleb Williams and Mandeville participated in contemporary debates about the relationship 
between matter and thought. Godwin had argued in Political Justice that only independent thinking 
could give rise to beneficial social reform, and he considered reading a vital means of achieving this 
independence. Yet throughout the 1790s he increasingly described the reading mind in material terms, 
apparently reducing thought to matter’s mechanical realm. Across his fiction and philosophy Godwin 
depicted readers who were powerless to escape the conditioning influences of their educational 
environments, raising questions about whether and to what extent the human mind was indeed able to 
transcend its social context in an act of truly independent or private judgment.  
These descriptions of reading do not simply raise problems, however. I argue that Godwin was 
intentionally drawing from an ambivalent or ‘double’ reading of mind that was integral to the 
philosophical and physiological writing of his time. Like other writers in his radical literary circle of 
the 1790s, he was exploiting the uncertain line between the literal and the metaphoric in the language 
of these works, in order to emphasise both the formative power of corrupt social environments and the 
ability of the individual mind to escape their confines and achieve intellectual agency through textual 
engagement. In other words, I claim that Godwin was attuned to the ways in which ‘reading matter’ 
could be transformed through fiction from an intellectual problem into a space for imagining social 
possibility. 
In Chapter Two, (‘The Ethics of Novel-Reading’), I argue that Godwin’s writing of the early 1830s 
was the climax of a career-long attempt to express the value of the novel form in terms of its alliance 
with the moral perfectibility of the human mind. I show that Godwin claimed the novel as a special 
means of moral knowledge in his preface to Cloudesley (1830) and preface to the 1832 edition of 
Fleetwood, remediating the ideas of his earlier draft essay ‘Of History and Romance’ (1797). In doing 
so, he contributed to a growing public discourse that allied fiction-reading to ethics, one of the many 
factors that aided the social elevation of the novel form in the early nineteenth century. This critical 
work had a dark side, however: it was haunted by images of shallow writers and passive readers who 
abused the moral potential of their materials. Godwin’s approach to the novel was based upon an 
assumption about how the reader’s mind should interact with certain kinds of prose in order to 
                                                      
37 This phrase is from Philp, Godwin’s Political Justice, p. 159. 
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develop its capacity for ethical judgment, and as such it exposes his ambivalent view of the mind and 
its tendencies. 
After my examination of this critical work, I suggest that Godwin used his final novel Deloraine 
(1833) to draw out the socio-political implications of the connection he had made between novels and 
moral knowledge. Through direct engagement with contemporary debates about criminal justice and 
print culture, this work upholds confessional narrative as a means to the true ‘moral law’ that he 
believed legal institutions had eclipsed. Yet it also offers a nightmarish portrayal of institutional 
power over the mind’s moral sense, casting doubt upon the ability of individuals to transcend the 
moral and intellectual dictates of their inherited social climate. I conclude that Godwin’s later work in 
and about the novel form exposes a tension between his conviction in human perfectibility through 
book-reading and his concerns about the moral illiteracy of the reading nation.  
In Chapter Three (‘The Discipline of Reading’) I consider Godwin’s practical reading advice, found 
throughout his educational writings and correspondence over a period of forty years. In contrast to the 
many studies of Godwin’s pedagogy which assume these instructions are based upon the principle of 
freedom, I argue that they are best understood through the concept of discipline. I justify my approach 
by examining the roots of Godwin’s pedagogy in religious Dissenting education – specifically, the 
educational advice of a tradition within so-called ‘rational Dissent’, spearheaded by Philip Doddridge 
and Isaac Watts – in which the activity of reading became a new preoccupation, a focus of study (or 
discipline) in itself. Through their teaching methods, lectures and textbooks, these educators 
conceived of reading as a form of training, a discipline in the sense that applied to military, medical 
and moral regimes. 
I then argue that Godwin inherited this conception of reading as a discipline, both in the sense of a 
focus of study and in the sense of a training regime that moulded the habits and abilities of 
participants. I show that he remediated and adapted the Watts-Doddridge pedagogical tradition 
through his practical reading advice, presenting reading as a form of training which should be 
undertaken in accordance with principles of exposure, routine and skill. I ultimately suggest that if we 
recognise the centrality of discipline to Godwin’s advice, we elucidate the conflicted view of the 
human mind that he inherited. Through his instructions he expressed great confidence in the mind’s 
discriminating powers, yet also great fear of its adverse principles, such as passivity, distraction and 
rebellion. Godwin thus probed across many years the extent to which the mind was corruptible, and 
the extent to which it was perfectible. He also developed his key response to this ambiguity: an 
increasing investment in textual production (something explored in more depth in Chapter Five). 
My final two chapters explicate how Godwin’s writing about the book as a material medium provided 
an ongoing response to his equivocality surrounding the nature and power of the mind. I explore his 
comparative evaluations of media and his direct ruminations upon the printed codex, connecting them 
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to wider debates about truth, death and cultural memory. I ultimately claim that Godwin used the 
book-object itself as a gesture of faith in the necessary perfection of human minds. 
I argue in Chapter Four (‘Truth and Social Media’) that when Godwin depicted the social operation of 
media he was negotiating an ambivalent concept of ‘truth’ and its relationship to the human mind. I 
draw attention to the places in Political Justice, The Enquirer and Thoughts on Man in which he 
directly evaluates book-reading as a means of apprehending truth and compares its social operation to 
that of conversation. Most criticism to date identifies disparity between these passages, but I argue 
that they are united by a concern with temporal regulation. Godwin repeatedly argues that book-
reading and conversation, properly conceived, should work in harmony to balance the speed of 
intellectual exchange amongst members of society. Books are presented in terms of slowness, and 
speech is presented in terms of rapidity. 
The more he describes these roles of reading and speaking, however, the more they become 
ambiguous and qualified, raising questions about sources of epistemic authority. They are energised 
by an uncertainty concerning which factors determine the knowing process and to what degree. At 
times truth is at the mercy of its mediation, and at others medial channels are subservient to truth as a 
self-sufficient, self-manifesting force. I ultimately argue that Godwin’s assessments of media were 
exposing and probing an historically-resonant question: to what extent is truth dependent upon the 
activities, structures and mediation of social groups, and to what extent is it external to them? I 
suggest that Godwin inherited this ambivalence from the Dissenting culture in which he was 
educated, and explore its roots in a two-fold conception of truth that appeared throughout the 
educational and philosophical writing of the previous century. I thus situate Godwin’s writing about 
media within an alethic dialogue, and argue that this shaped his understanding of the book’s role in 
intellectual life. 
In Chapter Five (‘Books, Bodies and Monuments’) I claim that Godwin increasingly presented printed 
books as substitutes for human minds, a strategy that became most concentrated in his early 
nineteenth-century writings. He repeatedly figured books in terms of human bodies, and sometimes in 
terms of commemorative monuments, in order to express the idea that they were ongoing physical 
legacies of passed human minds. I begin with his Memoirs of the Author of A Vindication of the 
Rights of Woman (1798) and his Life of Geoffrey Chaucer (1803), showing that he presented these 
literary biographies as works that mediated personal presence: he claimed that they embodied a mind, 
which functioned as on ongoing member of intellectual community and thus had the power to 
instigate social change. Through his Essay on Sepulchres (1809) Godwin clarified and publicised this 
contention, tapping into contemporary debates about national identity and cultural memory in order to 
argue that great books had unique social presence and authority. His manuscript essay ‘On Death’ 
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(1810) brought this argument to its climax, claiming that books did not simply perpetuate human 
minds, but transformed them into something that transcended the limitations of human nature. 
My conclusion is that, faced with challenges to his theory of intellectual perfectibility, Godwin was 
refining a longstanding contention that print technology was key to the unleashing of human intellect. 
He was claiming that the book gave durable form to various aspects of the mind that would otherwise 
be destroyed by death; they were a way of harnessing the progress made by individual thinkers and 
staging it as cultural memory. I show that Godwin was responding to public debates about political 
economy, national identity and religious belief, which had all brought the reality of death to bear upon 
his claims about the necessary intellectual perfectibility of humankind. As he defended this conviction 
against its critics, I argue, he exploited the symbolic power of the book-object in order to cast death as 
the ultimate means of intellectual advance. I thus read Godwin’s nineteenth-century writings about the 




The Matter of the Reader: 
Materialism and Private Judgment 
 
Introduction 
‘Reading furnishes the mind only with materials of knowledge; it is thinking makes what we read 
ours’, wrote John Locke in 1706.1 He was claiming that good reading had both a material and an 
immaterial aspect. If reading was to be profitable – if the reader was to acquire intellectual substance 
from their materials – there must be an immaterial processing of material information or input. If 
reading stopped short of thinking, however, the reader could be considered in the same terms as a 
bookshelf. They were passive storage facilities, ‘furnishe[d]’ with ‘materials of knowledge’, yet 
lifeless. Locke’s dualism influenced the way many writers and educators described reading 
throughout the eighteenth century: Isaac Watts, for instance, argued that ‘if all your learning be 
nothing else but a mere amassment of what others have written […] I do not see what title your head 
has to learning above your shelves’.2 Like Locke, Watts was concerned to distinguish and develop the 
thought of his reader (‘your head’) in direct contrast to the material bulk of their library (‘your 
shelves’). This genesis of independent thought, he argued, was the raison d'être of reading, and it was 
what made the reader truly human. 
Almost a century after Locke, and after a Dissenting education that used both Locke and Watts as 
teaching texts, William Godwin troubled this distinction between thought and its materials in his 
popular novel Caleb Williams.3 Its second and third editions increasingly describe the protagonist’s 
mental life in materialist language, and this includes his early and formative experience of reading 
romances. ‘I read, I devoured compositions of this sort’, Caleb records in the third edition (1797). 
‘They took possession of my soul; and the effects they produced were frequently discernible in my 
external appearance and my health’.4 Reading has become a process of corporeal consumption, an 
explicitly physical activity by which books invade and manipulate his soul and body. Rather than 
marking a boundary between mind and text, Godwin describes a young man whose mind is 
                                                      
1 John Locke, Of the Conduct of the Understanding in Posthumous Works of Mr. John Locke: Viz. I. Of the 
Conduct of the Understanding. II. An Examination of P. Malebranche’s Opinion of Seeing All Things in God. 
III. A Discourse of Miracles. IV. Part of a Fourth Letter for Toleration. V. Memoirs Relating to the Life of 
Anthony First Earl of Shaftsbury. To Which Is Added, VI. His New Method of a Common-Place-Book, Written 
Originally in French, and Now Translated into English (London: printed by W. B. for A. and J. Churchill at the 
Black Swan in Pater-Noster-Row, 1706), p. 60. 
2 Isaac Watts, The Improvement of the Mind in The works of the late reverend and learned Isaac Watts, D.D 
[…], 6 vols (London: printed for T. and T. Longman, J. Buckland, et al, 1753), V, pp. 185-358 (p. 189).  
3 For details of the curriculum at Hoxton Academy, see Peter Marshall, William Godwin, pp. 33-45. 




overridden by his reading materials. Caleb is possessed by his books, rather than possessing them: he 
becomes, as it were, his shelves. 
In troubling the boundary between matter and mind in this way, Godwin established a conflict internal 
to his work that critics have been quick to notice. Across his writing, he argued that human beings had 
an innate capacity for independent intellectual activity or private judgment, and he continually upheld 
this capacity as the key to beneficial social change. Yet just as widespread was an image of the mind 
which appeared to be in danger of being enveloped by the mechanical realm of matter, rendering it 
powerless to escape the conditioning influences of its environment. In his fictional work especially, 
the inner lives of his protagonists are explicitly manipulated by the material, political and social 
conditions of their day, and remain trapped within them despite their attempts to render an impartial 
and reflective account of their experiences. As Marilyn Butler observes, Godwin’s novels seem to 
threaten the ‘conscious, sentient, unique individual’ which he relied upon in his philosophy.5  
In this chapter, however, I explore one way in which Godwin used the tension between mind and 
matter to both imagine and empower this ‘conscious, sentient, unique individual’. I argue that his 
descriptions of reading, in both fictional and non-fictional works, bring to the foreground an 
ambivalent or ‘double’ reading of mind that was integral to the philosophical and physiological 
writing of his time. Godwin exploited the uncertain line between literal and metaphoric meaning in 
the language of such works, and in this way he was able to emphasise both the formative power of 
corrupt social environments and the ability of the individual mind to escape its confines. In other 
words, I claim that Godwin was attuned to the ways in which ‘reading matter’ could be transformed 
through fiction from an intellectual problem into a space for imagining social possibility. 
I begin this argument by exploring Godwin’s ambivalent descriptions and definitions of ‘thought’ in 
Political Justice (1793), which were echoed throughout his corpus and revisited especially in the early 
1830s. I then show that this way of figuring mind was translated into his fiction, using Caleb Williams 
(1794) and Mandeville (1817) as case studies. I claim that Godwin used the slippery conceptual and 
linguistic framework of the mind in order to present a picture of the world in which necessity and 
perfectibility could work in tandem. He exploited the ambiguous nature of ‘thought’ in the 
contemporary imagination in order to expound upon the sinister power of material environments 
whilst simultaneously upholding the emancipatory potential of individual judgment. 
 
 
                                                      
5 Marilyn Butler, Jane Austen and the War of Ideas (Oxford: Clarendon, 1988), pp. 55, 58. Butler argues that 
Godwin partially succeeds in vindicating this ‘individual’, unlike the other writers of his literary circle. 
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Political Justice and the problem of thought 
Godwin’s Political Justice was based upon a founding assumption about the importance of 
independent thought, an ideal which he most frequently referred to by the loaded term ‘private 
judgment’.6 For Godwin, private judgment was not simply the result of an enlightened and 
emancipated society; it was the means of achieving it. ‘The proper method for hastening the decay of 
error, is not, by brute force, or by regulation,’ he contends, ‘but on the contrary by teaching every man 
to think for himself’.7 In every edition of the treatise he describes private judgment as ‘a doctrine […] 
unspeakably beautiful’, and his analyses of social institutions and customs always take the principle 
as their reference point. National assemblies, for example, are considered to be pernicious because 
they encourage a false sense of unanimity and thus foster intellectual passivity in the individual.8 
Significantly, Godwin writes about the activity of reading as essential to the development of private 
judgment. He contends that thorough engagement with ‘literature’ (in the generous eighteenth-century 
sense of the term) produces ‘salutary’ effects upon the mind, helping to disentangle it from prejudice 
and mistake.9  
Despite this foundational commitment to independent thinking, however, the mind is threatened from 
every side in Godwin’s Enquiry. Political institutions infect and corrupt human faculties to such an 
alarming extent that escape from prejudice is made to seem almost impossible. The influence of 
government ‘fastens itself upon us like an incubus, oppressing all our efforts’ towards independent 
judgment.10 There are social threats to its operation, too; everyday conventions of politeness, custom 
and ‘domestic tactics’ alienate people from ‘the pursuit of truth’.11 This paradox has been widely 
noted in the work of Godwin, Wollstonecraft and their literary-intellectual milieu, and is aptly 
described by Barbara Taylor as the ‘corruption/progression antinomy haunting eighteenth-century 
thought’, in which widespread belief in inevitable national and universal progress clashes with a 
plethora of ultra-negative analyses of current society.12 Chapter Four of this dissertation investigates 
such social threats in depth. 
In Political Justice, however, independent thought is troubled on a level more basic even than this. An 
epistemological threat develops over successive editions of the treatise, as Godwin increasingly uses 
the vocabulary of the materialist to describe the production of knowledge in the human mind. 
                                                      
6 For in-depth discussion of private judgment in Godwin’s work, see Mark Philp, Godwin’s Political Justice. 
For the resonance of ‘private judgment’ in eighteenth-century religious discourse, see Chapter One of Daniel 
Patrick L. Huang, ‘“Private judgment” in the Anglican writings of John Henry Newman (1824-1945)’, (doctoral 
dissertation, The Catholic University of America, 1996) ProQuest Dissertations Publishing. 
7 Godwin, Political Justice, p. 450. 
8 Ibid., pp. 76, 306-07. 
9 Ibid., pp. 14-15. 
10 Political Justice: Variants, p. 125. 
11 Political Justice, p. 120 (retained in all editions). 
12 Barbara Taylor, Mary Wollstonecraft and the Feminist Imagination (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2003), p. 162; Peter Marshall, William Godwin, p. 404. 
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Knowledge is a process of ‘impression’ from external forces, in which minds can be ‘ductile’, ‘stiff’ 
or ‘elastic’. Whilst he constructs the spread of truth in abstract, ethereal terms – ‘diffusion’, 
‘dissemination’ – practical encounters with ideas are corporeal and tactile. This language is peppered 
throughout the treatise from the earliest printed version, but it becomes more concentrated as the 
editions progress and more problematic for Godwin’s ideal of independent thought.13  
A good example of these troubling implications can be found in the section on ‘the Cultivation of 
Truth’, in which Godwin equates virtue with one’s ability to understand circumstances clearly in the 
mind. Where the first edition describes the need for ‘clear and distinct perception’ of these 
circumstances, in subsequent editions this is changed to ‘strong and vivid perception’.14 Godwin 
replaces an intellect which is imagined in visual terms, implying a degree of distance and 
independence from the circumstances under consideration, with one defined by the material force of 
impressions upon sensory faculties. This appears to problematize his ideal of the impartial thinking 
agent; rather than describing the mind as separate from the material processes of the body, it evokes 
the scientific discourse of corporeal cause and effect, implying that the human mind is at the mercy of 
impersonal external forces.  
The consequences of Godwin’s altered language in the example discussed above indicate that debates 
about matter and thought in this period were closely affiliated with debates about determinism. A 
great variety of British thinkers – from Ralph Cudworth and Humphrey Ditton to Thomas Reid – had 
argued that if mind was explained in terms of matter, it would legitimise the equation of human life 
with machinery, a position that became associated mid-century with the notorious L’Homme machine 
of La Mettrie (1748). Many feared that if the mind was not ascribed a dimension beyond matter, then 
human action would be understood as determined by the cause-and-effect conditions of the natural 
world. Free choice would be reduced to a psychological illusion, and the domain of ethics left largely 
redundant. It was for these reasons, as John Yolton has detailed, that eighteenth-century fascination 
with automata went hand in hand with a profound fear that modern science was ‘mechanizing’ 
humankind.15  
Godwin’s writing about the mind often appears to make just such a ‘mechanizing’ move. In the first 
edition of Political Justice he states: 
Though mind be a real and efficient cause, it is in no case a first cause. It is the medium 
through which operations are produced. Ideas succeed each other in our sensorium according 
to certain necessary laws. The most powerful impression, either from without or from within, 
                                                      
13 See Philp, Godwin’s Political Justice, for Godwin's changing language across successive editions of the 
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14 Political Justice, p. 143; Political Justice: Variants, p. 169. 
15 See John W. Yolton, Thinking Matter: Materialism in Eighteenth-Century Britain (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983), 
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constantly gets the better of all its competitors, and forcibly drives out the preceding thought, 
till it is in the same irresistible manner driven out by its successor.16  
This description of mind, in which ideas compete for prominence in a process akin to natural 
selection, positions the thinker as fundamentally passive. Ideas are received according to ‘necessary 
laws’, and the subject’s power to select them is limited. By the third edition, however, Godwin has 
altered the first sentence to read, ‘Though mind be a real and proper antecedent, it is in no case a first 
cause, a thing indeed of which we have in no case any experimental knowledge’.17 The mind can now 
only be known as an ‘antecedent’ rather than an ‘efficient cause’ – i.e., it precedes action, but it does 
not itself determine the nature of that action. This signals increased scepticism about the degree to 
which thinkers can be said to have agency, even in a secondary sense. The most powerful impressions 
imprint themselves upon the mind, and the thinker appears to be merely their receptacle.  
When it comes to reading, this approach to mental life seems to have sinister implications. If the mind 
is necessarily subject to the most powerful ideas that it encounters, are its judgments at the mercy of 
its reading matter? As Godwin describes his ideal of an intellectually virtuous community in the 
Enquiry, he does indeed appear to position the reader in a materialist’s universe: 
Having ventured to state these hints and conjectures, let us endeavour to mark the limits of 
individuality. Every man that receives an impression from any external object, has the current 
of his own thoughts modified by force; and yet without external impressions we should be 
nothing. We ought not, except under certain limitations, to endeavour to free ourselves from 
their approach. Every man that reads the composition of another, suffers the succession of his 
ideas to be in a considerable degree under the direction of his author. But it does not seem as 
if this would ever form a sufficient objection against reading. One man will always have 
stored up reflections and facts that another wants; and mature and digested discourse will 
perhaps always, in equal circumstances, be superior to that which is extempore […] 
conversation and the intercourse of mind with mind seem to be the most fertile sources of 
improvement.18  
The tension within Godwin’s approach to intellectual activity is clearly shown here. The reader is 
depicted as though at the mercy of external impressions, which battle for impact upon the mind. Their 
ideas are ‘modified by force’, suggesting reading to be a kind of coercion by which readers are 
manipulated by their materials. This language allows Godwin to explain the power and importance of 
reading according to contemporary systems of natural philosophy, yet it seems to eliminate from the 
picture any sense of the reader’s independence. At the same time, however, Godwin seems to suggest 
that such coercion can be a necessary, even positive, process. Because each person ‘will always have 
stored up reflections and facts that another wants’, reading is an activity of sharing, which enlarges its 
participants. It is ‘fertile’, an activity which generates something new in the mind and causes 
‘improvement’. In other words, whilst Godwin’s descriptions of mind as matter jeopardize his central 
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claims about the development of intellectual autonomy, he also strives to keep the reader-as-agent on 
centre stage. 
Interestingly, later editions of the Enquiry – in which the materialist language is most explicit – 
contain an insightful comment upon this very tension. In a discussion of education, Godwin remarks 
that: 
Multitudes will never exert the energy necessary to extraordinary [educational] success, till 
they shall dismiss the prejudices that fetter them, get rid of the chilling system of occult and 
inexplicable causes, and consider the human mind as an intelligent agent, guided by motives 
and prospects presented to the understanding, and not by causes of which we have no proper 
cognisance and can form no calculation.19  
The emancipatory energy necessary for intellectual independence is to be achieved, Godwin implies 
here, through an act of the imagination.20 We must renounce determinism and instead ‘consider the 
human mind as an intelligent agent’ – believe that this is the case – and by doing so, we will find 
ourselves transformed for the better. This act of belief is far from a naïve or unreasonable gesture: in 
fact, it is crucial for understanding Godwin’s depictions and discussions of reading in later works.  
Godwin’s explicitly stated model of the human mind in Political Justice allows for this imaginative 
operation. He was not quite a materialist or an immaterialist in the traditional senses of those terms; 
Peter Marshall describes mind and matter in Godwin’s view as ‘parallel interactive schemes’, but this 
perhaps fails to do justice to the complexity of his position.21 Godwin describes mind as a 
‘mechanism’ like the body, and allows that we can use the vocabulary of physical process to describe 
its operation, but he argues that we must understand it to be ‘a mechanism of a totally different 
kind’.22 There is an overt element of mystery at play here, which has an important function. Godwin 
argues that we cannot know exactly how thought produces physical consequences, but he claims that 
this realm of unknowing does not mean that it cannot produce them or that thought does not exist. In 
fact, he echoes Hume in claiming that we cannot empirically know how anything causes anything; 
habit simply leads us to assume that it does.23 
Godwin uses this idea to argue that we must believe that the mind transcends matter, even if we 
cannot prove it by empirical method. Mind must be ascribed a dimension beyond matter, because only 
this dimension enables us to explain some of the fundamental elements of human life, intellectual 
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22 Political Justice, p. 176. 
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agency being an example. A manuscript note reinforces this idea, suggesting that although thought is 
non-material, it is not immaterial – it is just as tangible as 'the vegetation & life of a plant', which 
cannot be materially located but nevertheless exists in the physical world.24 Godwin’s foray into 
physiology thus builds from the imperative to ‘consider the human mind as an intelligent agent’, and 
allows for this consideration through its deliberate ambiguity.   
Godwin was not unusual for these ideas about mind and matter; he was borrowing from and 
responding to many other thinkers in the long-standing debate about the nature of thought.25 Locke’s 
dualism, in which thought was essentially ‘superadded’ to matter by God, came under pressure early 
in the eighteenth century. Scientists and philosophers began to grapple with the physiological 
applications of what Newton termed ‘subtle elastic fluid’, a concept which appeared to problematize 
the nature of matter as traditionally conceived. If matter had aspects of what had formerly been 
considered the immaterial, was the latter realm still necessary to explain human experience of the 
mind? A wide range of thinkers increasingly described moral and intellectual activity in physiological 
terms.26 David Hartley, for example, investigated the relationship between ideas and nervous 
operation, and his explanatory discourse of vibration influenced British science and culture for 
decades. Although Hartley made a distinction between ideas and the material vibrations that 
supposedly corresponded with them, his claim about their correlation was often understood to blur the 
boundaries between thought and its materials. Joseph Priestley adapted Hartley’s account, breaking 
down the traditional distinction between ‘material’ and ‘immaterial’ – all matter, in his account, is 
porous and defined solely by forces of attraction and repulsion – and claiming that ‘thought’ is a 
property of a system of such matter (the nervous system).27  
Godwin wrote at a time in which the nature of thought was much debated, and during which many 
medically significant neurological discoveries occurred in Britain.28 His writings suggest that he 
largely espoused Priestley’s views, like many from Dissenting communities, and like Priestley he 
described himself as modifying Hartley’s system in order to avoid the ‘material automatism with 
which it was unnecessarily clogged’.29 His open or ambiguous view of the mind was also intended as 
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a means to side-step the problems he perceived in the accounts of reading and enlightenment 
produced by French philosophes with materialist leanings, many of whom Godwin read and admired. 
Helvétius’s Essays on the Mind (1758), for example, describes the predicament of the poor labourer 
who ‘prefers the blue library, to the writings of St. Real, Rochefoucault, and cardinal de Retz’ and 
needs to be awakened to his ‘true interest’ in advancing the welfare of society through political and 
social reform.30 The means by which the labourer might transcend the affinity of his ideas to his 
uninspiring reading matter is conspicuously lacking in Helvétius’ materialist framework, however. 
The mechanics of the intellect render reading choice a matter of ‘attachment’, implying that the reader 
is ultimately passive and unable to change their ideas. Godwin confronted this problem as a student at 
Hoxton Academy and his during his early years as a writer, becoming convinced that, if the activity of 
reading was to be given emancipatory potential, then thought must be considered in some way 
independent of matter. 
Another key influence upon the way Godwin used materialist language, and perhaps the most 
significant for understanding his enduring confidence in independent thought, is the way in which 
physiological vocabulary was operating in works of empiricist philosophy. Brad Pasanek describes 
the eighteenth century as being ‘in the grips of an indirect or figurative empiricism’, according to 
which the mind was understood through ‘metaphors drawn from the sensuous impressions’.31 Locke’s 
Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690), for example, had described knowledge production 
in terms of sensation and reflection, using verbs such as ‘impress’ and ‘strike’ to conjure up an 
explanatory picture of the genesis of ideas – yet Locke did not intend his work to be an anatomy of 
ideas. Indeed, he almost apologises for his discussion of physical sensation, admitting, ‘I have […] 
been engaged in physical inquiries a little further than perhaps I intended’.32 Locke’s corporeal 
language of ideas hovers between the metaphorical and the literal. As Ann Jessie Vant Sant observes, 
his work represents ‘a fusion of traditional metaphor with the natural scientist’s and the physiologist’s 
understanding of sensation […] despite Locke’s deliberate avoidance of the physicality of sensation, 
he cannot do without its vocabulary’.33  
Whilst this ambiguous signification of sensuous discourse may have allowed Locke to avoid a 
problem, it became a feature of more sceptical empiricist works. David Hume’s Treatise on Human 
Nature (1739-40) capitalises on the limits of human knowledge, maintaining that ‘Nothing is ever 
                                                      
30 Claude Adrien Helvétius, De L’Esprit: Or, Essays on the Mind, and Its Several Faculties (London: Vernor, 
Hood, and Sharpe, 1810), pp. 51-53. 
31 Brad Pasanek, Metaphors of Mind: an Eighteenth-Century Dictionary (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 2015), p. 21 (emphasis mine). 
32 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 7th edn, vol. 1 (London: printed for J. Churchill 
and Samuel Manship, 1715), p. 102. 
33 Ann Jessie Van Sant, Eighteenth-Century Sensibility and the Novel: The Senses in Social Context 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 90. 
 
25 
present to us but our perceptions’.34 All we experience of reality, according to Hume, is a succession 
of vivid impressions in the theatre of the mind. Undermining the common anti-materialist argument 
which claimed matter could never give rise to thought (and therefore that the substances must be 
distinct), Hume asserted that as far as our knowledge goes, ‘any thing may be the cause or effect of 
any thing’; our idea of causation derives only from an experience of constant conjunction.35 The 
nature and cause of the impressions in our mind, whether material or immaterial, can never ultimately 
be known; and the question of whether the language of ‘impression’ is literal or metaphoric must 
therefore be eternally ambiguous. This ambiguity proves essential, in Hume’s Treatise, for the 
pragmatics of living. Although there is very little ground, according to its system, for proving notions 
such as individual agency, personal identity and moral value to be things-in-themselves rather than 
social fantasies, he concludes that the philosopher must act as if they were in order to live practically 
in the world. In everyday life the sceptic is obligated to ‘yield to the current of nature’ and ‘live, and 
talk, and act like other people in the common affairs of life’.36 The language of ‘impression’ for Hume 
thus takes on an element of extra significance than it does for Locke – the relationship of its imagery 
to reality cannot be known, but Hume insists that we assume it to have explanatory power, or else 
cease to function as social beings.  
Godwin was by no means a Humean philosophically speaking: he remained committed to a view of 
‘truth’ as an objective entity, something which was external to the knower and had great 
epistemological authority.37 Yet his language of matter in Political Justice elicits and participates in 
the deliberately ‘figurative empiricism’ of Hume’s Treatise. By describing mind in materialist terms, 
its formation could be articulated in a manner that had currency in the contemporary philosophical 
environment, and he could stress the formative power of material circumstances in his account of 
human intellect. Yet the overtly ambivalent status of his vocabulary – is it literal, metaphorical, or 
somehow both? – allows Godwin to imagine and assert what he cannot prove: his sacred ideal of 
independent thought. Thought is couched in physiological language, and is more than analogous to 
matter, and yet it escapes the confines of the material system through its mysterious nature as a 
mechanism ‘of a totally different kind’.38  
Godwin’s celebration of the emancipatory power of reading in the Enquiry was thus founded upon a 
discourse of matter drawn from eighteenth-century science and philosophy, just as much as it was 
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problematized by such discourse. He continued to negotiate the tension in Humean style, as his 
treatment of the mind-matter theme almost forty years later, in Thoughts on Man (1831), strongly 
suggests. ‘The mind may aptly be described under the denomination of the ‘stranger at home’’, 
Godwin argues in his opening essay ‘Of Body and Mind’: 
Where [the mind] resides we cannot tell, nor can authoritatively pronounce, as the apostle 
says, relatively to a particular phenomenon ‘whether it is in the body, or out of the body.’ Be 
it however where or what it may, it is this which constitutes the great essence of, and gives 
value to, our existence […]39 
Godwin appeals once again to mystery as he addresses the nature of the mind. His quotation from 2 
Corinthians 12 associates it with religious experience, a real aspect of human life that lies both within 
and beyond the scope of human knowledge. The great value and meaning that the mind has for human 
life, he argues, has a sort of obvious authority; it trumps physiological or philosophical conclusions 
about the nature of matter. Godwin spells this out in his later essay ‘Of the Material Universe’, 
directly echoing Hume: 
The speculator in his closet is one man: the same person, when he comes out of his 
retirement, and mixes in intercourse with his fellow creatures, is another man. The 
necessarian […] proves to his own apprehension irrefragably, that he is a passive instrument 
[…] But no sooner does this acute and ingenious reasoner come into active life and the 
intercourse of his fellowmen, than all these fine-drawn speculations vanish from his 
recollection. He regards himself and other men as beings endowed with a liberty of action 
[…] Nature is too strong, to be prevailed on to retire, and give way to the authority of 
definitions and syllogistical deduction.40 
The double standard of the materialist is adjacent to that of the necessarian: both are different men in 
the studious ‘closet’ to those that they are in everyday life. Godwin uses this discussion to contend 
that all persons must imagine themselves to be intellectual agents – they must act as though this is the 
case – no matter what theoretical conclusions about materialism or determinism they reach in private. 
As we shall see, this imaginative pragmatism, and its implications for the language used to describe 
acts of reading, took on an explicit role in his fictional works.   
 
Reading matter in Caleb Williams and Mandeville 
Descriptions of childhood reading feature in each of Godwin’s full-length novels, and one of the 
functions they perform is to place the matter of the mind upon centre stage. Perhaps the most striking 
example of this is found in the changes Godwin made to the opening of Caleb Williams in its second 
and third editions (1796, 1797). In the first edition Caleb is described as being ‘engrossed’ by reading 
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as a child, ‘neglect[ing] no means of information from conversation or books’.41 The second edition 
inserts a new paragraph, which describes how he ‘delighted to read of feats of activity’ and connects 
this propensity to his supple and vigorous physical frame.42 The 1797 text further expands this 
account, and its changes are retained in subsequent editions. It details at length how Caleb’s mental 
disposition and reading matter mutually reinforce each other, culminating in irresistible cravings: 
The spring of action which, perhaps more than any other, characterised the whole train of my 
life, was curiosity. […] In fine, this produced in me an invincible attachment to books of 
narrative and romance. I panted for the unravelling of an adventure with an anxiety, perhaps 
almost equal to that of the man whose future happiness or misery depended on its issue. I 
read, I devoured compositions of this sort. They took possession of my soul; and the effects 
they produced were frequently discernible in my external appearance and my health.43  
Caleb’s mental and physical faculties overlap here to an alarming extent. His mind (‘soul’) and body 
(‘external appearance’) are together shaped by his reading material. This preference for ‘books of 
narrative and romance’ has an uncertain origin: it is partly determined by a prior internal disposition 
of curiosity, partly by his athletic physique, and partly generated by the activity of reading itself – the 
books themselves ‘took possession of my soul’. The passage positions his reading experience as a 
process of positive feedback, with its precise genesis uncertain. Godwin’s use of the term 
‘attachment’ encapsulates this ambiguity: it implies both material connection (the mind’s fusion with 
its educative environment) and subjective bias (a preference for one thing over another). What kind of 
attachment is Caleb’s attachment to his books? Can mental and physical attachment be distinguished? 
The origins and nature of mental and physical states collide in this account of reading experience. 
This growing preoccupation with the effects of reading upon his protagonist’s appearance and 
personality corresponds to the changes of language in Political Justice explored above: in both texts, 
matter seems to encroach upon mind. Godwin revised both texts for new editions during the same 
period in the mid-1790s (the second and third editions of Political Justice were published in 1796 and 
1798). These years also saw the publication of The Enquirer (1797), a collection of essays on 
‘Education, Manners, and Literature’, which describes the process of reading using similar corporeal 
language and addresses the issue of literary determinism head-on.44 As the 1790s progressed, the 
boundary between the sensory and the intellectual became increasingly hard to distinguish across 
Godwin’s work, raising questions about the individual’s capacity for independent thought. A close 
look at scenes of reading in Caleb Williams and Mandeville suggests to us one reason why Godwin 
made the problem of intellectual determinism such an explicit theme in his fiction. 
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Upon an initial reading, the language and plot of Caleb Williams suggest that its characters are 
materially determined, unable to transcend their formative environmental conditions and exercise 
independent thought. Caleb’s reading experiences appear to govern his personality and the trajectory 
of his life. The process of attachment, consumption and possession quoted above, in which racy 
reading matter literally inscribes itself onto his body, conditions his mental character to be ‘irresolute 
and pliable’.45 This parallels, even merges with, his physical characteristics: his limbs are often 
described as flexible and active, and his body lends itself to manipulation and disguise from an early 
age. Throughout the novel, his mind is portrayed in similarly material terms, as pliable, 
impressionable and ductile.46 The love of action and novelty instilled through his engagement with 
books even determines his mental temperature: he is frequently characterised by the ‘burning’, 
‘boiling’ and ‘glowing’ of an inflamed imagination.47 
The materials of Caleb’s mind consequently determine the passionate and impetuous way that he 
responds to events and makes decisions. Despite his frequent resolve to display ‘firmness’ and 
‘unalterable constancy’, he describes his mental experience as akin to being blown about and driven 
by powerful winds, each one driving out the other with superior force.48 An early example of this 
behaviour is found when Thomas is sent to fetch Caleb after his first departure from the Falkland 
estate. Initially Caleb describes in the strongest terms his conviction that to return would be 
impossible: ‘I have taken my resolution […] all the world shall never persuade me to alter’. Upon 
reading Forrester’s letter, however, he experiences a dramatic U-turn in his ideas, and resolves to 
return with Thomas immediately. ‘The letter overwhelmed every quality of my mind’, Caleb records; 
‘The ideas it suggested had a tendency to fill the mind, and shut out the possibility of competition’.49 
This description signifies the processes of mind in spatial terms – ideas fill, shut out and overwhelm 
like wind or waves. It evokes Godwin’s account in Political Justice of the genesis of ideas by mental 
impressions: ‘The most powerful impression […] constantly gets the better of all its competitors, and 
forcibly drives out the preceding thought, till it is in the same irresistible manner driven out by its 
successor’.50 Caleb appears to be at the mercy of external impressions, which battle for impact upon 
his mind. Any independent conviction or resolve that he reaches – any hope of private judgment – 
seems to be instantly overridden. 
For all his energy and enthusiasm, then, Caleb is positioned as passive. His early encounter with 
books is presented as a process of material formation, which determines the dispositions of his mind 
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and body and generates the impetuous curiosity that governs his actions. Many of Godwin’s textual 
revisions for later editions of the novel emphasise this dynamic further. Where the first edition 
describes Caleb as impelled by ‘an unconquerable necessity’, for example, later versions read ‘a tide 
of unconquerable impulse’.51 Godwin replaces the abstract concept of necessity with tangible and 
physical ‘impulse’, locating Caleb’s sense of determinism in a material realm of cause and effect. His 
matter has been formed by his educational environment – most powerfully, by his reading materials –  
apparently precluding the effective development of private judgment. 
This supremacy of matter over mind appears to be equally the case for Falkland. As a young man he 
‘imbibed the love of chivalry and romance’; like Caleb’s undisciplined ‘devouring’, his childhood 
reading is a process of physical incorporation.52 These tales of chivalric tradition, combined with a 
classical education and a fascination with the histories of ‘great men’, shape him into a staunch 
upholder of tradition, a patron of the ancien régime. Moreover, just as Caleb’s mental and physical 
characteristics merge together through his reading practice, the materials of Falkland’s mind manifest 
themselves in his body. He is often described as ‘inflexible’, ‘rigid’ and ‘cold’, terms that apply both 
to his mental disposition and his physical features.53 Indeed, by the time Caleb becomes his secretary, 
his fraught battle to preserve chivalric ideals has become ‘inscribed in legible characters upon his 
countenance’.54 Capitalizing on the various meanings annexed to the eighteenth-century term 
character, Godwin depicts Falkland according to the literal, older sense of a typographical mark, 
suggesting that the stamp of his material environment has determined his personal characteristics.55 
Like Caleb, he is ultimately depicted as critically passive, for he is physically ‘inscribed’ by his 
material circumstances; he has been written upon by his reading material. 
When Caleb and Falkland meet in the final scene, they are extreme physical confirmations of the 
mental dispositions that their reading experiences have set in train. Caleb is wild and chaotic, whilst 
Falkland is shrivelled, hardened and corpse-like.56 Although their reconciliation may be interpreted as 
signalling the possibility of a change in opinions, their characters remain true to the end. Falkland is 
still ‘the fool of honour and fame’, for he cannot survive without being ‘the guardian of [his] 
reputation’, and promptly dies.57 Caleb’s reasoning remains subservient to impulse and enthusiasm, 
epitomised by the fact that he finally becomes possessed by Falkland’s reputation worship. He 
concludes by stating his allegiance to Falkland’s tale, subverting his original statement of narrative 
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intent with his claim that he finishes the memoirs ‘that thy story may be fully understood’.58 Once 
again his pliable mind has been usurped by the most powerful impression; he is arguably just as 
defeated as he was in the original manuscript ending, in which he was left drugged and incarcerated. 
Both the language and plot of Caleb Williams signal that its two main characters have been at the 
mercy of their reading materials. With ‘things as they are’, any hope of autonomous intellectual 
enquiry seems remarkably slim. When mind is described in terms of matter, reading becomes a 
malign and inhibiting activity. 
Twenty years later, Godwin intensified this picture of intellectual determinism in his thrillingly dark 
Mandeville (1817). The trajectory of childhood reading had become a trope in Godwin’s novels: St 
Leon (1799) is enslaved to ‘the first lesson imprinted upon my infant mind’ (the love of fame), and in 
Fleetwood (1805) early bookish isolation instils in the protagonist a stubborn and misanthropic cast of 
mind, which engenders tragic consequences.59 Yet Godwin depicted Mandeville as determined by his 
material environment and trapped within his mental dispositions more overtly than any of his other 
characters. He exploited the gothic potential of his determinist theme, using it to consider the 
experience of religion and mental illness in ways that prefigured James Hogg’s Private Memoirs and 
Confessions (1824). In Mandeville, the supremacy of matter over mind established in Caleb Williams 
appears to have reached a gloomy climax. 
From Mandeville’s opening pages, Godwin’s narrator-protagonist constructs an account of his 
character formation in explicitly material terms. Describing the details of his childhood residence, he 
observes that  
they insensibly incorporated themselves as it were with the substance of my mind; and my 
character, such as it was afterwards displayed, owed much of its peculiarity to the impressions 
I here received.60  
This comment merges together different kinds of ‘substance’. The material features of the house, the 
reclusive and strange personalities which populate it, the sombre violence of the waves against the 
rocks below – all converge in the mind of the young man, producing formative ‘impressions’. These 
forces confound any distinction between body and mind, for Mandeville’s physical appearance takes 
on the tenor of his environment in tandem with his intellectual disposition. In suggesting that his 
‘character’ may be read in its subsequent display, Mandeville here portrays his life as irrevocably 
stamped by the particulars of its context. Like Falkland, his mind and body are conformed together in 
accordance with his educational environment.  
Once again, a key aspect of this environment is reading material: 
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A book that my preceptor particularly recommended to my attention, was Fox’s Acts and 
Monuments of the Church; nor did I need much persuasion to a study, to which my temper 
inclined me, and which occasions that sort of tingling and horror, that is particularly inviting 
to young persons of a serious disposition. In this tremendous volume the engravings 
eminently help to inforce the dead letter of the text. The representation of all imaginable 
cruelties, racks, pincers and red-hot irons […] combined with my deep conviction that the 
beings thus treated, were God’s peculiar favourites […] produced a strange confusion and 
horror in my modes of thinking, that kept me awake whole nights, that drove the colour from 
my cheeks, and made me wander like a meagre, unlaid ghost, to the wonder and alarm of the 
peaceable and well-disposed inhabitants of my uncle’s house.61  
In this description, both text and image engrave themselves into the young Mandeville’s mind. The 
Book of Martyrs has an almost coercive effect, ‘inforc[ing]’ the substance of its pages upon the 
reader, manipulating not just his thoughts but his very ‘modes of thinking’. In a similar fashion to 
Caleb, the incorporation of reading matter into mental substance is visibly manifested, expressed 
through his skin colour, constitution and bodily stature, reinforcing the idea that reading is a process 
of physical possession. Godwin’s own attitude towards this particular text corresponds well to his 
novel’s image of readerly subjection: in an unpublished draft on the composition of history he bitterly 
attacked the Acts and Monuments for its propagandistic bias and dubious sources, contending that it 
manifested the common tendency for ‘a book of reasonable dimensions, of a grave & measured style’ 
to smuggle prejudice to its audience undetected.62 Mandeville’s reading experience of this weighty 
tome instils just such a disposition of latent hatred, leading him to embody its horror and gloom. The 
Book of Martyrs is integral to his mental and physical identity, welding both together. 
This sharing of substance that Mandeville experiences during childhood is presented thereafter in the 
novel as something that has irrevocably determined his character, trapping him in a dark trajectory of 
jealousy and isolation against which he is powerless. The narration is littered with retrospective 
reflections that call this process to mind, and the plot is frequently interrupted with seemingly 
impotent laments: ‘What a being I was, and for what a fate I was reserved!’ Terms such as ‘fate’ and 
‘destiny’ are ubiquitous, and Mandeville’s retrospective speculations include the claim that his 
‘character was fixed’, suggesting that he cannot escape his materially determined state.63 Indeed, he 
frequently reflects upon the early formation of his mind in terms of physical deformity: 
There were certain muscles of my intellectual frame that had never been brought into play; 
there were arteries of my heart through which the blood never rushed. My character was 
withered: not chilled; but dried, and stiffened, and changed to a yellow, death-like hue, like 
the confected carcasses of ancient Egypt. […] My education I had derived from a formal, 
rigid, pedantic, pharisaical priest. Other inmates of the roof under which I dwelt I had had 
                                                      
61 Ibid., p. 52. 
62 ‘On the Composition of History; An Occasional Reflection’, n.d., Oxford, Bodleian Library, Abinger 
Collection, MS. Abinger c. 29 Fols. 5-16 (7-8). 
63 Mandeville, p. 307. 
 
32 
none, except my unfortunate uncle, and his servants, who were more like automata, than 
human beings.64  
Here Mandeville reflects upon the formation of his mind through the language of the body. Certain 
‘muscles’ and ‘arteries’ of his immaterial person have been deprived of use and sustenance, left to 
wither. Images of lifeless bodies – mummified corpses and automata – reflect both the mechanistic 
framework in which Mandeville’s life is imagined (he has no intellectual independence or vitality), 
and the uncanny effects to which it is put. Eventually, the distorted natures of his intellectual and 
bodily identities fully align through the literal disfigurement of the novel’s final scene. Mandeville 
ends his tale with a climactic assertion of possession, similar to that of Caleb Williams: ‘Clifford had 
set his mark upon me, as a token that I was his forever’.65 This final surrender into past tense, 
combined with the imagery of branding, reinforces the novel’s characteristic sense of no return. 
Reviewers of Mandeville were quick to identify this dark picture of material trajectory as the work’s 
central concern, and many considered it to be in conflict with the reformist views of Godwin’s 
political philosophy. Percy Shelley aptly captured the impression that the novel gave to its first 
readers: 
The events of the tale flow on like the stream of fate, regular and irresistible, and growing at 
once darker and swifter in their progress; – there is no surprise, there is no shock; we are 
prepared for the worst from the very opening of the scene, though we wonder whence the 
author drew the shadows which render the moral darkness every instant more profound and, 
at last, so appaling [sic] and complete.66  
Shelley’s sense of wonder and profundity at Mandeville’s exploration of material determinism was 
not shared by the majority of reviewers, most of whom were repulsed rather than thrilled. Their 
comments identify a contrast between Godwin’s ideal of reform through independent thought in 
Political Justice and his bleak depiction of historical and social determinism in Mandeville. One 
writer suggested that Godwin’s repeated analyses of ‘whatever is deplorable in the constitution of 
society’ had led him to despair of his system, and accused him of ‘complaining of, and railing at, what 
he cannot hope to reform’.67  
Notably, however, this review equates Godwin’s own conception of reality with the constructions of 
his fictional narrator. In one respect it pinpoints the paradox of corruption and progress that all 
Godwin’s novels explore, yet it is also driven by assumptions about the nature and method of the 
reform that he hoped his work would achieve. In what follows, I show that Godwin presented the 
materially dictated lives of Caleb and Mandeville within a framework of perfectibility. His novels, I 
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argue, trade upon the double reading of thought that Political Justice established. As Jon Klancher 
puts it, they bring ‘Godwin on Possibility’ to the fore, by using ‘the sign of fiction and its possible or 
virtual worlds’ as a mode or symbol of social redress.68 In other words, at the same time that Godwin 
used his novels as troubling windows into interior lives, he also used them to imagine and assert the 
social possibility of independent thought by exploiting the ‘figurative empiricism’ introduced in his 
philosophical work.  
Godwin’s mode of first-person narration provides the framework in which this figurative empiricism 
comes to the fore. Caleb and Mandeville are made the authors of explicitly subjective accounts, tales 
which derive their energy from the narrators’ internal responses to their circumstances. The novels 
adapt a tradition of confessional perspective that was pioneered by Defoe a century earlier, placing 
psychological experience at the helm of the drama. This context thus renders the sensory language of 
the mind an experiential language: Godwin’s narrators communicate the felt nature of social 
formation. Godwin goes further than this, however, for he creates narrators that are overtly flawed and 
unstable in mind. Mandeville’s disturbing psychological condition casts his explanation of childhood 
events into doubt, for example, and the open-ended conclusion of his tale invites speculation as to its 
import. Caleb’s constant fluctuation in convictions and opinions, culminating in the dramatic reversal 
in his interpretation of his own story, performs a similar function. We are even encouraged to read his 
entire history of Falkland in the first volume with caution, given that he admits he cannot vouch for its 
veracity.69 Through his narrators, Godwin presented tales of psychological experience rather than 
authoritative histories of events. 
This experiential mode of narration thus implicitly upholds the possibility of private judgment by 
interpolating the reader themselves as a judge. Godwin’s novels deliberately provoke multiple and 
conflicting readings; as Pamela Clemit writes, they place the ‘burden of interpretation and decision’ 
upon the reader.70 This feature is exemplified by the central mystery devices of Caleb Williams and St 
Leon, by which the elusive contents of Falkland’s chest and St Leon’s alchemical secret become sites 
of endless conjecture for readers inside and outside the narratives, appropriated in ways that 
drastically alter interpretations of their ‘confessions’. As St Leon moves through history he is at times 
a philanthropic hero and at others a manipulative villain, and Falkland’s chest symbolises the 
unrealised promise of what Caleb calls a ‘faithful narrative’ – a definitive version of events.71 The 
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reader is thus invited to invent this ‘faithful narrative’ for themselves, to judge and interpret the 
accounts they have received. 
This narrative context matters for our discussion because it manoeuvres the language of mental 
development in Caleb Williams and Mandeville into a realm of possibility and speculation. In other 
words, Godwin recruited his fictional form in order to provoke double readings of matter even more 
explicitly than he had done in Political Justice. The ambiguous metaphorical status of words such as 
‘impulse’, ‘impression’ and ‘character’ allows for open-ended readings of character development: the 
terms express the formative nature of material circumstances, yet also reflect subjective experience, 
inviting readers to judge for themselves the authority and scope of the formative conditions that Caleb 
and Mandeville recall. This dual perspective is evident in Mandeville’s account of his childhood 
influences:  
they insensibly incorporated themselves as it were with the substance of my mind; and my 
character, such as it was afterwards displayed, owed much of its peculiarity to the impressions 
I here received.  
The substances of mind and matter here are analogous (‘as it were’), and although felt to be literally 
incorporated into one another, can be described as distinct. Moreover, Mandeville uses overtly 
performative language to describe his development: he considers his character ‘such as it was 
afterwards displayed’, evoking the most literal meaning of display in Godwin’s time, ‘to unfold to 
view’ like a banner or naval signal (OED). Godwin exploits the ambiguity of materialist discourse, 
describing circumstances that tangibly impact upon Mandeville’s personal development and yet he 
simultaneously implies that this may not be the complete picture. 
These novels thus allow us to read matter in two ways: as a literal confinement in the material realm 
on the one hand, and as an experience of formative coercion in a prejudiced society on the other hand, 
which may be reinterpreted and transcended by future enquirers. Godwin’s own summary of his 
authorial aims in a letter to The British Critic in 1795 appears to reinforce this view of his speculative 
ends. He claims that his goal was ‘to disengage the minds of men from prepossession, and launch 
them upon the sea of moral and political enquiry’.72 His novels solicit the reader’s imagination by 
confronting them with questions concerning the conditions of character development – to what extent 
is Caleb, or Mandeville, active rather than passive as an actor in the narrative? – and by doing so 
encourages them to realise the invitation of Political Justice, to ‘consider the human mind as an 
intelligent agent’. Godwin was exploiting the ability of fiction to raise questions about the formation 
of the individual in the current state of society through his use of this mind-matter debate and its 
associated language.  
                                                      




Reading matter as social critique 
I have already indicated that there was a critical dimension to Godwin’s use of materialist language in 
his novels. In what follows, I argue that his sensuous depictions of reading were in fact central to his 
ongoing argument against the acceptance of socio-political convention. By describing the reading 
mind as mechanical, passive and determined, Godwin positioned its social conditions as 
dehumanising. He was arguing that the ultimate and pernicious effect of institutions such as class and 
religion was their inhibition of intellectual agency, which for him was the very essence of human 
identity. This strategy was borrowed by other writers in his literary circle of the 1790s, most 
prominently by Mary Hays, and I use examples from their work below to illuminate Godwin’s 
understanding of the relationship between reading and social critique. 
Contemporary criticism often addresses the appearance of passive readers in Godwin’s novels as 
secondary motifs – correlations of prior observations about social institutions. In Isabelle Bour’s 
interpretation of Caleb Williams, for example, the reading experiences of Caleb and Falkland are 
considered simply as indicators of their a priori mentalities, by which they participate in the 
conventions of their station.73 I demonstrate below, however, that the activity of reading was not an 
after-thought for Godwin, thrown in to back up an argument about class; his depictions of class are 
secondary to fundamental assumptions about reading. The materialist discourse that he uses positions 
his argument about class as a conclusion drawn from debates about the nature of humanity more 
widely. Godwin exploited the ambiguous nature of mind-matter language in order to imply that class 
systems, which promote limited and stratified educational environments, are dehumanizing. They 
disfigure the development of private judgment, as symbolised by Mandeville’s disfigured face. 
The activity of reading was such a point of interest in Godwin’s fiction because, as I have shown, he 
understood it to be integral to the formation of the human person. Indeed, his novels suggest that all 
have the basic capacity to develop mental abilities through reading by depicting the fact of bookish 
formation amongst working class (Caleb) and upper class (Mandeville) alike. Godwin’s nonfictional 
works made it clear that books had a special power to direct and exercise the mind, which rendered 
them a vital means of developing the faculty of private judgment. The Enquirer, for example, 
describes the generation of an infant’s independent thinking through education in terms of a pseudo-
spiritual ‘awakening’. Biblical metaphors abound in descriptions of the mind’s response to good 
pedagogy: the potter forming clay, the sower sowing seeds, the instructor breathing a soul into an 
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unformed mass like God’s original creative act. Throughout these descriptions, Godwin positions 
interaction with literature as the defining feature of humanity: 
Books are the depository of every thing that is most honourable to man. Literature, taken in 
all its bearings, forms the grand line of demarcation between the human and the animal 
kingdoms.74  
Godwin contends that the generation of independent thought, especially though reading, is what 
makes human beings human. Indeed, he does not hesitate to describe the intellectually unformed or 
anti-literary as animalistic (the ‘wild beast’ Barnabas Tyrell makes a good example).75 It was this 
conviction that underlay his reformist agenda: true reform would come about through the ‘conquest of 
the judgment’. Anything less than this – anything that encouraged the mind to be passive – ‘reduc[ed] 
men to the state of machines’.76  
If reading was considered an escape route from such dehumanising passivity of mind, then why did 
Godwin link them together in his fiction? The particular ways in which books trouble his protagonists 
suggest that he was making a point about the nature of social prejudice. In the current state of society, 
he implies, reading becomes disassociated from the formation of private judgment and instead 
becomes a tool of manipulation. Falkland’s elitist environment warps his mind towards the quixotic 
and destructive ideals of his chivalric tales; Caleb’s untutored upbringing suffers his mind to 
overindulge in the thrills of adventure, generating a hastiness of character which might have been 
balanced by a more disciplined and wide-ranging textual diet; Mandeville’s narrow religious climate 
encourages hatred and prejudice to the extent of insanity.77 Godwin uses the language of matter and 
necessity to describe their mental lives in order to suggest that these conditions have indeed 
‘reduc[ed] men to the state of machines’. Religious bias and class norms distort mental development, 
turning persons into passive, dependent beings. Only a new social order which respects foremost the 
operation of individual judgment, he implies, will redeem the humanness of humanity. It is a reversal 
of the ‘closet’ situation described in Thoughts on Man: in lived experience Caleb and Mandeville are 
positioned in the realm of necessity, described as subject to the forces of their social environments, 
yet from a position of speculative remove they offer the possibility of independence to their readers. 
Godwin’s use of reading for the purpose of social critique is further clarified when we consider its 
adoption and adaption by others. The most notable example is Mary Hays, a writer in the Joseph 
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Johnson publishing circle and one of several women to whom Godwin became literary advisor in the 
mid-1790s.78 Hays’s semi-autobiographical novel Emma Courtney (1796) drew directly from 
Godwin’s use of reading in Caleb Williams, employing a troubled reader-protagonist to comment 
upon the pernicious nature of social convention. Hays also borrowed heavily from her discussions of 
philosophy with Godwin, which had centred around questions of personal agency. Like Godwin, Hays 
exploits materialist language in her novel in order to raise questions about the ability of individuals to 
transcend the state of ‘things as they are’. Yet the social evil to which she drew attention was one that 
she believed Godwin had neglected: gender convention. 
Emma Courtney describes her own character as determined by material impressions, in a similar 
fashion to Caleb and Mandeville. She sets out the narrative to describe 
the irresistible power of circumstances, modifying and controuling [sic] our characters, and 
introducing, mechanically, those associations and habits which make us what we are; for 
without outward impressions we should be nothing.79 
This account of materialist determination, signified by the language of ‘associations’ and 
‘impressions’, frames the novel from start to finish, depicting Emma as trapped within predetermined 
dispositions and tendencies. The novel relates her struggle to negotiate the tensions between an overly 
sentimental disposition and a rigidly stratified community, in which patriarchal values determine 
socially sanctioned behaviour.  
Emma’s disposition is fashioned, in a large part, by reading material. At her most formative age she 
develops an ungoverned penchant for novels from the circulating library: ‘Every day I became more 
attached to my books’, she records, to the extent that she ‘devoured’ them.80 Her reading is a 
corporeal experience of attachment and impression that echoes much of The Enquirer and the 1797 
Caleb Williams, and Hays similarly incorporates the vocabulary of ingestion, indicating that the 
assimilation of pages involved in Emma’s intellectual formation is a physical and vulnerable process. 
This initial, unchecked consumption of sentimental tales grates against Emma’s subsequent 
engagement with classical history and metaphysical enquiry through the works of Plutarch and 
Descartes, for her fundamental tendency towards sentiment has been irrevocably set. Agony results: 
the uneven reading diet produces an irrevocable fault line between ‘rational’ and ‘sentimental’ matter, 
which compose her mind like layers of sediment. ‘I went through, by my father’s direction, a course 
of historical reading, but I could never acquire a taste for this species of composition’, she relates; 
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though it sometimes inspired ‘pleasure and enthusiasm’ it mostly left her ‘fatigued and disgusted’, 
craving the solace of poetry and fiction.81 
The internal conflict that this reading produces in Emma’s mind also determines an external social 
conflict. Whilst she ardently desires to participate in the rational detachment and critical autonomy to 
which Mr Francis (a Godwinian philosopher figure) urges her, the sentimental bedrock of her 
disposition renders these exhortations impotent and obsolete. Emma is trapped within herself, unable 
to process or progress beyond her all-consuming feelings for Harley. The material language of the 
mind positions her as a passive character, like Caleb and Mandeville; she is unable to escape the 
‘modes of thinking’ initially instilled through her reading material. 
Emma’s disqualification from the ‘masculine’ arena of critical autonomy is understood by many 
critics to signal a fundamental disagreement with or departure from Godwin’s work. Marilyn Brooks, 
for example, argues that Emma Courtney turns the Godwinian exhortation to rational enquiry into ‘a 
public debate about an inadequate discourse’; it points out the felt incompetence, she suggests, of 
Godwin’s entire theory of social change through rationality.82 This claim assumes that Emma’s 
sentimental temperament is fully endorsed by Hays (which is far from clear), and also takes for 
granted that Godwin’s social theory excludes sentiment (which is untrue). Brooks accurately 
pinpoints a perceived problem concerning the process of individual reform, but this problem is one 
with which both Hays and Godwin were centrally concerned. Just like Godwin, Hays describes 
Emma’s intellectual formation in vividly material language in order to raise questions about the extent 
to which certain kinds of people can develop critical autonomy: she holds the discourse of reform up 
to scrutiny. In doing so, the novel performs a similar function to Caleb Williams and Mandeville, 
portraying the formation of private judgment in current society to be a brutal struggle. The experience 
of individuals such as Emma, the work suggests, testifies to the sinister power of material 
circumstances. Like Godwin, Hays paints a dark picture of ‘things as they are’. 
Moreover, just as Godwin’s novels celebrate human potential for independent thought, Emma 
Courtney expresses confidence in the positive power of reading through its narrative frame. Emma’s 
story is an epistolary ‘confession’ to her son, who remains a textually absent figure, a symbol of a 
new generation. Through this addressee the novel appeals to external judgment: the future reader is 
urged to ‘exercise your understanding, think freely, […] Rouse the nobler energies of your mind’.83 
Such overt summons to critical reinterpretation continue until the final pages, in which the novel’s 
future readers are imagined as harbingers of intellectual emancipation: 
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Posterity will plant the olive and the laurel, and consecrate their mingled branches to the 
memory of such, who, daring to trace, to their springs, errors the most hoary, and prejudices 
the most venerated, emancipate the human mind from the trammels of superstition, and teach 
it, that its true dignity and virtue, consist in being free.84 
Rather than espousing determinism, Hays’s narrator prophesies autonomy. New generations of 
readers will attain to the freedom of private judgment, despite the bleak depiction of such 
opportunities in Emma’s life. As they trace the sources of error in her educational circumstances their 
minds will develop beyond the material realm; independent thinking will be realised. Alongside 
Godwin’s novels, then, Emma Courtney transcends the confining language of matter, and asserts the 
triumph of individual thought. 
In a similar manner to Godwin, then, Hays used her conviction about bad reading to critique the social 
station of her fictional character. This similarity has been overlooked by contemporary criticism of 
Emma Courtney, much of which presumes that Hays’s interest in reading is derivative from her 
critique of gender conventions.85 One recent study, for example, argues that the problem of mental 
passivity addressed in Emma Courtney is an exclusively female one; assuming that Hays’s feminist 
convictions led her to react against a popular discourse in which women were portrayed as more 
intellectually vulnerable than men, the author conflates this stance with Hays’s protagonist, claiming 
that Emma becomes an example of how ‘through disciplined reading, women can achieve the status 
of free and rational subjects’.86 Another study similarly conflates Hays’s own belief in the social value 
of ‘intelligent and discriminating reader[s]’ with her depiction of Emma’s reading practices, 
attempting to reclaim the protagonist as ‘as active reader’ who courageously subverts gendered 
expectations.87 These readings both overlook the specific physiological and philosophical discourse 
about mind and matter that Hays exploits, which positions Emma’s character struggle alongside that 
of a Caleb or a Falkland. In other words, the woman tends to come before the reader, but for Hays 
social norms are harmful because they disrupt reading. Hays and Godwin both argued through their 
novels that the uniquely human faculty of private judgment was distorted by social restrictions upon 
education. 
Reading was used as a similar mode of critique by other writers in Godwin’s literary-intellectual 
circle. Mary Wollstonecraft’s assertion of men and women’s equal capacity to develop their mental 
faculties, for example, led her to castigate the current social situation in which women’s reading was 
commonly limited to romances and behavioural instruction books. This textual diet, she argued, 
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promoted intellectual feebleness and triviality. Whilst advocating reading as a key means of female 
emancipation, then, her work simultaneously analyses in scathing detail the role of books in 
perpetuating the eighteenth-century woman’s ‘infantine’ position. Like Godwin, she indicates the 
need for a transformation of reading practice that will actualise books’ potential to precipitate 
intellectual and social reform.88 Along similar lines, Elizabeth Inchbald depicts her protagonist Miss 
Milner in A Simple Story (1791) as intellectually superficial through her concern for the material 
appearance of books rather than their content – ‘you will be vastly pleased with them when you see 
how elegantly they are bound’ – using this faulty relationship as evidence, in the final pages, that her 
father should have ‘bestowed upon his daughter A PROPER EDUCATION’.89 Gender norms are harmful 
in these works because they disrupt reading equality, rather than the other way around. Their primary 
concern is the growth of the human mind through literary engagement. 
A corollary of this observation is that, contrary to what might be assumed, depictions of passive 
reading in Godwin’s and Hays’s fiction are not dependent upon the genre or textual content of the 
books being read. Whilst novels shape the characters of Caleb and Emma in particular ways, for 
example, the basic fact of textual influence does not depend upon their being novels. As we’ve seen, 
Emma’s disposition is formed through her reading of Plutarch as well as her library fare: her troubles 
don’t come from novels per se but from her unbalanced education, a topic Hays expounded upon in 
her earlier Letters and Essays (in which she refused to condemn, as a principle, the reading of popular 
romances).90 Hays’s social critique hinges upon a model of human nature that positions the activity of 
reading as central to selfhood, first and foremost, and this is the basis upon which observations about 
literary form or gendered education rely. The same was true for Godwin: Caleb is damaged not 
because he reads tales of romance, but because his reading of such tales is obsessive and 
unbalanced.91 
Godwin’s fiction reflected his foundational conviction about the human capacity to realise 
independent thought through reading, and this was shared and illuminated by his literary circle of the 
1790s. The perpetuation of social and educational inequality between men and women, between 
landed gentry and the working class, between those of different religious sects – these were portrayed 
as social ills because they were understood to channel the formative power of reading into unnatural, 
limited avenues, rendering it a power that distorted human flourishing. Godwin used the ‘double 
                                                      
88 Mary Wollstonecraft, A Vindication of the Rights of Woman, ed. by Janet Todd (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1994), pp. 71-75. Cf. Taylor, Mary Wollstonecraft and the Feminist Imagination, pp. 71-72 (in which 
Taylor discusses the connection Wollstonecraft perceived between female novel-reading and the sexual 
immorality of mind and body). 
89 Elizabeth Inchbald, A Simple Story, ed. by J. M. S. Tompkins (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 
146, 338. 
90 Hays, ‘Letter to Mrs. -- on Reading Romances, &c’, in Letters and Essays, Moral, and Miscellaneous 
(London: printed for T. Knott, 1793), p. 90. 
91 See Chapter Two for discussion of the novel form in Godwin’s work, and Chapter Four for further 
consideration of different kinds of reading matter in Caleb Williams. 
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reading’ which the concept of thought allowed in order to portray the dark power of social prejudice 
alongside the possibility of change. 
 
Conclusion  
Through his fiction and his philosophy, Godwin persistently engaged with debates about the 
relationship between matter and thought in order to make an argument about the nature and operation 
of reading. His work shows that the distinctive value of independent thought, which Locke had 
described as the essential characteristic of good reading practice at the beginning of the eighteenth 
century, was still being upheld by reformist writers at the beginning of the nineteenth. In the midst of 
intellectual controversy – and in some cases extreme scepticism – about the nature and operation of 
the mind, Godwin used his work as a platform for imagining the possibility of intellectual agency and 
social change through reading. 
In doing so, Godwin was developing a recognised feature of eighteenth-century writing. The problem 
of matter and thought had been integrated into mid-century sentimental fiction, for example; David 
Fairer has shown that the acknowledged mystery of the matter-thought relationship gave rise to a 
celebration or excess of meaning-making through physical signs in the novels of Henry Mackenzie 
and Laurence Sterne.92 Godwin built upon this idea of excess or possibility in order to defend and 
uphold his belief in intellectual perfectibility. He placed an act of the imagination at the heart of his 
concept of private judgment, and used this to fuel and undergird his practice of novel writing. For 
Godwin, imaginative literature could use the language of matter to serve an ideal of mind. 
Godwin’s work also demonstrates, however, a new commitment to bringing to public attention 
perceived social threats to such intellectual independence. He exploited materialist discourse in order 
to argue that the development of autonomous intellect was disabled in lived experience. Social power 
structures fostered, for Godwin, the passive acceptance of prejudice: they produced readers who, like 
Caleb and Mandeville, were unable to transcend the confines of their pages. He thus represented 
reading as an activity that simultaneously troubled and emancipated humankind, presenting human 
intellectual experience from two contrasting perspectives. 
This chapter has explored one way in which Godwin approached the novel as a special means of 
intellectual insight and emancipation. The following chapter turns to directly consider his theory of 
the novel form, as expressed at the beginning and the end of his career. I find at its centre a similarly 
twofold conception of human intellect: Godwin invests great hope in the mind’s innate capacity to 
                                                      
92 See David Fairer, ‘Sentimental Translation in Mackenzie and Sterne’, Essays in Criticism, 49.2 (1999), 132-
51, and Butler’s discussion of sentimental fiction in Chapter One of Jane Austen and the War of Ideas. 
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The Ethics of Novel-Reading:  
Fiction and Moral Law in the 1830s 
 
Introduction  
William Godwin ended his preface to the 1832 edition of Fleetwood on a disturbing note. After giving 
a lengthy retrospective account of the composition of his most famous novel, Caleb Williams, he 
recollected the experience of one of its first readers: 
Thus I have endeavoured to give a true history of the concoction and mode of writing of this 
mighty trifle. […] And, when I had done all, what had I done? Written a book to amuse boys 
and girls in their vacant hours, a story to be hastily gobbled up by them, swallowed in a 
pusillanimous and unanimated mood, without chewing and digestion. I was in this respect 
greatly impressed with the confession of one of the most accomplished readers and excellent 
critics that any author could have fallen in with (the unfortunate Joseph Gerald). He told me 
that he had received my book late one evening, and had read through the three volumes 
before he closed his eyes. Thus, what had cost me twelve months’ labour, ceaseless heart-
aches and industry, now sinking in despair, and now roused and sustained in unusual energy, 
he went over in a few hours, shut the book, laid himself on his pillow, slept and was 
refreshed, and cried, 
            ‘To-morrow to fresh woods and pastures new.’ 1 
Godwin was appropriating a long tradition of gustatory metaphor (‘gobbled’ ‘swallowed’) in order to 
present novels as disposable commodities, things consumed for temporary pleasure and then 
discarded.2 He evokes the idea that novel-readers – even those who are otherwise ‘accomplished 
readers and excellent critics’ – allow their fictional fare to bypass the mind, and to feed only the 
sensations of the body. In fact, Godwin’s description of eating ‘without chewing or digestion’ turns 
this into a deliberately absurd picture. Such a mindless way of reading, he implies, is as pointless as 
dining without a digestive system. 
Earlier in the preface, Godwin had described his original ambition for the work in strikingly different 
terms. In the glow of success that he had experienced following the publication of Political Justice, he 
was ‘unwilling to stoop to what was insignificant’, and thus said to himself, ‘I will write a tale, that 
shall constitute an epoch in the mind of the reader’.3 He envisaged the novel in direct collaboration 
with the improvement of human minds, a work that would ensure ‘no one, after he has read it, shall 
ever be exactly the same man as he was before’. These lofty hopes jar with Godwin’s subsequent 
description of the work’s reception: the text he had hoped would induce an ‘epoch’ in the mind of the 
reader becomes instead fuel for ‘vacant hours’, an inconsequential time-filler. The preface thus 
                                                      
1 Godwin, Preface to Fleetwood: or, The New Man of Feeling, in Collected Novels and Memoirs, v, p. 12. 
2 See Denise Gigante, Taste: A Literary History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005). 
3 Preface to Fleetwood, pp. 8, 10. 
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provokes a question about the place of novels and novel-reading in Godwin’s conception of 
intellectual perfectibility. As he reflected upon his literary career at the end of his life, had he lost 
faith in the power of fiction to benefit the mind? Garrett Sullivan claims that he had, and that this 
preface shows a more general ‘pessimism regarding print culture’ which had enveloped him as his 
career progressed.4 
In this chapter, I argue by contrast that Godwin’s writing of the early 1830s brought to a climax a 
career-long attempt to situate novel-reading within a framework of moral perfectibility. I show that 
his prefaces to Cloudesley (1830) and the Bentley’s Standard Novels edition of Fleetwood (1832) 
remediated and developed the ideas of his 1797 draft essay ‘Of History and Romance’ in order to 
claim the novel as a unique source of moral knowledge. In doing so, they contributed to a growing 
public discourse that allied fiction-reading to ethics, one of the many factors that helped to ‘elevate’ 
the novel form socially.5 Yet I show that these writings also reflect Godwin’s dark view of the state of 
the human mind in contemporary society: they bring to the fore his anxieties about shallow writers 
and passive readers who waste or abuse the moral potential of their materials. His approach to the 
novel was based upon an assumption about how the reader’s mind should interact with certain kinds 
of prose in order to develop its capacity for ethical judgment, and as such it exposes his ambivalent 
view of the mind and its tendencies. 
After examining this critical work, I argue that Godwin used his final novel Deloraine (1833) to make 
the socio-political implications of his argument about novels and moral knowledge explicit. Through 
its direct engagement with contemporary debates about criminal justice and print culture, this novel 
crystallises Godwin’s vision of how confessional fiction could reclaim the true ‘moral law’ that he 
associated with the emancipation of independent thought. Yet it also offers a nightmarish portrayal of 
institutional power over the mind’s moral sense, casting doubt upon the ability of individuals to 
transcend their inherited social climate of intellectual dependence. Deloraine is thus integral to 
Godwin’s critical discussion about the social role of prose fiction in the early 1830s, and unearths 
some of the key factors underlying his ambivalent depictions of readers. I conclude that Godwin’s 
later work in and about the novel form exposes a tension between his conviction in human 
perfectibility through book-reading and his concerns about the moral illiteracy of the reading nation. 
 
                                                      
4 Garrett A. Sullivan, ‘“A Story to Be Hastily Gobbled Up”: “Caleb Williams” and Print Culture’, Studies in 
Romanticism, 32.3 (1993): 323-37 (p. 337). 
5 The language and concept of ‘social elevation’ here are indebted to the work of Ina Ferris, especially 
‘Transformations of the Novel - II’, in The Cambridge History of English Romantic Literature, ed. by James 
Chandler (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 473-89, and The Achievement of Literary 
Authority: Gender, History, and the Waverley Novels (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991). See also William 
Warner, Licensing Entertainment: the Elevation of Novel Reading in Britain, 1684-1750 (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1998). 
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1. Novels and the Mind 
The novel in the 1790s  
Godwin claimed several times in the 1790s that the novel was a crucial vehicle for engendering the 
kind of thinking that led to social reform. One of his best-known articulations of this position 
appeared as a letter to the editor of the British Critic in 1795, in which he replied to an accusation by 
one of the paper’s correspondents that his goal in writing Caleb Williams had been to ‘throw an 
odium on the laws of my country’. Godwin’s response was to claim an intention ‘of much greater 
magnitude’. The object of Caleb Williams, he stated, was ‘to disengage the minds of men from 
prepossession, and launch them upon the sea of moral and political enquiry’.6 In this statement he 
connects the mind, specifically, to the development of moral and political good. Novels can stimulate 
independent thought in their readers, he implies, which is the first step towards reforming the ethical 
priorities and social structure of modern life. It was a vision that Godwin reiterated in more general 
terms in his preface to The Enquirer, describing himself as ‘persuaded that the cause of political 
reform, and the cause of intellectual and literary refinement, are inseparably connected’.7 
Anticipating demand for a second Enquirer volume, Godwin drafted an essay in 1797 which made a 
more detailed case for ‘that species of literature, which bears the express stamp of invention, and calls 
itself romance or novel’. ‘Of History and Romance’ is concerned with ascertaining which sorts of 
prose narrative are best suited to improving the minds of readers (‘My first enquiry is, Can I derive 
instruction from it?’).8 Godwin contrasts different styles of narrative history in order to make a 
comment about the unique potential of narrative fiction to benefit readers. He begins by criticizing 
abstract accounts of nations as ‘dry and frigid’, arguing that historiography is at its best when it 
facilitates personal encounters between readers and characters:  
The men I would study upon the canvas of history, are men worth the becoming intimately 
acquainted with. […] Superficial acquaintance is nothing. A scene incessantly floating, 
cannot instruct us; it can scarcely become a source of amusement to a cultivated mind. I 
would stop the flying figures, that I may mark them more clearly. There must be an exchange 
of real sentiments, or an investigation of subtle peculiarities, before improvement can be the 
result. There is a magnetical virtue in man, but there must be friction and heat, before the 
virtue will operate.9 
Godwin uses the language of visual portrait here (‘canvas’, ‘scene’, ‘figures’) to make a connection 
between detailed textual characterisation and the moral improvement of readers. If the author fleshes 
out the actors of their narrative, they will facilitate ‘an exchange of real sentiments’: an intimate 
encounter between reader and character which will draw out and develop the readers’ moral 
                                                      
6 ‘To the Editor of the British Critic’, 7 June 1795, in The Letters of William Godwin, I, pp. 116-17. 
7 The Enquirer, p. 79. 
8 ‘Essay of History and Romance’, in Political and Philosophical Works, V, pp. 290-301 (pp. 297, 298).  
9 Ibid., pp. 290, 292, 294. 
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knowledge (‘magnetical virtue’). Godwin employs a discourse of moral sentiment that had been 
precipitated mid-century by the ethical theories of Scottish Enlightenment thinkers – notably Adam 
Smith in The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759) – according to which human capacity for 
imaginative sympathy was posited as the basis of a shared ‘moral sense’.10 The vocabulary of the 
body was often used to describe this sentimental experience, reflecting the ambiguous line the concept 
trod between philosophy and physiology. Godwin exploits this language here, contrasting the ‘dry and 
frigid’ experience of reading abstract national histories to the ‘friction and heat’ engendered by 
character studies. The latter sort of prose encourages the reader to imaginatively identify with the 
text’s subject, triggering the same moral sentiment that would be facilitated by a real interpersonal 
encounter. Godwin had already capitalised on this idea in his Enquirer essay ‘Of An Early Taste in 
Reading’, which uses the same derogatory phrase – ‘superficial acquaintance’ – to invest great 
intellectual and moral value in the idea of intimate friendship with one’s reading matter.11 
Such character focussed historiography is inevitably speculative, Godwin notes, rendering it a sort of 
fiction in its own right. But the line between fact and fiction is far from clear: ‘True history consists in 
a delineation of consistent human character, in a display of the manner in which such a character acts 
under successive circumstances’. In other words, Godwin argues that real histories are those which 
give a detailed account of the relationship between character, context and action, using a specific 
individual to illustrate something general and timeless. It follows from this, he claims, that novelists 
are in fact the best historians, for they have far more scope to render their accounts convincing and 
thus give them representative power. ‘The writer of romance […] is to be considered as the writer of 
real history’, Godwin announces:  
The writer of romances collects his materials from all sources, experience, report, and the 
records of human affairs; then generalises them; and finally selects, from their elements and 
the various combinations they afford, those instances which he is best qualified to pourtray 
[sic], and which he judges most calculated to impress the heart and improve the faculties of 
his reader. In this point of view we should be apt to pronounce that romance was a nobler 
species of composition than history.12  
First this idealised romance writer ‘collects’ and ‘generalises’, gathering a broad range of evidence 
about human nature and events; then he ‘selects’, distilling his evidence into specific characters and 
‘instances’, which will represent something true from the whole. In this sense, Godwin argues, his 
work is a real history of human experience. Godwin also firmly situates his activity in a framework of 
                                                      
10 Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, ed. by D. D. Raphael and A. L. Macfie (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1976). Cf. Isabel Rivers, Reason, Grace, and Sentiment: a Study of the Language of Religion and Ethics 
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imagination, see Chapter Three. 
12 ‘Essay of History and Romance’, pp. 301, 299. 
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moral perfectibility, for the aim of a good novel is to ‘impress the heart and improve the faculties’. It 
is not simply that the novelist is able to give a better psychological portrait, and thus portray the 
human condition more vividly, than the historian. The real advantage lies in the relationship this 
opens up between reader and textual subject, the ‘exchange of real sentiments’. By presenting the 
reader with true-to-life characters, the novelist is able to engender the sort of ‘friction and heat’ 
between reader and subject that will initiate and develop their ‘magnetical virtue’ or moral sense. 
Godwin is far from sanguine about the social reality of novels and novel-reading in this essay, 
however. As he introduces his conception of the novel’s contribution towards moral improvement, he 
pauses to make a preliminary qualification in his argument. ‘This sort of writing has been exposed to 
more obloquy and censure than any other’, he notes, and concedes that this is partly justified when 
one assesses the novel ‘as an object of trade among booksellers’. He describes with evident disdain a 
‘class of readers, consisting of women and boys, and which is considerably numerous’, who require ‘a 
continual supply of books of this sort’. Because of this demand from lesser educated persons, writers 
and booksellers have become undiscriminating in what they produce; for athough few novels make a 
fortune, ‘There is scarcely one by which some money is not gained’. This is the reason why the whole 
form is fallen into disrepute, Godwin explains, and why ‘such works are rarely found to obtain a place 
in the collection of the gentleman or the scholar’. He concludes that we must distinguish between true 
and false novels if we are to make a moral case for the literary form. ‘The critic and the moralist […] 
[have] taken into their view the whole scum and surcharge of the press’, but ‘I should consider only 
those persons who had really written romance, not those who had vainly attempted it.’ If we are to 
benefit from the opportunities for intellectual and moral improvement that the novel offers, Godwin 
implies, we must divide the literary field into two categories: real novels (which benefit the mind) and 
pseudo-novels (which don’t).13 
As the essay draws to a close, Godwin complicates this picture further by suddenly arguing that all 
novels inevitably fall short of their moral potential. Hard on the heels of his proclamation that 
romance is true history, he announces ‘a deduction to be made from this eulogism’, because the 
production of true romance is a task for which the faculties of even the best novelist are incompetent. 
The writer of abstract history at least implicitly acknowledges that ‘events are taken out of his hands 
and determined by the system of the universe’; the novelist, however, ‘is continually straining at a 
foresight to which his faculties are incompetent, and continually fails’. To accurately portray the 
relationship between character, context and action is impossible: ‘to tell precisely how such a person 
would act in a given situation, requires a sagacity scarcely less than divine.’ Godwin concludes, 
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48 
therefore, that ‘To write a romance is a task too great for the powers of man’. True novels actually lie 
out of reach.14  
The final paragraph of ‘History and Romance’ makes an ambivalent move towards situating this in a 
trajectory of perfectibility. Godwin suggests that the failure of novels and novelists reflects the reality 
that all ‘the sciences and the arts of man are alike imperfect’, constantly in progression towards 
something better. This is the situation that we have to work with, he implies; we need to confront the 
reality of mismatch between aspiration and reality in the current state of society. The tensions inherent 
to the novel in fact encapsulate the defining tension of human life for Godwin, according to which 
minds are caught between forces of corruption and perfection.15  
 
The novel in the 1830s  
‘Of History and Romance’ was not published in Godwin’s lifetime, but its ideas did surface publicly 
in his preface to Cloudesley (1830). Cloudesley was the first novel that Godwin had produced since 
Mandeville in 1817, and was composed during a period in which he was revisiting his previous 
fictional work pending its republication in the Bentley’s Standard Novels collection. Godwin’s 
reading records from this time suggest a renewed interest in the novel form more generally: diary 
entries for 1829 include novels by Daniel Defoe, Henry Mackenzie, Ann Radcliffe, Elizabeth 
Inchbald, Walter Scott, Edward Bulwer Lytton, and James Fennimore Cooper (amongst others). 
Cloudesley’s preface makes a case for the novel in a manner similar to ‘Of History and Romance’, 
though more concise. Godwin begins by identifying the shortcomings of historical narrative, subtly 
developing his previous account by placing greater emphasis upon the internal dimensions of 
character: 
[N]o man thoroughly understands himself: how then is it to be expected, that the historian, 
who looks at him through a narrow aperture, and sees but a small part of his thoughts, his 
words and his actions, should arrive at a sounder result? 
The conventional historian, Godwin argues, is barred from access to real knowledge about the persons 
whose lives they record. Their understanding of internal character or selfhood necessarily remains 
inadequate, because their task only allows for ‘a narrow aperture’ into past lives. This is a 
shortcoming, for Godwin, because it ‘render[s] the attempt to pass a sound judgment upon the 
characters of men to a great degree impossible’. In other words, neither writer nor reader have the 
inside information that they need in order to arrive at moral knowledge.16  
                                                      
14 Ibid., p. 301. 
15 Ibid. 
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Godwin then introduces his previous claim that ‘The writer of romance […] is to be considered as the 
writer of real history’: 
When the creator of the world of imagination, the poet, or writer of fiction, introduces his 
ideal personage to the public, he enters upon the task with a preconception of the qualities 
that belong to his being, the principle of his actions, and its necessary concomitants. […] In 
this sense then it is infallibly true, that fictitious history, when it is the work of a competent 
hand, is more to be depended upon, and comprises more of the science of man, than whatever 
can be exhibited by the historian […].17  
Fiction discloses greater knowledge of human nature than so-called historical writing, Godwin argues, 
because the author has greater freedom to unveil and explore the very things that make their agents 
human: qualities of being, principles of action, webs of contingency. Interestingly, these are the 
principles that Political Justice had claimed were neglected by the contemporary legal system and yet 
were essential to sound ethical judgment. In a discussion of criminal justice, Godwin had argued that 
the legal system, by its very nature as an institution, could not take into account the individuality of 
each accused person and their unique set of formative circumstances (see below for further 
discussion). By maximising these elements of human existence and eliciting the judgment of the 
audience upon their particular manifestations in plot and character, fiction could thus provide a better 
means of moral literacy than other social codes. In this sense, Godwin argues, it ‘comprises more of 
the science of man’ than anything pretending to be factual.  
This link between Cloudesley’s preface and Political Justice is important because it underscores the 
fact that the Godwin of the 1830s continued to place the life of the individual mind at the helm of his 
ethics.18 This position stemmed from his basic assumption about humanness, that humans were 
distinguished from animals and from machines by their perfectible intellectual lives. He had critiqued 
institutional law in Political Justice along these lines: by ‘reduc[ing] men to intellectual uniformity’, 
the law was ‘reducing men to the state of machines’.19 We see the same logic involved in Godwin’s 
critique of historical narrative. His call to ‘stop the flying figures’ was about rescuing past lives from 
the sort of ‘superficial acquaintance’ that effaced their personhood. Cloudesley’s preface makes this 
explicit through a comparison of page and stage, according to which the novelist contributes more to 
the moral development of society than the dramatist because he has more scope to render the unique 
details of intellectual life: he ‘explains the inmost thoughts that pass in the bosom of the upright man 
                                                      
17 Ibid., pp. 7-8. 
18 In this respect, his work participated in a more general preoccupation with individuality, which is now 
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and the perverse’.20 The connection Godwin was making between the life of the mind and moral 
perfectibility was picked up by Cloudesley’s reviewers. He ‘makes the analysis of our inmost 
thoughts the materiel for melioration of the human species’, one reader noted.21 
In his introduction to the 1832 edition of Fleetwood, Godwin further developed this claim about the 
moral significance of disclosing a character’s ‘inmost thoughts’, connecting it to the specifics of 
narrative technique. During a retrospective account of the composition of Caleb Williams, he explains 
his choice of first-person mode by allying it to the ‘science of man’ that Cloudesley’s preface had 
described: 
I began my narrative, as is the more usual way, in the third person. But I speedily became 
dissatisfied. I then assumed the first person, making the hero of my tale his own historian; and 
in this mode I have persisted in all my subsequent attempts at works of fiction. It was 
infinitely the best adapted, at least, to my vein of delineation, where the thing in which my 
imagination revelled the most freely, was the analysis of the private and internal operations of 
the mind, employing my metaphysical dissecting knife in tracing and laying bare the 
involutions of motive, and recording the gradually accumulating impulses, which led the 
personages I had to describe primarily to adopt the particular way of proceeding in which 
they afterwards embarked.22 
Godwin was justifying his choice of confessional narrative by casting it as a facilitator of the sort of 
moral knowledge he had described in ‘History and Romance’ and the preface to Cloudesley. First-
person perspective gives readers access to the complex relationships between character, context and 
action: it exposes ‘the private and internal operations of the mind’, ‘the involutions of motive’, and 
‘the gradually accumulating impulses’ that underlie human events. This intimate portrait thus engages 
the reader’s moral faculties by encouraging them to imaginatively identify with the character, and by 
giving them the inside information they need in order to interpret and judge the character’s actions. 
Godwin uses the language of physical science – ‘dissecting’, ‘analysis’, ‘recording’ – in order to lend 
authority to his enterprise. This sort of fictional narrative, he implies, is the real ‘science of man’. 
Through all these comments, Godwin was participating in a longstanding public debate about the 
moral significance of novel-reading. His work represents one aspect of a critical movement in the 
early nineteenth century, which strove in various ways to link the sensitive reader of fiction to the 
sensitive reader of the moral landscape. In the essay ‘On The Origin And Progress Of Novel-Writing’ 
(1810) that prefaced her selection of eighteenth-century reprints The British Novelists, Anna Barbauld 
claimed that novels not only generate pleasure, but also ‘have had a very strong effect in infusing 
                                                      
20 Preface to Cloudesley, p. 8; Godwin makes Shakespeare an exception to this rule. For Godwin’s attitude to 
drama more generally, see David O’Shaughnessy, William Godwin and the Theatre (London: Pickering & 
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21 [Edward Bulwer-Lytton], ‘Cloudesley, by the Author of Caleb Williams’, in The New Monthly Magazine and 
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principles and moral feelings’.23 William Hazlitt explored this notion further in his Lectures on the 
English Comic Writers (1819), arguing that through novels we ‘imbibe our notions of virtue and vice 
from practical examples, and are taught a knowledge of the world’. We gain this knowledge not from 
the ‘professed moralist’, but from ‘the painter of manners’, who ‘gives the facts of human nature, and 
leaves us to draw the inference’.24 There is a clear similarity to Godwin’s ideas here, in the 
assumption that the simple apprehension of human experience (‘the facts of human nature’) will be 
morally formative.  
Contemporary historians and critics consider this kind of discourse integral to the novel’s social 
elevation in the early nineteenth century – its journey from an unrespectable form to one with 
recognised literary authority and public value. Ina Ferris has shown that the novel in the 1810s and 
20s attempted ‘deliberate self-alignment with non-fictional genres’ and argues that this was an 
attempt ‘to harness for itself the cultural power of modern fact and to transform itself into a properly 
public genre’. Godwin’s language of ethics, along with his language of history, was an endeavour to 
ally his fiction to other genres of writing with greater social weight, and he thus participated in a 
wider movement of elevation. Indeed, the very contexts of this growing body of critical comments 
about the novel (prefaces, essays, lectures, reviews) are significant. They show that the novel was 
becoming a form with a history, deemed worthy of theorising, which could be organised into 
respectable collections. 25 
This social and material context helps us to understand Godwin’s choice of ending to his 1832 preface 
to Fleetwood. This was his own critical introduction in a reprint collection of ‘classics’ – Henry 
Colburn and Richard Bentley’s Standard Novels – a collection which was conceived according to a 
‘conscious editorial policy to secure revised texts and new Prefaces in which the author’s mature 
judgment was passed on his earlier work’.26 In the early 1830s, then, Godwin was professionally 
required to reflect once again upon his fictional craft, and this time he was speaking into a context in 
which the novel was rapidly rising in public grace. His emphasis was thus less upon defending the 
moral status of the form as a whole (as it had been in 1797), and more upon criticising those readers 
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who missed its moral potential. He built from some of his essays in Thoughts On Man, written during 
the late 1820s, which in various ways made good reading a fundamental condition of moral 
knowledge.27 
Godwin’s closing description of the way in which Caleb Williams was ‘hastily gobbled up’ by ‘boys 
and girls […] in a pusillanimous and unanimated mood’ is thus best understood as an ironic comment 
about the prevalence of shallow reading practice, intended to expose, in David McCracken’s words, ‘a 
certain class of readers’.28 He echoes the anxieties he had expressed in his essay ‘Of History and 
Romance’ about the ‘class of readers, consisting of women and boys’, who lacked discrimination and 
thus lowered the standard of the novel’s production and reception. His lengthy preceding account of 
compositional labour, and the projected intellectual and moral implications of his aesthetic choices, 
renders the ending deeply bathetic. His novel-readers lack ‘digestion’ – they consume the story but 
fail to process it, fail to extract moral nutrition from the lives that it contains. As he contrasts the 
author’s ‘twelve months’ labour’ with Gerrald’s one-evening binge, Godwin presents such reading 
practice as a travesty to his Standard Novels readers.  
Yet the inclusion of Joseph Gerrald also troubles the boundaries of this reading ‘class’. Gerrald was a 
political reformer and member of the London Corresponding Society, with whom Godwin had had 
close acquaintance before his trial for sedition in 1794 and eventual deportation in 1795.29 He was 
thus apparently the ideal reader for Caleb Williams, one well attuned to the social and political ideas 
that Godwin hoped to convey. Yet Godwin describes his reading experience in uninspiring, even 
passive terms: he simply ‘went over [it] in a few hours’. This hasty encounter with the text unsettles 
clear distinctions between ‘true’ and ‘false’ novel-readers, in much the same way that the ending of 
the essay ‘Of History and Romance’ had unsettled the distinction between ‘true’ and ‘false’ novel-
writers. Godwin’s critical writing seems to place the weight of moral responsibility for the novel form 
upon its readers, and yet if ‘one of the most accomplished readers’ could fail, what hope was there for 
others? 
Godwin’s Deloraine (1833) was composed at the same time as the preface to Fleetwood and begun 
almost immediately after the preface to Cloudesley was published.30 In what follows, I show that this 
final novel was based upon similar anxieties about the social possibility of moral literacy. Godwin 
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used it to flesh out the socio-political dimensions of his critical argument about novels and 
knowledge, using contemporary debates about criminal justice and print culture to dramatize his 
critical vision of how fictional narrative could reclaim true ‘moral law’. Yet whilst Deloraine upholds 
the sanctity of private judgment in many respects, it also offers a nightmarish portrayal of institutional 
power over the mind’s moral sense, casting doubt upon the ability of individuals to escape an 
inherited social climate of intellectual dependence. The last novel of Godwin’s career thus unearths, I 
suggest, some of the key factors underlying his ambivalent critical writing about the novel form. 
 
2. The Case of Deloraine 
Murder is at the centre of Godwin’s Deloraine (1833). This is true in a literal sense – the act is 
narrated in the middle of the second of three volumes – and in a figurative sense, for the substance 
and style of the entire work revolve around it, submitting it to constant interrogation. What this novel 
pursues is not factual knowledge of the perpetrator’s identity or proceedings (the act occurs in public), 
but moral knowledge. It foregrounds the conflicting stories that may be told about human action, and 
in doing so opens up the question of whether, and in what ways, human behaviour is morally legible. 
Most prominently, Deloraine launches an assault upon ‘the vocabulary of undistinguishing law’.31 
Representatives of the British criminal justice system appear in its pages as defunct story-tellers, 
whose narratives obscure, rather than disclose, moral knowledge.  
In what follows, I argue that Godwin used this fictional set-up to dramatize the socio-political 
implications of his critical argument about novels and moral knowledge in the early 1830s. He used 
Deloraine’s tale to flesh out his critical vision of how confessional narrative could emancipate 
independent thought in order to reclaim true ‘moral law’: through the mode, content and style of his 
narration, Godwin confronted a disparity between legal and moral guilt that he had first identified in 
Political Justice and placed individual private judgement at the centre of ethical decision-making. Yet 
his novel also stages a violent battle between competing stories and endows institutional forces with a 
terrifying power over the mind’s moral sense. Deloraine’s bittersweet ending ultimately casts doubt 
upon the ability of the mind to achieve independent moral judgment in a society whose systems foster 
bad stories and weak readers. I suggest that this work pinpoints the ambivalence about the nature of 
the mind that undergirded Godwin’s wider ambivalence about the social role of novels. 
I proceed by addressing two sorts of narrative at play in Deloraine. Firstly, I explore the narratives of 
crime perpetuated by the legal system and its mechanisms of publicity, which Godwin presents on an 
immediate level as reductionist and inhuman. I then consider how the content, structure and narration 
of Deloraine’s personal account disrupts this narrative system more implicitly, presenting human 
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action as contingent, ambivalent and ultimately irreducible. Godwin confronted his audience with 
contrasting modes of moral literacy, I argue, and made the role of printed texts themselves within this 
explicit and self-conscious. I finish by drawing attention to the dark picture of intellectual dependence 
which runs throughout the novel, arguing that Godwin used it raise his most poignant question about 
the possibility of true moral literacy in the current state of society. 
Legal Narrative 
Criminal law features in Deloraine as a narrative imposed upon human action, and it is criticised as a 
reductive mode of representation. This criticism is not only implicit – the legal narrative jars against 
the personal experience presented to the reader by the narrator – but also explicit in Deloraine’s direct 
reflections upon his circumstances. These reflections commence immediately after he shoots William 
dead: ‘I knew enough of the laws of my country,’ Deloraine claims, ‘to know that that which in my 
mind was a vindication, would not be so received in an English court of justice as to obtain my 
acquittal of the crime of murder’.32 This conflict of interpretations is shortly explained by a 
description of the law’s fundamental approach to moral knowledge: 
Nothing, I was well aware, was more precise than the expounding and application of the 
English law in the case of murder. It is like the application of a cloth-yard in a mercer’s shop. 
[…] the life of the individual arraigned, is disposed of in obedience to terms and definitions. 
The only question is, Does the deed under consideration come up to the rule? Just as in the 
shop of the mercer we decide, Does the cloth measure three feet of twelve inches each? […] 
No consideration is had of the character of the parties, or the nature of the provocation. The 
heart of the judge is dead within him, and so of the rest. The whole is determined, in a way 
that more resembles the turning of a machine, than the decision of that complicated being 
called man, endowed with eyes to see, and an understanding to discriminate, and a heart to 
feel, and a moral sense to judge according to the eternal law written in the skies.33  
Institutional law obscures moral knowledge, Deloraine claims, because it is based upon the wrong sort 
of measurement. It works according to rules, categories and terms, which are appropriate for judging 
inanimate materials such as cloth, but of little use when it comes to understanding ‘that complicated 
being called man’. It is based upon an inadequate, overly simplistic mode of representation; it upholds 
a story about moral behaviour that is untrue to human life. Deloraine assumes that such a mechanistic 
approach to public judgment not only harms the person accused, who is simply ‘disposed of’ 
according to the rules, but also damages the judicial authorities themselves, whose abilities to reason 
(‘understanding’, ‘discriminate’) and feel (‘heart’, ‘sense’) are overridden and blunted by the legal 
machinery. Criminal law thus dehumanises all participants – ‘The heart of the judge is dead within 
him, and so of the rest’ – because it replaces the living capacity for moral judgment with rigid, 
insensible measures. Reductive representations of human action usurp the minds of all involved.  
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Deloraine’s view of criminal law appears to be confirmed by the actions of the legal authorities once 
he has fled the scene of violence. The local magistrate organises an inquest on the morning after the 
killing, assisted by the doctor, the coroner, and a hastily assembled jury. They process the available 
information solely according to ‘the principal constituents of what the law denominates the crime of 
murder’, valuing only those categories of legal measurement that Deloraine had bitterly critiqued. 
After interviewing witnesses they conclude with a judgment of wilful unprovoked homicide, finding 
no evidence for ‘a charge of previous malice’ but sufficient time lapse before the act itself for ‘malice 
aforethought’. Godwin’s matter-of-fact, list-like prose affirms the mechanistic impression of the 
meeting: ‘This verdict was accordingly found and recorded; and the coroner in conclusion issued his 
warrant for my apprehension’.34 It jars with the preceding relation of the actual killing, which after 
nearly two volumes of context is embedded in a matrix of relational and psychological pressure. The 
narrative produced by the inquest accounts insufficiently for the event, for its language seems to 
extract the event unnaturally from its proper home. 
The law is critiqued again in similar terms by Deloraine’s daughter and ally Catherine, in an eloquent 
appeal that brings the plot to its climax and finally ends the flight/pursuit motif of the third volume. 
Boldly confronting Travers, who has tracked them across Europe in the name of English justice, 
Catherine states: 
I know how the law construes all this. It scorns to take account of previous circumstances, of 
any of the strings that twine themselves round the human heart. It comes with its scales, and 
weighs every thing to the partition of a hair. It comes with its measures, and takes account of 
roods, and yards, and inches of space, and reckons hours, and quarters of an hour, and 
minutes, and seconds of time. And it finds in the present case the required sum of space and 
time, and pronounces a crime of malice prepense, and a verdict of wilful murder. It hurries 
the actor therefore to an ignominious death. – But I speak to a man, who has not by long 
poring on precedents and cases purged himself of all sentiments of humanity, to a West 
Indian, who has quick pulses beating in his heart, a ‘soul made of fire, an offspring of the 
sun’. […] Deloraine, however unfortunate in the offence he has committed, has not deserved 
the retribution you seek. He has no felonious qualities. He is neither profligate nor malicious. 
Though he shed the blood of William, he did not imbrue his hands in guilt. He has contracted 
no moral defilement. He could not fail to be sufficiently unhappy in the memory of the wide-
spreading and tragical consequences of the act into which he was hurried.35 
Catherine appropriates the language of the law here in order to attack the way that it ‘construes’ 
events. Sir William Blackstone’s Commentaries On the Laws of England had distinguished between 
‘excusable’ and ‘felonious’ homicide, for example, and her claim that Deloraine ‘has no felonious 
qualities’ is a deliberate subversion of accepted criminal categories.36 Whilst the action itself, 
extracted from its context, falls under the definition of felonious homicide (an unlawful deliberate 
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killing), the personal qualities of the perpetrator himself resist the category and trouble its authority. 
The ‘scales’ and ‘measures’ of the law are thus insufficient for attaining moral knowledge. Catherine 
presents them as Deloraine had done previously, as blind, mechanical and inhuman. She addresses 
Travers by contrast as a sentient, discriminating being, who can apprehend the reality of the situation 
if he chooses: that Deloraine ‘has contracted no moral defilement’. Her speech in its entirety contains 
a radically alternative narrative about Deloraine’s action, presented in a manner deliberately 
antithetical to the stories circulated by social authorities, in which Deloraine is a tragic figure and 
Travers the one morally ‘degraded’ by his role as ‘a hunter of human blood’.37 This climactic appeal 
reinforces the novel’s central theme of defunct legal judgment, and positions it in a framework of 
narrative conflict. 
These direct critiques of criminal law intersect in several places with Godwin’s comments about legal 
institution in Political Justice, which he consulted during his composition of Deloraine in the early 
1830s.38 All editions of the work had argued that criminal law was fundamentally flawed because it 
took insufficient account of the contingency, complexity, and individuality of human action. Godwin 
began by addressing and redefining the term ‘law’ itself. ‘Reason is the only legislator’, he argued, 
and thus ‘The functions of society extend, not to the making, but to the interpreting of law’.39 In other 
words, the law of reason – apprehended by human beings through the faculty of private judgment in 
an interminable, yet perfectible process – should be the only fixed principle that determines society’s 
response to wrongdoing. Legal codes and structures sustained over time by societies tend to ossify the 
faculty of private judgment and thus obscure the true law of reason: 
Law tends no less than creeds, catechisms and tests, to fix the human mind in a stagnant 
condition, and to substitute a principle of permanence, in the room of that unceasing 
perfectibility which is the only salubrious element of mind.40  
Institutional law, Godwin argues, makes judgments about human behaviour in the future by 
constraining it to the precedents and frameworks of the past. It operates upon ‘a principle of 
permanence’, rather than a principle of progress, thus violating his central tenet of intellectual 
perfectibility. This conflict of principles is referenced by Deloraine’s contention that the English legal 
system neglects ‘the eternal law written in the skies’ (above). Its fixed regulations are unable to 
account for the unusual, ambivalent nature of Deloraine’s situation, which the reasoning mind would 
apprehend and prioritise. The novel thus incorporates Godwin’s contention in Political Justice that 
moral knowledge is not attained by the fixed measures of institutions, which are static and prone to 
misrepresentation, but only by the ongoing and non-predetermined operation of private judgment.  
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Although Godwin’s rhetoric in Political Justice often makes the ‘law of reason’ sound as though it 
should be easily apprehended by the individual mind, his ensuing discussion of the proper treatment 
of crime shows that he does not believe this will be the case. Moral judgment is complicated, time-
consuming, and must take many different truths into account. Overall, Godwin argues in Political 
Justice that public attitude towards wrongdoing should be informed by three main principles (which 
are neglected by the institutions of current society): 
1. The rule of mind. In accordance with his central tenet of private judgment, Godwin believes that 
‘To reform a man is to change the sentiments of his mind’, for people always act according to what 
they think. He argues that such mental reformation of the wrongdoer is always preferable to forcible 
punishment, for it produces the greatest good. Society’s approach to crime should therefore focus 
upon its intellectual causes, and be energised by a desire for intellectual change.41 When decisions 
must be made about individual cases, the minds of those involved should be the utmost priority for 
judges. 
2. The rule of necessity. Godwin’s believes that crime should be understood in light of the immense 
power of material and intellectual antecedents upon present human behaviour (see Chapter One). This 
includes an overall focus upon the causes of crime and thus upon its prevention for the future, rather 
than its curtailment in the present; and, when moral judgments must be made concerning individual 
cases of wrongdoing, an awareness of contingency and a disposition towards compassion.42  
3. The rule of individuality. Godwin contends repeatedly that no two crimes are alike, for characters, 
circumstances and context are never identical. The fixed categories, time measurements and modes of 
evidence sustained by legal institutions are thus inherently unjust, for their tendency is to level such 
distinctions rather than taking them into account. Murder is a key example here: ‘how complicated is 
the iniquity of treating all instances alike, in which one man has occasioned the death of another?’ 
Godwin asks. ‘Can a system that levels these inequalities, and confounds these differences, be 
productive of good?’43  
Interestingly for our purposes, Political Justice explicitly describes the current legal system’s neglect 
of these areas in narrative terms. The fixed categories of criminal law ignore and confound all the 
subtleties of thought, motive, and psychology that each case involves, and thus the law tells defunct 
stories about the mind. Or rather, it tells defunct stories about human life that fail to take the centrality 
and complexity of the mind into account. ‘What a vast train of actual and possible motives enter into 
the history of a man, who has been incited to destroy the life of another?’ Godwin asks. He draws 
attention to ‘the uncertainty of history’ in this regard: if scholars still dispute whether Cicero was ‘a 
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vain or a virtuous man’, how will it be decided concerning ‘the man who was tried last week at the 
Old Bailey?’ He continues: 
This part of the subject will be put in a striking light, if we recollect the narratives that have 
been written by condemned criminals. In how different a light do they place the transactions 
that proved fatal to them, from the construction that was put upon them by their judges? […] 
Who will say that the judge with his slender pittance of information was more competent to 
decide upon the motives, than the prisoner after the severest scrutiny of his own mind? How 
few are the trials which an humane and a just man can read, terminating in a verdict of guilty, 
without feeling an uncontrolable [sic] repugnance against the verdict? If there be any sight 
more humiliating than all others, it is that of a miserable victim acknowledging the justice of 
a sentence, against which every enlightened reasoner exclaims with horror.44 
Here Godwin describes the limitations of the justice system through the concept of narrative. Events 
may be represented more or less faithfully by the parties involved, yet the system is such that the 
judge, ‘with his slender pittance of information’ and predetermined behavioural categories, will 
always tell an obfuscatory tale. The prisoner himself will tell a better narrative, Godwin claims, since 
he knows instinctively to prioritise and scrutinise ‘his own mind’. Yet the legal story is invasive and 
manipulating, often leading even the accused to ‘acknowledg[e] the justice’ of its conclusion. The 
audience member, if he be ‘enlightened’, will intuit that the label ‘guilty’ is nearly always reductive 
and therefore a distorted interpretation of the circumstances under investigation. 
Godwin’s argument about narrative fiction in his essay ‘Of History and Romance’ can thus be seen in 
germinal form in this section of Political Justice. He uses the example of historiography to make a 
point about the necessity of interior knowledge to ethical judgment: historians dispute whether Cicero 
was vain or virtuous, he claims, because his inner motives remain inaccessible to them. This 
important status given to interior life should thus have two effects on judgment of contemporary 
criminals: firstly, humility on the part of the judge, who must acknowledge the limits of his 
knowledge, and secondly, greater weight given to accused persons’ own testimonies. Personal 
confessions are deemed most useful for the apprehension of moral knowledge, because they provide 
interior knowledge that would otherwise remain out of reach (‘the severest scrutiny of his own 
mind’). This argument thus lays the groundwork for Godwin’s later claim that fictional confession 
could be truer to the human condition than any historiographical enterprise. It also establishes the 
ethical backdrop to this claim: for Godwin, the ability of romance to provide representative truth 
about human interiority rendered it a unique source of moral knowledge. 
The entire story of Deloraine is based upon these ideas precipitated by Political Justice. The legal 
system inherently provides a woefully inadequate representation of Deloraine’s action, and the plot is 
driven by the ensuing tension between the dehumanising force of legal stories and the complex, 
compelling account of the protagonist himself. It owes much to Caleb Williams, as contemporary 
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reviewers noticed, and Godwin’s diary shows that he was rereading it at the time of composition. Yet 
Deloraine is preoccupied more singly with the idea that fictional confession could provide a 
knowledge of human nature that was superior to that offered by institutional justice, using Deloraine’s 
self-analysis in order to expose and explore the falsehood sustained by impersonal systems of law. 
Like Caleb Williams, it also forces the reader to ask questions about the conditions required for access 
to a completely ‘faithful narrative’ of the events themselves.45 
This connection between narrative and justice is made even stronger in Deloraine by Godwin’s 
engagement with a real crime narrative, that of Eugene Aram. Aram, a successful philologist, was 
convicted and hanged for the murder of his associate Daniel Clark in 1759, fourteen years after the 
event took place and amongst considerable controversy. His case was widely publicised via the 
Newgate Calendar, and was experiencing a resurgence of popularity in the nineteenth century.46 It 
had been used to reformist ends in the late eighteenth century by Holcroft and by Godwin himself. It 
had surfaced directly in Caleb Williams through the story of Raymond, which troubled the black-and-
white legal judgments of society and posed one of the key questions that Godwin felt was latent in 
Aram’s case: should the virtuous character of a wanted person, displayed during a significant lapse of 
time between crime and apprehension, affect subsequent legal judgments?47 Aram was fast becoming 
a tragic figure in popular literature, signalled by the publication of Thomas Hood’s ‘The Dream of 
Eugene Aram’ (1829). Godwin himself made notes for a novel based upon Aram’s life, which he may 
have given to Edward Bulwer-Lytton, whose own novel Eugene Aram appeared in 1832 and was 
adapted into a play the same year.48  
Deloraine’s story has clear similarities to Aram’s, and Godwin used the parallel to critique the law for 
its insufficient attention to the complex human category of character and its relation to time. As 
Catherine argues, criminal law ‘reckons hours, and quarters of an hour, and minutes, and seconds of 
time’, yet fails to take into account enduring patterns of character. Godwin used Deloraine as both a 
tragic figure and a reformatory voice, uniting both ‘versions’ of Aram in Romantic-period literature 
and highlighting the protean nature of criminality itself. By referencing and to some extent rewriting a 
‘real’ crime story that was in popular circulation, Godwin drew attention to the various stories that 
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may be told about human action, and argued that the law might be usefully perceived and critiqued in 
narrative terms.  
In order to emphasise this narrative dimension to institutional judgment, Godwin gives it an overtly 
textual embodiment throughout the novel. Deloraine becomes aware of the legal rendering of his case 
solely through newspapers, and these printed forms pursue him across Europe with aggressive, 
distorted tales about his life and character. Godwin’s use of the newspaper associates legal judgments 
with crude publicity, in a similar manner to Falkland’s handbills in Caleb Williams. He was tapping 
into a well-known trope, for as Aled Jones has shown, the image of the newspaper as an agent of 
corruption – moral, intellectual, political – had become a common one in nineteenth-century 
literature.49 Deloraine’s first confrontation with his case in such a printed form occurs, appropriately 
enough, in a bookshop; a British paper catches his eye, and although it contains nothing unsurprising, 
it has a powerful effect upon his mind: 
Though all this was matter of course, was drawn up in the ordinary forms, and might have 
been anticipated by me almost word for word as I found it, yet such is the nature of the human 
mind, that a stronger and almost a new effect is produced upon us, when it comes to be 
subjected to our sense. It lost its vagueness, the misty and obscure form it previously bore, 
and thrilled through the marrow in my bones. It was like the writing upon the wall […] 50 
In accordance with the defunct measures of legal judgment, the newspaper story makes no allowance 
for ambivalence, nuance or uncertainty. The events are presented to the reader in black and white, 
literally and figuratively. The newspaper’s sensory dimensions reinforce this reductive aspect of legal 
narrative: as material object, ‘subjected to our sense’, it makes clear and stark what Deloraine knows 
to be ‘obscure’. This is an unnatural embodiment, and as such elicits horror: it ‘thrilled through the 
marrow in my bones’. It also precipitates violence: 
The paragraph I beheld struck at my liberty and my life. Till the hour of the rash act I had 
committed, I had been a recognised and authentic member of the aristocracy of my country, 
protected by its laws and with all my immunities and privileges, and honoured by my fellow-
citizens. […] Now I was proclaimed as a loathsome and rejected member of the community, 
and a price was fixed upon my head. […] My head was devoted, a victim to the demands of 
criminal law; and the code of civilization could not be satisfied without my extirpation.51  
The narrative here is inherently hostile: it strikes, demands, victimizes. And a key mechanism of this 
violence is its typology, its recognition and sorting of subjects via the ‘code’ of institutional law. 
Deloraine’s status as ‘authentic’ and ‘honoured’ is suddenly reversed to ‘loathsome and rejected’, 
simply due to the unreasoning measures of criminal law. The newspaper’s ultimate contribution is to 
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exacerbate and reinforce this categorisation through public embodiment. By disseminating legal 
measures in sensory form, it materialises them.  
As the novel progresses, newspapers take licence with the content of Deloraine’s story, distorting it 
more obviously. They are also increasingly associated with Gothic literary tropes: they energise a 
long flight-and-pursuit narrative, which owes much to Frankenstein, and includes elaborate disguises, 
a ruined castle, and an encounter with an escaped lunatic. As Deirdre Lynch notes, Gothic fiction in 
this period is marked out by its interest in the possession of stories – i.e., in who has the power to 
interpret and thus control events.52 In Deloraine, Godwin allies the reductionist narratives of criminal 
law to this anxiety about tale-telling, ultimately implying that institutional justice employs its stories 
about human behaviour for the purposes of irrational coercion, distortion of reality and oppressive 
surveillance. These sinister aspects to legal narrative become explicit in Deloraine’s encounter with a 
second newspaper. Its threat is hinted at before it becomes manifest; hiding in a castle under the 
dubious protection of Jerome, Deloraine finds his life compared to that of Brissac, previous tenant 
who committed fratricide. ‘I certainly felt small pleasure in being classed by him with M. Brissac’, he 
reflects;  
I assuredly looked upon my offence in a very different light. […] There was no mixture of 
depravity and vileness in what I had done; and, however the vocabulary of undistinguishing 
law might call my act and that of M. Brissac by the same name, I was fully convinced that a 
sound and discriminating judgment would place an eternal distance between them.53  
Once again, the law’s mode of measurement is described as inadequate, for it is unable to distinguish 
fundamental differences of character and motive in two murder cases. Deloraine connects the 
flattening legal interpretation of his actions to its ‘vocabulary’, its lexical system of representation, 
which obscures the workings of healthy judgment. This consideration of manipulative discourse is 
shortly followed by a material example. Deloraine chances upon a page torn from a French 
newspaper, which offers a large reward for his apprehension: 
But the events were so distorted by their pretended historian, and the whole seemed 
composed with so diabolical a malignity, that I had a difficulty in supposing that the facts 
which had actually occurred, could have furnished the materials to so odious a 
misrepresentation.54  
This time, Deloraine’s character and history are entirely twisted to fit the ‘misrepresentation’ that he 
was the ‘only author’ and ‘only perpetrator’ of the events. All misfortune and ambiguity are removed 
from the story: the article alleges that he always knew William to be alive, and labels him a ‘tyrant-
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husband’, the hyphenated phrase implying familiar typology. ‘What means this paper?’ Deloraine 
exclaims. One thing is clear: the newspaper fully establishes the connection Godwin is making 
between legal judgments and spurious narratives about human behaviour. It positions legal narrative 
as an invasive Gothic nightmare, which twists Deloraine’s memories, experiences and relationships 
into an uncanny double version. Godwin also associates legal narrative with contemporary anxieties 
about ephemeral print culture, exploiting the widespread perception of newspapers as agents of 
ignorance and immorality. The article empowers base motives: it prompts Jerome to betray Deloraine 
for reward money, and to excuse his actions by describing himself as a naïve reader (‘if it had not 
been for that paper […] I never heard of anything so cold-blooded’).55 Godwin thus aligns stories 
generated by criminal law with the dangers associated with mass literacy; he evokes the image he had 
conjured in his essay ‘Of History and Romance’ of readers and writers who are concerned about the 
price of their wares, but don’t have the moral or intellectual wherewithal to question their quality or 
veracity.  
In describing the judgments of institutional law as bad stories about human behaviour in Deloraine, 
Godwin was also drawing directly from contemporary parliamentary debates about criminal law. 
Capitalising on the reformist energy precipitated by the passing of the 1832 Reform Act, he used one 
particularly controversial issue – the justice of capital punishment – to pinpoint the more general 
conviction amongst legal campaigners that the very representation or ‘image of justice’ was at stake 
in their work. 56 Whig activists had made this a key issue: if laws were justified and expressed in terms 
of impersonal universal principles, it was argued, they would seem more acceptable to an increasingly 
unrestful public. Godwin’s intervention in Deloraine was to present the entire justice system as a 
social force that enshrined a discrepancy between human experience and its representation. He makes 
a distinction between the abstract principle of reason itself (‘the eternal law’) and institutionally-fixed 
principles (human law), arguing that the latter obscures human access to the former. Deloraine thus 
exploits a cultural moment in which ‘English law was a touchstone for scandal in many educated 
circles’, in David Lemmings’s words – a moment in which social commentators were particularly 
sensitised towards the ways in which the justice system was perceived, and the ways in which the 
system itself could misread or misrepresent human behaviour.57 
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Godwin used the confessional form of Deloraine to disrupt this system of legal narrative. I show 
below that through structure, narrative mode and prose style, he emphasised the elements of justice 
that Political Justice had argued were lacking in society: the complexity, necessity and individuality 
of human character and action. By prioritising the private thoughts of his protagonist and by recruiting 
the private thoughts of his readers, Godwin positions independent judgment as the true standard of 
moral arbitration. He thus offers Deloraine as a facilitator of the sort of moral knowledge that he had 
allied to the novel form in his critical writings of the 1790s and early 1830s. He also uses the novel to 
suggest that such knowledge undermines the justice institutions of his day – i.e., that it precipitates 
socio-political reform. 
Firstly, Godwin uses the overall structure and balance of content in Deloraine to alienate the 
constructions of legal narrative from lived experience. We see this most simply in what the tale 
includes: we are presented with Deloraine’s entire, unwieldy personal history. The first volume 
acquaints the reader at length with his childhood, education, and idyllic first marriage; it recounts the 
death of his first wife, and his introduction to his subsequent wife Margaret Borrodale. During the 
next volume tension builds in this second marriage, which is brought to a crisis when Deloraine 
discovers that her previous lover, thought to be dead, is alive and expecting her hand. Towards the 
middle of the book, Deloraine finds William sitting beside his wife and instinctively shoots him with 
a pistol, the distress of which causes Margaret to die from haemorrhage. Yet the murder is described 
in an unusually laconic style; the story quickly descends into a lengthy flight-and-pursuit narrative, 
which takes up most of the third volume, and features most prominently Deloraine’s developing 
relationship with his daughter Catherine. In other words, the overall structure and content of 
Deloraine privileges the protagonist’s entire character development, and it thus encourages moral 
judgment to be based upon this holistic view, rather than upon the single act of homicide. By placing 
the murder in a complicated web of history and psychology, Godwin also draws attention to the 
power of antecedent circumstances, raising questions about the necessity of Deloraine’s action and 
therefore the extent to which he should be held accountable. Further, by structuring the whole story of 
Deloraine’s life around his relationships with his wives and his daughter, the novel suggests that the 
real issue to be addressed for his moral development is not his act of violence, but his attitude towards 
women. Deloraine consistently idealises and objectifies women, which is the root cause of his 
aggressive jealousy, and this is something he begins to unlearn as the novel draws to a close. 
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Godwin also alienates legal narrative from lived experience through what he leaves absent from the 
novel. Deloraine is never tried. He immediately flees after he kills William, assuming that the system 
of criminal law will be inadequate in its moral judgment upon the case. Official legal spaces, 
procedures and apparatus are thus conspicuously absent from the novel, unlike in Caleb Williams: it is 
as though the system has been denied a home. Criminal law is represented in ghost form, through 
Travers, through the mob, through the newspapers. It is always on foreign territory, an alien force that 
invades human life. The legal story, moreover, is denied an ending. Catherine’s climactic appeal to 
Travers is successful and he ceases his European pursuit, but Deloraine remains in exile from 
England, knowing that a price remains upon his head. The justice that has been recognised and felt 
between two personal parties cannot be mirrored by institutional justice, Godwin implies. Criminal 
law remains suspended in the novel, and the psychological effects of this lack of closure imbue it with 
a bittersweet ending. Such lack of closure was a recognised feature of Godwin’s novels, and annoyed 
most reviewers – particularly those of Mandeville.58 In Deloraine, however, this kind of ending was 
bound up with a specific attempt to show the inadequacy of legal narrative. By leaving its ‘official’ 
story pending, Godwin disrupts the law’s drive towards simplified case-closure.  
The ambivalent content of Deloraine’s narration further disrupts the authority of legal narrative, for it 
highlights the ambiguities inherent in past action and insists that these inform moral judgment. His 
account of the murder, for example, accrues uncertainty as it is repeated and reconsidered, resisting 
the simple and pre-determined categories of motive and moral character that the criminal law system 
sustains. Catherine articulates this notion in her appeal to Travers, connecting the moral uncertainties 
of Deloraine’s action to the fact that William’s appearance was unprecedented and bizarre, thwarting 
neat conclusions. She presents his survival as a defiance of ‘the condition of human life’, an unnatural 
event ‘which in the usual train of human affairs happens to none’. This is a fact for which the law 
makes no allowances. It tries to quantify recognised aspects of the case, rather than acknowledging its 
uniquely strange nature: ‘It comes with its scales […] It comes with its measures’.59 By contrasting 
this rigid measurement of the fatal event to Deloraine’s shifting and ambivalent renderings, Godwin 
portrays the law as a system of false measurement, which cannot do justice to the tangled, irreducible 
nature of human action. 
These faulty legal ‘measures’ are also counteracted by another sort of ambiguity in Deloraine’s 
narration, that concerning time. Although the story begins rather conventionally with his birth, 
Deloraine builds temporal disruption into it as he proceeds: he started composing the tale at a certain 
point in his flight from the law, he records, and signals that the narrative is being continued in the 
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present around its crisis point, rather like in Caleb Williams. Throughout his account Deloraine draws 
attention to the fact that he is including information inaccessible to him at the time of action and thus 
only gained at a later date, sometimes presumably after the climax itself.60 The tale ends by placing 
the process of composition into the preceding narrative, and imagining its moral tendency upon future 
generations. Yet it also deliberately evades historical location, conjecturing that it will be most of use 
centuries down the line, when the particulars of names and dates have been forgotten.61 The narrator 
is thus anxious to position himself and his narrative in time, and yet simultaneously highlights his 
nonlinear (even atemporal) rendering of events. By contrast, the demands of the law are portrayed in 
terms of precise time measurement: it ‘reckons hours, and quarters of an hour, and minutes, and 
seconds of time’. Indeed, the verdict of malice prepense hangs upon these measures. Godwin’s 
conscious temporal disruption of Deloraine’s tale undermines the authority of these minutes and 
seconds, placing their strictures in a disorienting web of past, present and future. 
Secondly, Godwin’s mode of narration itself also launches an assault upon the interpretive framework 
of the law. He chose first-person perspective in order to prioritise subjective accounts over 
institutional ones, and to draw attention to the complex operation of the individual’s mind. As the 
1832 introduction to Fleetwood made clear:  
[First person mode] was infinitely the best adapted, at least, to my vein of delineation, […] 
the analysis of the private and internal operations of the mind, employing my metaphysical 
dissecting knife in tracing and laying bare the involutions of motive, and recording the 
gradually accumulating impulses, which led the personages I had to describe primarily to 
adopt the particular way of proceeding in which they afterwards embarked.62 
As mentioned above, Godwin justified his mode of narration by fusing it to those elements of justice 
that he had argued were neglected by institutional law in Political Justice. First-person perspective 
gives a privileged position to the operation of an individual’s judgment, the ‘private and internal 
operations of the mind’. By conveying events to the reader through this channel, the subject’s 
intellectual life – however flawed – is implicitly offered as the key to understanding and interpreting 
events. Moreover, first-person allows Godwin to illustrate the basic necessity of thought and action. It 
allows him to make explicit ‘the involutions of motive’, ‘the gradually accumulating impulses’ that 
contribute to human behaviour. Finally, he argues that this mode enables him to delineate the 
complexity and irreducibility of human life. The utmost precision and technical care is required to 
portray mental life successfully; the pen must become a ‘metaphysical dissecting knife’, teasing apart 
the delicate nuances of psychology. Godwin’s ‘laying bare’ of the mind results in protagonists that 
resist straightforward character judgments, who are neither ‘innocent’ nor ‘guilty’, defying familiar 
categorisation.  
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This was a decision with overtly socio-political implications. Some critics have seen Godwin’s 1832 
preface as reflecting a shift to a politically redundant subjectivity, and have linked this to the fact that 
he dropped Things as They Are from the title of Caleb Williams in its 1831 edition.63 Yet Godwin’s 
interest in the individual mind was always an interest of public import because private judgment 
remained the keystone of his theory of social reform (see Introduction), and his aesthetic choices were 
allied to this principle. As one reviewer of his fiction recognised in 1830, Godwin ‘makes the analysis 
of our inmost thoughts the materiel for melioration of the human species’.64 The connections between 
Godwin’s account of fictional psychology in 1832 and his critique of justice in Political Justice 
(which he consulted that year) make this explicit: the first-person mode was in part a challenge 
launched against the misconstructions of institutional law. This mode and its ideological justification 
was in fact a belated development of Defoe’s confessional novels at the beginning of the eighteenth 
century, as Pamela Clemit, Deirdre Lynch and Hal Gladfelder have all noted. Godwin was employing 
a tradition of criminal narrative that presented events to their readers exclusively from the position of 
the social deviant, drawing their readers into ‘imaginative complicity’ with the protagonists. 65 He was 
making a statement about public ethics, attempting to redress both institutional displacement of 
private judgment in moral discrimination, and institutional neglect of the complexity, necessity and 
irreducibility of individual life. 
Thirdly and finally, whilst the fact of first-person perspective elevates the individual mind in the 
process of moral discrimination, the style in which that perspective is rendered implicitly recruits 
readers themselves to the judgment task. Godwin’s prose mirrors his subject’s thought processes, 
which respond to a new event or intelligence with a sequence of reflections, questions and imagined 
possibilities. Deloraine’s receipt of William’s ship letter, for example, initiates such a string of 
reactions. He begins with a question of knowledge – ‘What was I to believe?’ – and after 
contemplating historical possibilities, considers a question of action, the appropriate response to the 
unopened letter: ‘On what was I to resolve?’ Ultimately, after reading it, he wonders what the letter 
means for his own being, and poses a question of identity: ‘What was I now?’66 Pockets of intellection 
thus cluster around key plot developments, framing them as matter for thought and offering them up 
to scrutiny. Godwin himself wrote of the novel-writer’s need for a mode of expression that would 
‘give the reader recollection & pause, which […] should perpetually revive & reanimate the reader’s 
attention’. This meant providing ‘resting-places’ for the reader’s mind, of the sort provided by 
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Deloraine’s interludes of rumination.67 This feature is perhaps of most import in Deloraine when it 
comes to the murder itself. The protagonist-narrator revisits the scene in his mind’s eye repeatedly, 
viewing it from various angles, and often unsettling his previous convictions about the appropriate 
moral judgments to be drawn.68 As Godwin encourages his readers to participate in Deloraine’s 
protean mental stream, he thus prompts them to pause and consider the moral significance of the 
events for themselves.  
By reconstructing the subject’s intellection in this manner, Godwin also presented the narrator’s mind 
itself as a key object of scrutiny. Contemporary reviewers noted the importance of this: Deloraine is 
‘full of thought, and the matériel of thought’, wrote one, recognising the link that he established 
between the mental life of his protagonist and the mental life of his reader.69 This was the core 
element of Godwin’s challenge to institutional forms of knowledge: he aimed, as he wrote in 1795, to 
‘disengage the minds of men’ from their ‘prepossession’ by social systems and to incite them to 
‘moral and political enquiry’.70 His literary concept of confession was in fact entirely predicated upon 
this link between interior analysis and social reform, as Pamela Clemit has shown.71 His interest in 
fictional and autobiographical ‘confession’ reflected a longstanding conviction that, in order for true 
justice to be apprehended in society, the formative conditions of intellectual life (political, social, 
religious) needed to be continually exposed and improved. This is why Godwin’s preface to 
Cloudesley founded its high conception of the novel form upon its ability to render ‘inmost thoughts’. 
In Deloraine, dramatization of the narrator’s mental life highlights the protean and contingent nature 
of interpretive judgment, suggesting that the fixed, pre-determined categories of motive and moral 
character upheld by criminal law are inadequate. It thus also becomes an invitation, a proposal that his 
audience join in the process of re-forming these judgments. 
Deloraine’s confession finishes on a deeply ambivalent note, however. It emphasizes the power of 
institutions over human moral sense, and thus seems to question the very possibility of true moral 
literacy in society’s current state. This is foreshadowed early in the tale, as Deloraine absorbs the 
‘vocabulary of undistinguishing law’ during his descriptions of events. His initial account of the 
killing, for example, is preceded by two emotionally intense accounts: the first of William and 
Margaret’s reunion, during which they temporarily relive their relational past in a ‘sort of transporting 
delusion’, and the second of Deloraine’s dark broodings, in which he tussles with hatred against his 
rival, his wife, and himself (‘all that constituted my individuality’).72 When it comes to the violent act 
that results when these two situations collide, however, Deloraine suddenly empties the agents of all 
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their history, personality and emotion. William and Margaret are described as ‘two human figures, a 
male and a female’; as the violence is about to erupt, they become ‘the parties’; and finally, they are 
‘Two human bodies, dead, or apparently dead, […] at my feet’.73 He uses the cold language of a legal 
statement, which detaches the persons involved from the very things that give them identity. These 
contrasting modes of representation jar increasingly throughout Deloraine’s narration; Godwin 
portrays legal discourse as an unnatural intrusion into his protagonist’s thought-world, something that 
obscures the true meaning of human events. 
This institutional colonization of Deloraine’s mind is exacerbated by textual manifestations of legal 
narrative. Newspaper stories manipulate his judgment, gradually overpowering its capacity for 
independent conviction. Deloraine describes how the first article he encountered ‘haunted my 
thoughts, as the paper lay before me’: 
My soul was in tumults. Alternately the ideas I have above expressed passed in sad and 
dreary order before me; and alternately they shaped themselves into a wild and terrific dance 
of death, till I no longer knew where I was, or what I was.74  
The newspaper story has slotted Deloraine into a conventional story of crime: ‘I was proclaimed as a 
loathsome and rejected member of the community’. Its effect is to destabilise Deloraine’s knowledge 
of his own life and character, forcing him to question the authenticity of the memories, practices and 
beliefs that have shaped his identity. ‘I no longer knew where I was, or what I was’, he states; he 
begins to wonder whether the newspaper version of his life might be true. The sheer physical presence 
of the pages seems to impress this idea upon his mind – ‘It was like the writing upon the wall’. 
The second newspaper account has even greater psychological power. The picture it paints is so 
grotesque that it first prompts Deloraine to defend himself: ‘I cared not for the world and its 
constructions. I felt in my heart that I was justified’. Yet he soon slips into a train of anxious 
reflections, questioning his memories of the fatal event and his motives for taking action. ‘This paper 
[…] first suggested to me a doubt of the all-sufficiency of the evidence upon which I had acted’, he 
records. The possibility devastates him, producing ‘a total revolution in the system of my being’.75 It 
precipitates an increasingly negative stream of reflections, which often revise or contradict his earlier 
convictions. Soon Deloraine asserts: ‘never did I regard [my action] but as the most aggravated and 
atrocious crime that imagination itself could devise’.76 His language echoes that of the second 
newspaper article, suggesting that he has absorbed its two-dimensional construction of his character.  
By the time that Deloraine’s tale has reached its conclusion, he seems almost completely overpowered 
by the reductive legal story of his life. Godwin echoes the printed ending of Caleb Williams, in which 
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Falkland’s confession leads Caleb to announce that ‘I have been his murderer’; ‘I began these 
memoirs with the idea of vindicating my own character’ but ‘I have now no character that I wish to 
vindicate’.77 Deloraine’s apparent moral victory over Travers causes him to enter a similar realm of 
self-abasement and narrative revision. Whilst he was on the run, Deloraine claims, his ‘thoughts were 
beguiled’:  
But, now that my person is secure, and I no longer fear the ministers of human justice, my 
condition becomes infinitely worse. I have nothing to do, but to ruminate on what I have 
committed. […] And the more I revolve in my secret soul the deed I have perpetrated, the 
blacker does it shew itself. 
He concludes that his character is ‘odious, horrible even to the imagining, and past all redemption’, 
once again reflecting the second newspaper account (which described him as ‘an unparalleled 
monster, heartless, selfish and sanguinary’).78 Although Catherine is able to heal, Deloraine’s moral 
sense has been irrevocably warped by the interpretation of his life produced and promoted by the 
criminal law. 
Why finish with this nightmarish portrayal of institutional power over the mind’s moral judgment? 
Godwin’s preface to Fleetwood in 1832 ended with a disordered reading experience, and the final 
scene of his 1833 novel provides a similar close-up of a weak mind, a reader whose capacity for 
ethical knowledge has been overwhelmed by his social climate. This conclusion represents a tension 
that remains as unresolved in Deloraine as it does in the preface to Fleetwood: the capacity of the 
mind to launch into independent territory is set starkly against its tendency to capitulate to the status 
quo. The reading mind became a battleground in Godwin’s work, upon which human potential 
conflicted with human habit and behaviour. 
 
Conclusion 
Godwin made a renewed effort to link the novel form to intellectual perfectibility in the early 1830s. 
As he revisited his fiction in theory and in practice, he argued that confessional narrative was a special 
means of moral knowledge. By representing and encouraging an effort towards intellectual 
independence, he argued, this sort of narrative fiction could disengage human minds from the 
inadequate ‘readings’ of human nature and behaviour perpetuated by their socio-political institutions. 
He exploited a moment in which novelists were increasingly associating their work with the social 
authority of non-fictional genres, remediating his draft writing from the 1790s in order to ally the 
novel to ethical theory. 
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I have also shown, however, that Godwin’s particular view of the mind imbued this argument with 
ambivalence. He repeatedly depicted readers that had given way to mental passivity, in both critical 
and fictional works, drawing attention to the prevalence of intellectual dependence amongst the 
contemporary reading nation. His writing about novel-reading in the early 1830s distils enduring, 
unresolved questions about the nature of the human mind itself: Was it strong enough to transcend the 
confines of its social climate? Could inherited forms of intellectual dependence ever be overcome? 
What were the conditions necessary for such emancipation? 
One of Godwin’s ongoing responses to this tension was to write about good reading practice. This 
was a longstanding strategy in his educational writings, but Godwin integrated it into his novel-
writing too. Reading advice is interspersed throughout Deloraine, and involves the remediation of 
passages that had appeared in print elsewhere. The narrator praises the practice of rereading, for 
example, expressing the notion that revisiting a book after a lapse of time leads to the discovery of 
new things, and thus enriches the mind. This passage clearly echoes a section of Godwin’s essay ‘Of 
the Duration of Human Life’ in Thoughts on Man (1831), which he was composing at the same time 
as his novel.79  
Reading in company is portrayed as another means of particular benefit: Emilia reads with Deloraine, 
Travers reads with William, Deloraine reads with Catherine, and the shared experience ‘enhances the 
gratification tenfold’. In Deloraine as in St Leon, the salutary potential of reading becomes especially 
manifest in a social context: ‘[It] makes the proposition, the fact, or the sentiment, leap as it were 
from the insensible page, and become impregnate with life’. It helps participants to see things anew, 
so that they share ‘modes of apprehending and judging’.80 In other words, reading develops 
relationships, it develops judgment, and it does so in part by tying the two activities together. This 
repeated, shared reading is the opposite of the solitary, disposable experience that blights the ending 
of the Fleetwood preface. It also contrasts starkly with Deloraine’s lonely absorption of newspaper 
stories about his life. It is in some respects a counterbalance, an attempt to nudge actual readers into 
the sorts of practices that will benefit the mind. 
Deloraine is not alone in its implicit division between good reading and bad. In fact, one of the 
consistent features across Godwin’s corpus is his appeal to the notion of ‘true reading’. My next 
chapter turns to directly consider Godwin’s practical reading advice, and to explore the assumptions 
about the mind upon which it was based. 
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The Discipline of Reading: 
Education and Dissenting Pedagogy 
 
Introduction 
‘[F]ew men have sufficiently reflected on the true mode of reading’, William Godwin contended in 
The Enquirer (1797).1 His comment reflects a longstanding interest in reading as a practical task, and 
simultaneously advertises his exclusive attitude towards it: the fact that reading had a ‘true mode’ 
meant that it also had a false one. Writing to Percy Shelley a few years later, Godwin argued that 
‘True reading is investigation, […] an active enquiry’.2 Particular ways of reading were so important 
to him because they were allied to the development of the mind. Healthy reading and the formation of 
private judgment were mutual developments. Such a crucial activity was not to be taken lightly, and 
accordingly practical advice about how to read appears throughout Godwin’s educational writings and 
correspondence.  
Insofar as it attracts critical attention in the modern day, this reading advice is discussed almost 
exclusively from the standpoint of freedom. The focal point tends to be Godwin’s essay ‘Of Choice in 
Reading’ in The Enquirer (1797), and its most relevant context is assumed to be the political debates 
in Britain following revolutionary events in France. Godwin’s advice is cast as a liberal voice in the 
midst of conservative reactionism: Richard De Ritter, for example, recommends that his reading 
advice ‘be viewed as a microcosmic exploration of the use and abuse of power, and of the reaction it 
provokes: a concern of obvious public relevance in the 1790s’. Others emphasise Godwin’s interest in 
the freedom of children’s reading, in particular, linking this to wider concerns about the social role of 
the imagination. Few look beyond the political context of the 1790s, and fewer still take into account 
Godwin’s reading advice beyond this period.3 
In contrast to these approaches, I argue in this chapter that Godwin’s reading advice as a whole is best 
understood from the standpoint of discipline. I justify this by examining its roots in the pedagogical 
                                                      
1 The Enquirer, p. 237. 
2 Godwin to Percy Shelley, Dec. 10 1812, in ‘Godwin/Shelley Correspondence’, Collected Novels and Memoirs, 
I, p. 81. 
3 Richard De Ritter, Imagining Women Readers, p. 91. See also: Matthew Grenby, The Child Reader, 1700-
1840 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011) (e.g. p. 244), and Grenby, ‘Politicizing the Nursery: 
British Children’s, Literature and the French Revolution’, The Lion and the Unicorn: A Critical Journal of 
Children’s Literature, 27.1 (2003), 1-26; Susan Manly, ‘William Godwin’s “School of Morality”’, The 
Wordsworth Circle, 43.3 (2012), 135-42; Robert Anderson, ‘Godwin Disguised: Politics in the Juvenile 
Library’, in Godwinian Moments: From the Enlightenment to Romanticism, ed. by Robert Maniquis and 
Victoria Myers (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011), pp. 125-46; Alan Richardson, Literature, 
Education and Romanticism: Reading as Social Practice, 1780–1832 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1994), p. 127; Julie Carlson, England’s First Family of Writers, especially pp. 80-81. 
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culture of religious Dissent – specifically, the reading advice of one educational tradition within so-
called rational Dissent, which was spearheaded by John Jennings, Philip Doddridge and Isaac Watts. 
This body of reading advice has not to date been brought to bear upon Godwin’s work, despite many 
acknowledgements from critics that eighteenth-century Dissenting culture was an important influence 
upon his pedagogy. 4 I argue here that its understanding of reading as a form of discipline was 
Godwin’s main inheritance in his educational writings, and the key concept that he remediated in his 
practical advice. Rather than denying the importance of educational and political freedom for 
Godwin, I hope to show that the organising concept of discipline encompasses and contextualises his 
concept of freedom most usefully. It reveals that educational freedom for Godwin meant a form of 
beneficial exposure to heterogeneous beliefs and choices, rather than an attitude of self-sufficiency or 
a blanket rejection of all social authority.  
My contention in this chapter is that when we look at Godwin’s reading advice through the lens of 
discipline, we clearly see the conflicted view of the human mind that he inherited from rational 
Dissenting culture: great confidence in its discriminating powers, yet great fear of its adverse 
principles, such as passivity, distraction and rebellion. The key issue that concerns Godwin in his 
reading instructions, as critics note, is authority – who or what is to be trusted with power in the 
educational process – and I argue here that this was at root a long-standing issue concerning the 
nature of the human mind, rather than simply an extension of the debate about political power in the 
1790s into the domestic realm. Through his instructions, Godwin was probing the extent to which the 
mind was corruptible and the extent to which it was perfectible. I also suggest that we catch a glimpse 
of his response to this tension through the main way in which his reading advice departs from that of 
his educational forebears: an increasing investment in textual production (something explored further 
in Chapter Five). 
The discussion of this chapter is not limited to childhood reading, in part because Godwin himself 
often did not make a clear distinction between the reading practices of adult and child. I consider 
childhood insofar as it mattered to Godwin’s reading advice, and its importance lay in its ‘ductility’, 
its nature as a crucial window for instilling habits that would set the tenor for later life. I also draw 
attention to Godwin’s specific advice for mature readers: the importance of revisiting books read in 
former days, exploiting old reading notes, and making the composition of new works an integral part 
of the reading life. Throughout all this I bracket Godwin’s involvement in the business of children’s 
publishing; my focus is his written reading advice, rather than the production or marketing of reading 
matter itself. 
                                                      
4 Works that acknowledge the importance of Dissenting education upon Godwin's work more generally include 
Pamela Clemit, ‘Godwin’s Educational Theory: “The Enquirer”’, Enlightenment and Dissent, 12 (1993), 3-11, 
and Burton Ralph Pollin, Education and Enlightenment in the Works of William Godwin (New York: Las 
Americas, 1962), especially chapters one and two on the concepts of rationality and perfectibility. 
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Unlike Isaac Watts, Godwin did not devote a book or an essay purely to the topic of ‘how to read’, but 
instead dispersed his ideas throughout his educational treatises and letters, which span a period of 
over forty years. His comments feature in broader philosophical discussions of communication and 
pedagogical method; even an essay with the title ‘Of Choice in Reading’ is primarily concerned with 
power relations and epistemic authority – ‘choice’ – rather than ‘reading’ in and of itself. My main 
sources are Godwin’s two essay collections The Enquirer (1797) and Thoughts on Man (1830). I also 
draw from personal correspondence between these publications, to Marmaduke Martin in 1798 and to 
Percy Shelley in 1812. Godwin acted as educational adviser and tutor to a number of young men, and 
the letter to Martin was subsequently incorporated into ‘Letter of Advice to a Young American’, an 
1818 pamphlet which responded to the enquiries of an aspiring student from the USA, Joseph 
Vallence Bevan.5  
Whilst I argue in this chapter that a clear pattern of advice emerges from Godwin’s work, then, I also 
respect the individual contexts of Godwin’s comments, showing differences and developments within 
them as well as continuities. In fact, the dispersed and integrated nature of Godwin’s reading advice 
as a whole is significant in its own right, reflecting something crucial about his approach to reading. 
For Godwin, ‘true’ reading was not a study skill that could be segregated from others, but rather an 
outworking of a way of life, an action that sprung naturally from the ‘enquiring’ disposition. Indeed, 
by writing the bulk of his educational advice as essays and weaving his reading advice throughout 
them, Godwin was attempting to instil this enquiring disposition as he described it. According to The 
Enquirer’s preface, his essays were ‘the materials of thinking […] the hints of enquiry rather than 
actual enquiries: but hereafter perhaps they may be taken under other men’s protection, and cherished 
to maturity’.6 In other words, Godwin chose the essay form in order to embody his educational 
advice, to initiate his audience into the discipline of ‘true’ reading.  
Discipline is a rich term with a long history; I will exploit two aspects of its meaning as I make my 
argument in this chapter.7 I begin by outlining an educational tradition that flourished in several 
Dissenting Academies during the mid-eighteenth century, in which the activity of reading became a 
new preoccupation, an area of study (discipline) in itself. Its key figures, Philip Doddridge and Isaac 
Watts, had a broad influence upon Dissenting education through their teaching methods, lectures and 
textbooks, which were embraced in the academy Godwin attended at Hoxton. I show that their 
                                                      
5 See the editor’s introduction to Godwin, ‘Letter of Advice to a Young American, on the course of studies it 
might be most advantageous for him to pursue’, in Political and Philosophical Works, V, pp. 318-38 (pp. 318-
19), and references to Bevan in The Diary of William Godwin throughout the year 1818.  
6 The Enquirer, p. 78. 
7 The OED entry for ‘discipline, n.’ distinguishes between ‘Senses relating to punishment’, ‘Senses relating to 
training, instruction, or method’ and ‘Senses relating to order arising from training or instruction’. My first use 
of the term here refers to sections 5a and 7a: ‘Instruction as given to disciples, scholars, etc.’; ‘A branch of 
learning or knowledge; a field of study’. My second use refers mainly to section 4a, ‘Instruction or teaching 
intended to mould the mind and character’, yet also draws from its specific application to military, medical and 
moral regimes (see sections 4, 8 and 9). 
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approach to the life of the mind meant that reading was conceived as a form of training, discipline in 
the sense that applied to military, medical and moral regimes. I then explore the three main principles 
within this discipline of reading as they were remediated in Godwin’s work – exposure, routine and 
skill – drawing attention to the conflicted view of the mind that these principles expose.  
 
Reading and Rational Dissenting Pedagogy 
Perhaps the most important context for Godwin’s educational theory is eighteenth-century rational 
Dissenting pedagogy. The Dissenting academies of eighteenth-century Britain had developed in 
response to the 1662 Act of Uniformity which, together with the statutes of the Universities, 
effectively barred all non-conformists from Oxford and Cambridge. They were generally small, 
irregular and lacking in resources, often facing closure or relocation due to legal action or the death of 
a tutor. Yet their curricula developed into the most broad and innovative of their day, and countless 
figures of influence emerged from their student ranks: from Daniel Defoe to Joseph Priestley to John 
Keats. Godwin came from a family of strong Dissenting tradition, as discussed in the Introduction, 
and was educated at Hoxton Dissenting Academy (having been rejected from Homerton due to 
heterodox views).8 
The life of the mind was very important to religious Dissenters of the eighteenth century, many of 
whom believed it to have crucial ethical, even salvific, implications. Despite various and important 
differences between Non-Conformist groups, three unifying beliefs held by all Dissenting 
denominations were commonly summarised as ‘1. The right of private judgment, 2. Liberty of 
conscience, and 3. The perfection of scripture as a Christian’s only rule of faith and practice’.9 This 
first emphasis upon independent intellectual conviction was particularly important to Rational 
Dissenters, who upheld reason as the primary arbiter in religious matters. Their approach was founded 
on the belief that the human mind had an innate capacity to distinguish truth from error given equal 
circumstances, or as Joseph Priestley put it, that ‘Truth will always have an infinite advantage over 
                                                      
8 For a wealth of information on Dissenting Academies and for up-to-date scholarship, see ‘Dissenting 
Academies Online’, The Dissenting Academies Project, The Queen Mary Centre for Religion and Literature in 
English, Queen Mary University of London <www.qmulreligionandliterature.co.uk/research/the-dissenting-
academies-project> [accessed 24 May 2018]; predecessors to this project include Irene Parker, Dissenting 
Academies in England: Their Rise and Progress and Their Place among the Educational Systems of the Country 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1914); H. McLachlan, English Education Under the Test Acts: Being 
the History of the Non-Conformist Academies 1662-1820 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1931); Joe 
W. Ashley Smith, The Birth of Modern Education: The Contribution of the Dissenting Academies, 1660-1800 
(London: Independent Press, 1954). For details of the curriculum at Hoxton during Godwin’s time, see Peter 
Marshall, William Godwin, pp. 33-45. 
9 Qtd. in Daniel E. White, Early Romanticism and Religious Dissent (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2006), p. 10. 
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error, if free scope be given to inquiry’. 10 Thus for many, including the obscure Sandemanian sect in 
which Godwin was raised, eternal life was at stake in the operation of an individual’s private 
judgment. At times this focus upon truth’s ‘natural revelation’ (through reason) left the role of 
‘special revelation’ (through Biblical texts) rather uncertain; it was a problem of authority that caused 
division within Dissenting Academies throughout the century.11 
In accordance with this high view of reasoning powers, many Dissenting educational institutions were 
founded upon the concept of ‘free enquiry’.12 Uninhibited questions were encouraged, and in many 
cases a pattern of teaching emerged that tended to emphasise methods of critical activity over and 
above specific doctrinal tenets. These educational programmes were far from sceptical or secular; as 
Tessa Whitehouse points out, ‘theological education [was] the core aim of academies, even those with 
a markedly liberal approach to education’.13 Yet within this theological agenda, many tutors came to 
believe – as Richard Price put it later in the century – that the task of education ‘should be to teach 
how to think, rather than what to think; or to lead into the best way of searching for truth, rather than 
to instruct in truth itself’.14 As an educational ethos this was mercilessly attacked by conservative 
thinkers, perhaps most famously in Edmund Burke’s criticism of Price in 1790. ‘His zeal […] is not 
for the propagation of his own opinions, but of any opinions’, Burke wrote. ‘It is not for the diffusion 
of truth, but for the spreading of contradiction’.15 For Burke, the emphasis that rational Dissenters 
                                                      
10 Joseph Priestley, The Importance and Extent of Free Inquiry in Matters of Religion: A Sermon [...] 
(Birmingham: printed by M. Swinney; for J. Johnson, no. 72. St. Paul’s Churchyard, London, 1785), p. 18. For 
more on the concept of truth in Dissenting culture, see Chapter Four. 
11 For a helpful definition of Rational Dissent and its place within Christian denominations, see Mark Philp, 
‘Rational Religion and Political Radicalism in the 1790s’, Enlightenment and Dissent, 4 (1985): 35-46 (esp. p. 
36); see also the essays collected in Enlightenment and Religion: Rational Dissent in Eighteenth-Century 
Britain, ed. by Knud Haakonssen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). On Sandemanianism in 
particular see ‘Glasites’, in The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church, ed. by F. L. Cross and E. A. 
Livingstone (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), and Mark Philp, ‘Godwin, William (1756-1836)’, in 
Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford University Press Online, 2004), 
<http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780198614128-e-
10898 > [accessed 23 Feb 2018]: ‘Whereas Calvin preached faith, not works, Sandeman scorns faith and 
presents God as saving or damning a person solely ‘according to the right or wrong judgment of the 
understanding’.’ For a thorough overview of Dissent in general in this period see Michael Watts, The 
Dissenters: Vol. 1: From the Reformation to the French Revolution (Oxford: Clarendon, 1978) and Vol. 2: The 
Expansion of Evangelical Nonconformity (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995); see also Alan P. F. Sell, Philosophy, 
Dissent and Nonconformity, 1689-1920 (Cambridge: James Clarke, 2004). 
12 ‘Free enquiry’ was not, of course, an exclusively religious concept, but one that had traction in various realms 
of intellectual and cultural life in the period. Towards the end of the century Joseph Priestley even suggested 
that it had become a banal phrase, perceived by many as ‘a worn out and useless topic’ (The Importance and 
Extent of Free Inquiry in Matters of Religion, p. 6). Nevertheless, ‘free enquiry’ was a defining mark of 
Godwin’s religious upbringing and the teaching texts from which he was tutored. For more detail of the broad 
associations of ‘freedom of thought’ in eighteenth-century culture, see Peter N. Miller, ‘“Free Thinking” and 
“Freedom of Thought” in Eighteenth-Century Britain’, The Historical Journal, 36.3 (1993), 599-617. 
13 Tessa Whitehouse, The Textual Culture of English Protestant Dissent, 1720-1800 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2015), p. 17. 
14 Richard Price, Observations on the Importance of the American Revolution, and the Means of Making It a 
Benefit to the World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 51. 
15 Edmund Burke, Reflections on the French Revolution in France, ed. by Conor Cruise O’Brien (London: 
Penguin, 1986), p. 95. 
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placed upon method meant that they failed in substance. They dispersed their students into heterodoxy 
and scepticism, thus failing in education’s primary task, to pass on an inherited body of wisdom to the 
emerging generation. 
This emerging pedagogical priority of ‘how to think’ over ‘what to think’ gave the practice of reading 
a new prominence and significance within Dissenting Academies. Dissenters had long emphasised the 
importance of rigorous, independent engagement with the Scriptures, but many tutors began to 
develop this devotional advice into a broader educational principle. Reading became a sort of 
discipline in itself – a focus of study in its own right – and a crucial one, because in their view 
different modes of enquiry were allied to different moral, social and spiritual outcomes. As one 
Dissenting pupil noted, the ‘true End of Reading’ for tutors such as Doddridge was ‘to furnish the 
Mind with Materials to exercise its own Powers’.16 In other words, reading was a God-given means to 
develop the faculty of private judgment; this was its ‘true End’ or teleology. Reading was central to 
the life of the mind, and thus central to the very fabric of society. 
One notable body of reading advice that emerged from this ethos was centred around a collaborative 
network of Dissenting educationists, which included Jennings, Doddridge and Watts. Their advice can 
be described according to three principles for inculcating intellectual health – exposure, routine and 
skill – which reflected the mix of confidence and doubt that rational Dissenters invested in the human 
mind. Trust in the mind’s innate capacity to discriminate between truth and error led to the advocacy 
of wide-ranging, extensive reading – what I have called the principle of exposure. At the same time, 
fear of its adverse principles (passivity, distraction, rebellion) led to a focus on adhering to rigorous 
reading regimes and honing particular skills of critical engagement with texts. Taken as a whole, their 
advice figured reading as a discipline, in the sense of a training programme. The principles they 
espoused were formative for Godwin, as we shall see, and permeated his educational writing. 
John Jennings (1687-1723), who established an academy at Kibworth, is an early example of the 
rational Dissenting emphasis upon extensive reading. One of his pupils recorded that he ‘encourages 
the utmost freedom of inquiry. He furnishes us with all kinds of authors of every subject, without 
advising us to skip over the heretical passages for fear of infection’. When he gave lectures, ‘Mr 
Jennings does not follow the doctrines or phrases of any particular party; but is sometimes a Calvinist, 
sometimes an Arminian, and sometimes a Baxterian, as truth and evidence determine him’.17 
Jennings’s approach was founded on an ideal of intellectual exposure; he followed the argument of 
                                                      
16 Job Orton, Memoirs of the Life, Character and Writings of the Late Reverend Philip Doddridge, D.D. Of 
Northampton (Salop: printed by J. Cotton and J. Eddowes; and sold by J. Buckland, in Pater-Noster-Row, 
London, 1766), p. 125. 
17 Philip Doddridge, The Correspondence and Diary of Philip Doddridge, D.D. Illustrative of Various 
Particulars in His Life Hitherto Unknown; with Notices of Many of His Contemporaries, and a Sketch of the 
Ecclesiastical History of the Times in Which He Lived, ed. by John Doddridge Humphreys, 5 vols (London: 
Henry Colburn and Richard Bentley, 1830), I, pp. 198, 156. 
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Milton’s Areopagitica (1644), which in its campaign against press licensing had claimed robust 
reasoning skills as a product of uncensored reading. He was convinced that the mind’s critical powers 
would be strengthened by exposure to a broad range of views.18 It was a controversial standpoint even 
amongst other Christian denominations, many of which did not share this exalted view of human 
intellect and feared that young readers would be corrupted by unorthodox or immoral texts. As early 
as 1703, Samuel Palmer wrote a pamphlet that defended the Dissenting schools against charges of 
licentious and lewd reading, indicating that their affiliation with unrestricted reading practice was 
already strong.19  
To ensure this freedom of reading was undertaken responsibly, Jennings maintained a strict routine of 
study for all his students, and would question them extensively about their reading to ascertain 
whether or not they were using their independent reason in response to their books.20 Exposure was 
good for the reading mind insofar as it equipped them for intellectual battle: it was a means of 
provoking the mind to be active, forcing it to reason independently rather than allowing it to passively 
accept the orthodox position. Whilst many criticized Jennings’s approach as irresponsible, others 
greatly admired his generosity towards different viewpoints and emphasis upon disciplined critical 
engagement. His method was formative for future Dissenting educationists including Doddridge, 
Watts, and Andrew Kippis (Godwin’s own tutor at Hoxton).21   
Philip Doddridge (1702–1751), a pupil of Jennings who became leader of the Academy at 
Northampton, admired this reading advice and developed it further in his own educational practice.22 
A voracious reader and a polymath, Doddridge was the first Dissenting tutor to establish an academy 
                                                      
18 See John Milton, Areopagitica; A Speech of Mr. John Milton For the Liberty of Unlicenc’d Printing, To the 
Parliament of England, in Complete Prose Works of John Milton, ed. by Ernest Sirluck, 8 vols (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1959), II, pp. 480-570. For more information about Jennings’s teaching, see ‘Dissenting 
Education and the Legacy of John Jennings, c.1720-c.1729 (Second Edition)’, ed. by Tessa Whitehouse, The 
Dissenting Academies Project, Queen Mary University of London, 
<www.qmulreligionandliterature.co.uk/online-publications/dissenting-education>; and Mark Burden, ‘Jennings, 
John’, in A Biographical Dictionary of Tutors at the Dissenters’ Private Academies, 1660-1729 (London: Dr 
Williams’s Centre for Dissenting Studies, 2013), pp. 294-300. 
19 Samuel Palmer, A Defence of the Dissenters Education in Their Private Academies: In Answer to Mr. W-Y’s 
Disingenuous and Unchristian Reflections upon ’Em. In a Letter to a Noble Lord (London: printed and are to be 
sold by A. Baldwin, 1703), pp. 15-16; for a later example of the strongly differing views about what was 
appropriate to read within Dissenting communities themselves, see Watts, The Dissenters: Vol. 2: The 
Expansion of Evangelical Nonconformity, pp. 209-10. 
20 See Doddridge, Correspondence and Diary, p. 464. 
21 Whitehouse’s The Textual Culture of English Protestant Dissent examines the collaborative relationship of 
this educational group in great detail.   
22 For a thorough explication of Doddridge’s teaching, see Isabel Rivers, The Defence of Truth through the 
Knowledge of Error: Philip Doddridge’s Academy Lectures (London: Dr Williams’s Trust, 2003). See also her 
discussion of Doddridge in ‘Dissenting and Methodist Books of Practical Divinity’, in Books and Their Readers 
in Eighteenth-Century England, ed. by Isabel Rivers (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1982), pp. 127-64 
(pp. 136-38), and her entry for Doddridge in the ODNB: ‘Doddridge, Philip (1702–1751)’, Oxford Dictionary of 
National Biography (Oxford University Press Online, 2004), 
<http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780198614128-e-7746> 
[accessed 23 Feb. 2018]. 
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library (others relied on teachers’ private collections), and he gave lectures to his students on its 
contents and proper use. Doddridge was convinced that extensive, unrestricted reading would foster 
sound critical judgment; individual reasoning would be strengthened through the habitual practice of 
discernment, leading to more reliable knowledge of God’s truth. In a letter to John Wesley, he argued 
that ‘in order to defend the truth, it is very proper that a young minister should know the chief strength 
of error’.23 Wesley, like many others, strongly objected. Their dispute about pedagogy highlights a 
more fundamental theological disagreement about the nature of the mind, which was endemic to both 
the established church and nonconformists in this period, and revolved around the extent to which 
human reason was affected by sin. For Doddridge, the mind was more perfectible than it was 
corrupted, and this was reflected in his confidence in wide reading. 
Doddridge’s method of lecturing further enacted his belief in the principle of exposure. He would 
assemble opposing arguments from several authors representing the main approaches to his topic, and 
discuss his views of their merits; students would then copy down a broad reading list and follow up 
the references for several hours in the library. At the next lecture he would question his pupils 
concerning their opinions before proceeding to the next subject, and whilst making his personal 
beliefs clear, his concern to foster a proper investigative method in his students came over and above 
his own doctrinal convictions. As Isabel Rivers points out, the rhetorical emphasis upon ‘free enquiry’ 
amongst Rational Dissenters did have practical boundaries; the denominational agendas of academy 
life remained strong, and library resources were limited.24 Nevertheless, Doddridge was both 
criticised and respected for his perceived encouragement of extensive reading, emphasis upon 
independent judgment and avoidance of dogmatism.  
Alongside this emphasis upon extensive reading, Doddridge believed in the formation of disciplined 
reading habits. Time was a fleeting resource and needed to be used wisely. He himself kept to a strict 
schedule of study, often rising at 5am to read for several hours before breakfast.25 An early 
memorandum entitled ‘Rules for the Direction of my Conduct While a Student’ contains the 
commitment: ‘Never let me trifle with a book with which I may have no present concern’.26 This fear 
of wasting time through ‘superficial’ reading is evident throughout his writings. He later advised a 
friend to ‘consider books as a food we ordinary sort of animals cannot live without; and yet we may 
possibly be overcharged, if we cram ourselves with more than we can digest’.27 His portrayal of 
careful reading as digestion was a resonant and widespread metaphor, one picked up by Watts, and 
later in the century by Godwin. 
                                                      
23 Doddridge, Correspondence and Diary, IV, p. 493 (emphasis in original). 
24 Rivers, The Defence of Truth, pp. 18, 31. 
25 See comments throughout Doddridge, Correspondence and Diary. 
26 Doddridge, Correspondence and Diary, I, p. 97. 
27 Ibid, p. 459. 
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To ensure that reading was properly digested, Doddridge advocated close, critical engagement with 
books. Job Orton – a pupil, friend and later a colleague of Doddridge – testified to these habits of 
‘Care and close Study’ in a posthumous biography, remembering him as a keen note-taker who sought 
out books with large margins.28 Orton recalled his example with admiration: 
As he cautioned his Pupils against that indolent and superficial Way of Reading, which many 
Students fall into, so he took Care that his own Example should enforce his Precepts. His 
usual Method was, to read with a Pen in his Hand, and to mark in the Margin particular 
Passages, which struck him. Besides which, he often took down Hints of what was most 
important, or made References to them, in a blank Leaf of the Book, adding his own 
reflections on the Author’s Sentiments.29  
This close, analytical sort of reading was important to Doddridge not simply for understanding the 
text, but for the formation of individual reasoning powers. It was about adopting and honing the 
critical skills that would ensure one’s faculty of judgment was effective. As Orton noted, Doddridge 
believed that ‘the true End of Reading [was] only to furnish the Mind with Materials to exercise its 
own Powers’.30 To unite the practice of reading with one’s own writing, in particular, was to take a 
crucial step in the formation of private judgment – a conviction that Godwin would endorse and 
expand upon throughout his literary life.  
This nascent pattern of reading was articulated most fully in the writings of scholar and hymnodist 
Isaac Watts (1674–1748). Whilst Watts did not hold a tutorial post, his educational works were very 
influential amongst the Dissenting network; Arthur Davis remarks that ‘he was commonly accepted 
by his colleagues as the principal adviser on matters educational’.31 He also had a close literary 
relationship with Doddridge, both editing each other’s texts and building from their ideas.32 Watts’s 
treatise The Improvement of the Mind (1741, 1751), a sequel to his enormously popular Logick; Or, 
the Right Use of Reason in the Inquiry After Truth (1725), took the Rational Dissenting conviction 
about the centrality of independent reason and translated it into a set of practical instructions for 
conversation, meditation and reading. The reading principles of exposure, routine and skill, developed 
by Jennings and Doddridge, were manifest most clearly in Watts’s work. He presented reading as a 
discipline for the mind, akin to physical exercise or labour, and expanded in detail upon particular 
strategies for promoting the rigour and growth of critical faculties. 
Like Jennings and Doddridge, Watts presented critical exposure as essential to the healthy 
development of the mind. Yet although he eulogised the proliferation of printed material throughout 
                                                      
28 Job Orton, Memoirs of Doddridge, p. 16. 
29 Ibid, p. 124. 
30 Ibid, p. 125. 
31 Arthur Paul Davis, Isaac Watts: His Life and Work (London: Independent Press, 1948), p. 100. 
32 See Whitehouse, Textual Culture; this relationship is evident throughout Doddridge's Correspondence and 




history as a divinely ordained process, he downplayed the overt summons to extensive reading that 
characterised his colleagues’ work.33 Instead, he used the principle to advocate an internal disposition 
towards exposure, a posture of openness to ideas. Quoting the book of Proverbs, Watts instructed 
readers to ‘Cry after knowledge, and lift up thy voice; seek her as silver, and search for her as for 
hidden treasures’.34 For Watts, this disposition of exposure involved placing oneself in the author’s 
shoes and viewing things from his or her perspective: ‘Enter into the sense and argument of the 
authors you read’, he advised. Readers must be imaginatively open to the viewpoints they come 
across; only by this sort of intimate mental investment will they be enabled to judge the merit of the 
work accurately.35  
Watts was also at pains to present good reading as a temporal discipline, a way of life that readers 
formed through deliberate habits. Readers, he contended, must seek ‘by degrees an Habit of judging 
justly, and of reasoning well’.36 This meant that they had to work regularly at their task: do not 
‘abandon reading and labour’, he urged, listing the verbs side by side to imply their affinity. 37 He 
repeatedly used agricultural imagery to emphasise this point: ‘infinite errors will overspread the mind, 
which […] lies without any cultivation’, he argued, warning would-be readers against idleness or half-
hearted reading. The neglected intellect, he warned, will become ‘a barren desert, or a forest 
overgrown with weeds and brambles’.38 He believed that the mind must be tilled regularly like a field, 
or it would never be fruitful.  
In giving these instructions, Watts was reacting strongly against the idea that intellectual ability could 
be innate and unschooled. He was not denying the existence of talent, but attacking the pedagogical 
idea that talent would bring itself to fruition unaided by educational discipline. ‘Presume not too much 
upon a bright genius,’ Watts cautioned from the beginning of Improvement of the Mind, ‘for this 
without labour and study will never make a man of knowledge and wisdom’.39 This sort of 
presumption was particularly pernicious because it appeared to undermine the key Dissenting 
conviction that truth must always be actively examined for oneself and not chosen by instinct or blind 
trust. The treatise is thus at pains to present reading as an ‘industry’, and frequently warns against the 
mental and spiritual dangers of critical apathy. 40  
                                                      
33 ‘[T]he providence of God has brought printing into the world’ – see Watts, ‘A Discourse on the Education of 
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372). Cf. Godwin, Political Justice, p. 141; Political Justice: Variants, pp. 138-39; Thoughts on Man, p. 248. 
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35 Watts, Improvement of the Mind, p. 209. 
36 Ibid., p. 67 (emphasis mine). 
37 Ibid., pp. 185-88. 
38 Ibid., p. 185. 
39 Ibid., p. 188; cf. Watts, Logick; Or, the Right Use of Reason in the Inquiry After Truth, in The works of the 
late reverend and learned Isaac Watts, D.D […], V, pp. 1-184 (p. 162). 
40 e.g. Watts, Improvement of the Mind, p. 195. 
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Watts expressed his conflation of reading and labour practically through the endorsement of strict 
reading routine, giving instructions, like Doddridge, for the efficient use of time. He believed different 
topics and pursuits should have regular seasons, like recommending crop rotation to make the most of 
the soil. ‘Let every particular study have due and proper time assigned it’, he advised; ‘Order and 
method in a course of study will have a happy influence to secure you from trifling and wasting your 
minutes in impertinence’. When organising this schedule, it was also important to be aware of the 
mind’s limits: ‘Do not apply yourself to any one study at one time longer than the mind is capable of 
giving a close attention to it without weariness or wandering’; ‘Don’t over-fatigue the spirits at any 
time’.41 Habits of private judgment would be formed most effectively through reading schedules that 
maximised attentive capacities. 
Diligent habit wasn’t enough on its own, however: ‘There are many who read with constancy and 
diligence, and yet make no advance in true knowledge by it’.42 Watts also recommended specific 
techniques of critical engagement with one’s reading matter, and he went into them at greater length 
than other Dissenting pedagogues. He gave detailed instructions about how become a skilled reader, 
describing practical strategies that would render the labour of the reader effective and fruitful. There 
was a degree of finitude and fallenness to the mind that meant the reader needed to be cautious and 
thorough in their engagement with books. He wanted readers to develop abilities and strategies that 
would protect them from these tendencies to deception, superficiality, impotence.  
Watts separated ‘reading’ and ‘meditation’ into separate sections in The Improvement of the Mind, but 
he considered them inseparable, like two sides of the same coin. He made it clear that ‘meditation, or 
study’ was an integral part of truly profitable reading, and encapsulated this contention in gustatory 
metaphor. Reading was like eating, and critical engagement with one’s reading was like digestion: 
It is meditation and study that transfers and conveys the notions and sentiments of others to 
ourselves, so as to make them properly our own. It is our own judgment upon them as well as 
our memory of them that makes them become our own property. It does as it were, concoct 
our intellectual food, and turns it into a part of ourselves: Just as a man may call his limbs and 
his flesh his own, whether he borrowed the materials from the ox or the sheep, from the lark 
or the lobster […] it is all now become one substance with himself.43 
In expressing the need to ‘digest’ reading by means of this extra dimension, Watts was drawing from 
a long tradition of reading-eating metaphor. As Denise Gigante has explored, the imagery of digestion 
in eighteenth-century writing had two major strands of meaning: it could suggest the drive of 
corporeal, Hobbesian appetite, as well as an older idea of holistic engagement with authoritative 
revelation, ‘a presecular ontology of eating based on the edible Word of Christianity’.44 Watts was 
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perhaps exploiting both connotations: readers could be shallow gobblers, concerned merely with their 
transient appetites, or devoted recipients, who processed the materials they received through the 
discipline of close engagement. He was implying that intellectual health and growth could only be 
acquired from reading matter if it was skilfully processed, integrated into a larger critical economy. 
As he wrote later in the treatise, ‘Readers may cram themselves in vain with intellectual food, and 
without real improvement of their minds, for want of digesting it by proper reflections’.45 Most 
significantly, Watts allied this practice to the formation of an independent intellect. Shallow readers 
merely regurgitate the arguments of books they read, but the digesting reader transforms them into 
their ‘own property’. He implied that intellectual nutrients would only be acquired through a certain 
sort of reading. 
Accordingly, Watts gave instructions about how to read in this distinctive, meditative manner. He 
advised readers to work through books slowly (after a quick initial survey of the contents and 
structure). He recommended that books were read more than once, with the occasional exception of 
history, ‘poesy’ or travels.46 He also placed great stress upon proper habits of notation; commonplace 
books were a popular educational resource at the time, but Watts’s treatise transcended 
commonplacing conventions and expanded their usual role.47 He recommended that students mark up 
their books with questions and comments, create their own index systems, and even rewrite an 
original text into a more convincing argument. He argued that particularly worthy books should be 
written out in an abridged form for personal use, a suggestion that was popular in Academy teaching 
and may well have inspired the practice that Godwin prescribes in his educational writing (see below). 
‘[O]ne book read over in this manner, with all this laborious meditation, will tend more to enrich your 
understanding, than the skimming over the surface of twenty authors’, Watts claimed.48 It forced the 
reader to verbalise their interaction with the text, bringing their response into clear formation and 
enabling them to reflect upon it; it was a safeguard against thoughtless reading, prejudice, and the 
passive absorption of error. Godwin was greatly impacted by this idea that the marriage of reading 
and writing enabled private judgment to be properly formed. 
Watts’s reading advice thus distilled the fundamental principle of all these Dissenting educators: 
discipline. We see this reflected in the language of training, labour, and cultivation, which describes 
the task of reading according to a version of Protestant work ethic. Watts, in particular, persistently 
                                                      
45 Watts, Improvement of the Mind, p. 209. 
46 Ibid., pp. 76, 198, 206, 211. 
47 For a detailed account of commonplace book usage in the eighteenth century see David Allan, Commonplace 
Books and Reading in Georgian England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). Allan locates the 
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described reading as ‘labour’ and ‘industry’.49 Joseph Priestley summarised and reiterated this view 
when he argued that the nature of a good education as a whole was ‘constant exercise and 
discipline’.50 As a foundational ideal, this may at first appear antithetical to that of independent 
reasoning, which was the professed goal of such Dissenting education. But it was in fact integral to it, 
as Richard Price expressed in the 1780s: 
[H]itherto education […] has been a contraction, not an enlargement of the intellectual 
faculties; an injection of false principles hardening them in error, not a discipline enlightening 
and improving them. Instead of opening and strengthening them, and teaching to think freely; 
it hath cramped and enslaved them, and qualified for thinking only in one track. 51  
Price encapsulates the Dissenting position here by presenting mental strength, freedom and 
enlightenment as the outcomes of ‘a discipline’. Rational Dissenters pictured intellectual life as an 
ongoing battle: they believed that the mind had an innate capacity to apprehend truth when in an 
active, unprejudiced state, but that in order to reach that state it must fight against the reigning social 
climate of passivity and prejudice, which hampered the development of private judgment from birth. 
Only by engaging habitually in action and by training oneself in the techniques of reasoning, 
interpreting and imagining would one become independent, truly skilled, able to judge effectively.  
The reading advice propounded by Dissenters in the Watts-Doddridge tradition thus exposes a 
conflicted view of the human mind. Their pedagogy was best publicised for its underlying confidence 
in the mind’s innate abilities, and its emphasis upon the benefits of mental exposure through extensive 
reading brought much ridicule and censure. But they also adhered to principles that were less radical 
and less optimistic: their focus upon inculcating habit reveals a fear of mental tendencies to passivity 
and indolence, and their focus upon critical skills reveals a fear of the impotence, superficiality and 
prejudice that threatened intellectual life. Their reading advice indicates that they were grappling with 
key philosophical and theological questions about the nature of the mind. Does it lend itself more to 
corruption or to perfection? Is it innately active or passive, honest or deceptive? What degree of 
confidence should we place in it? 52  
Despite the internal tensions and external hostility that they experienced, this group of educators had 
considerable influence. Doddridge’s lectures were revised, annotated and circulated for about 70 years 
after his death, and were influential both in Dissenting institutions and amongst a wider public – they 
were even used by some Oxbridge tutors.53 Watts’s books, in particular, were immensely popular. The 
Improvement of the Mind was famously praised by Samuel Johnson – ‘Whoever has the care of 
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51 Price, Observations on the Importance of the American Revolution, pp. 51-52 (emphasis in original). 
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instructing others, may be charged with deficience in his duty if this book is not recommended’ – and 
a contemporary historian describes it as ‘one of the best known textbooks’ of the period.54 Its especial 
popularity in Romantic-period Britain is attested to by the fact that it went through several new 
editions in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century.  
 
The Discipline of Reading in Godwin’s Work 
Godwin’s fundamental interest in reading practice – particularly his sense of the determinative effects 
of different kinds of reading – stemmed from the educational approach outlined above. I argue in this 
section that Godwin inherited the rational Dissenting conception of reading as a discipline, both in the 
sense of a focus of study, and in the sense of a training regime that moulded the habits and abilities of 
the participant. He believed that such discipline was fundamental to the achievement of freedom and 
independence, and articulated this in similar terms to his Dissenting forebears long after he abandoned 
his religious convictions. See, for example, this extract from some reading advice in The Enquirer: 
The discipline of mind here described is of inestimable value. He that is not initiated in the 
practice of close investigation, is constantly exposed to the danger of being deceived. His 
opinions have no standard; but are entirely at the mercy of his age, his country, the books he 
chances to read, or the company he happens to frequent. His mind is a wilderness.55 
In similar terms to Price, Godwin assumes here that intellectual independence – the cultivation of 
one’s private judgment – is achieved through ‘discipline of mind’. But Godwin is more specific, 
making a particular sort of reading fundamental to this discipline: ‘the practice of close [textual] 
investigation’. This is the prerequisite for intellectual freedom. The reader that doesn’t undergo this 
reading discipline will remain dependent upon their cultural, social, and historical circumstances, ‘at 
the mercy’ of time and chance. Like Watts’s undisciplined reader, their mind is unfruitful as a 
consequence, ‘a wilderness’.56 
Godwin’s own education was clearly shaped by the Doddridge-Watts tradition. Two of his tutors at 
Hoxton, Andrew Kippis and Samuel Morton Savage, had been disciples and friends of Doddridge, 
and in his autobiography he gave prominence to his memories of reading during his time there, 
suggesting its key role in Academy life.57 Evidence shows that Godwin had a keen eye for 
pedagogical theory from an early date: one of his first published works is a prospectus for an 
Academy of his own (which was never actualised). Notably, this work gives reading a special 
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importance, assuming that a child’s education should be tailored to instil within them a love of 
reading and to encourage critical engagement with books.58 Godwin was undoubtedly familiar with 
Watts’s educational work, and records reading his Logick as late as 1792.59 
Yet Godwin’s debt to the Watts-Doddridge pedagogical tradition is perhaps shown most clearly by 
the fact that he continued their emphasis upon the ‘how’ of education over and above the ‘what’. He 
articulated it explicitly as his central principle in The Enquirer: ‘It is of less importance’, he argued, 
‘that a child should acquire this or that species of knowledge, than that, through the medium of 
instruction, he should acquire habits of intellectual activity’.60 This conviction about intellectual life 
forms the backbone of the collection: each essay is concerned, at root, with the conditions necessary 
for instilling and directing beneficial habits of mind. It also translates directly into a concern about 
reading, just as it had done for Doddridge and Watts. Godwin attaches great significance to particular 
modes and strategies of reading, allying them to various kinds of outcome for the intellectual life. We 
see this concern clearly in his infamous passage about the ‘tendency’ of reading in The Enquirer: 
Godwin’s fundamental argument is that a child’s moral character will ultimately be determined by 
their ‘temper of mind’ – the ‘how’ of their thinking and reading – rather than simply by the content of 
their books.61  
Godwin, then, was remediating in his educational writings a Dissenting tradition in which reading was 
understood not simply as a useful accomplishment or a means to impart information, but as a crucial 
tool of enquiry in itself, according to which the mind was shaped for good or for ill. He believed that 
the development of ‘true’ reading practice would ultimately lead to the advancement of the human 
species because it was integral to the development of private judgment, the linchpin of social 
behaviour. As he wrote in The Enquirer, ‘He that loves reading, has every thing within his reach’.62 
This high view of reading is reflected in the fact that Godwin’s advice was directed to a specific sort 
of person, ‘the enquirer’ – a highly idealised person whose fundamental concern was to nourish their 
intellectual life. This is not to say that his writings were designed exclusively for full-time students, 
but that they assume the cultivation of intellectual life as their primary end or priority.  
In what follows, I compare Godwin’s practical reading advice with that of his predecessors, 
approaching it via the three principles that emerged from the Doddridge-Watts network: exposure, 
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routine, and skill. My main goal is to show that he drew heavily from this tradition, but I also 
highlight areas of departure. Godwin resisted what he perceived to be a hermeneutic bias towards the 
Christian Scriptures, paid more attention to the role of the imagination in reading, and placed a 
stronger emphasis upon composition, which he positioned as reading’s greatest fruit. He thus adapted 
the advice to suit a more sceptical framework of enquiry and an increasingly author-focussed literary 
environment. On a fundamental level, however, Godwin’s reading advice reveals that he inherited the 
Rational Dissenters’ ambivalence about the nature of the mind. It exposures his mixture of hope and 
fear in the mind’s capacities and tendencies, and indicates some of the ways in which he attempted to 
negotiate it.  
 
Exposure 
Like Jennings and Doddridge, Godwin advocated wide-ranging, extensive reading practices in order 
to train readers in critical discernment. This was his particular focus in The Enquirer, in which he 
argued that readers should be exposed to a wide range of printed material from the earliest age, of 
different languages, genres and viewpoints; in this way, their critical judgment would be sharpened as 
they learnt to distinguish truth from error. ‘It must probably be partial, not extensive, information, that 
is calculated to lead us astray’, he contended. ‘[H]e who reads in a proper spirit, can scarcely read too 
much’.63 The essay ‘Of Choice in Reading’ is devoted to the argument that textual restriction is 
always detrimental to the young. Like those before him, Godwin echoed the argument of Milton’s 
Areopagitica, which had allied the licensing of the press with European Catholicism and intellectual 
oppression. He asks,  
Is it our duty to digest for our offspring, as the church of Rome has been accustomed to digest 
for her weaker members, an Index Expurgatorius, a catalogue of those books in the reading of 
which they may be permitted to indulge themselves?64 
Censoring a child’s reading, Godwin argues, is a harmful and authoritarian practice; it undermines 
relational trust and results in critical naivety. Only the reader with unrestricted access to printed works 
from the earliest age will be properly trained to reason, distinguish and judge. The wise parent or 
teacher will ‘Suffer him [the child] to wander in the wilds of literature’.65  
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On one level, this argument was about releasing the reader from harmful external authorities, and thus 
a political argument. 66 Godwin had claimed in Political Justice that the major evil of political 
institutions was their inherent narrowness or fixity of ideas, which hindered accurate judgment of 
alternative viewpoints because it excluded them a priori. Recent government legislation against 
sedition reinforced this view, and Godwin’s ‘Considerations on Lord Grenville's and Mr Pitt's Bills’ 
(1795) makes similar use of Milton and the Catholic ‘Index’ in order to protest against political 
censorship.67 Giving the new generation complete freedom of reading choice would protect them from 
institutional indoctrination, Godwin reasoned. It would encourage them to rethink the traditions and 
assumptions of the reigning order.  
On a more fundamental level, however, Godwin was making an argument about the mind. His advice 
was based upon the philosophical-theological assumptions of rational Dissent, and sprung from his 
own articulation of these principles in Political Justice – in particular, a great confidence in the mind-
truth relationship. A person’s private judgment became reliable and effective if it was developed 
through habitual exercise and practice, like a sort of military training. In Godwin’s language, the mind 
needed to be kept ‘flexible’ or ‘ductile’. By advocating extensive, unrestricted reading, he was thus 
claiming that critical exposure was essential to the formation of a healthy mind. It was like a soldier’s 
experience of conflict: it was essential to know your opponents, to learn how to fight from repeated 
engagement with the enemy. The idea had been well publicised through Dissenting leaders and 
pedagogues long before Godwin’s time, Doddridge being a prominent example. Priestley had 
encapsulated it in an educational work of the late 70s, arguing that shielding a student from certain 
writers was ‘like committing him with an enemy, of whom he had no previous knowledge’.68 
Viewed from this perspective, Godwin’s essays ‘Of Choice in Reading’ and ‘Of an Early Taste in 
Reading’ are best seen as extensions to his first essay of the Enquirer collection, ‘Of Awakening the 
Mind’. Generous, extensive reading practice is crucial for Godwin because it enables the most 
fundamental thing, which is the awakening of private judgment, the spirit of ‘true enquiry’. As we’ve 
seen, he understood the goal of education as the formation of ‘habits of intellectual enquiry’, the 
development of a proper attitude or posture of mind.69 Reading’s importance thus lay primarily in the 
fact that it inculcated this through the experience of enquiry that it facilitated. His much-discussed 
theory of the moral and intellectual ‘tendencies’ of books makes most sense when read in this context: 
when considering the effects of books upon young readers, ‘Every thing depends upon the spirit in 
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which they are read’; ‘he who reads in a proper spirit, can scarcely read too much’.70 Godwin was 
arguing that the mind’s receptive posture determines the way that it receives textual content, and 
therefore the development of mental posture should be the primary focus of curricula, not textual 
content. 
Whilst this principle of critical exposure was a well-known aspect of Dissenting education, Godwin’s 
specific focus upon early childhood reading was controversial even among Dissenters. This was 
exacerbated by the timing of his publication: in the wake of Revolutionary events across the Channel, 
his theory of ‘tendency’ sounded like an excuse to infuse radical doctrine into the most vulnerable, 
despite the fact that it was drawn from Dissenting faith in the mind’s innate capacity to distinguish 
truth from error. Even the reviewers that were charitable towards his descriptions of ‘the true mode of 
reading’ elsewhere in The Enquirer were critical of his recommendation of unrestricted childhood 
reading in the same volume. ‘Books are, in effect, companions’, wrote one; ‘and parents might almost 
as safely trust their children to gather up any straggler whom they may find in the streets for an 
associate, as, before their judgment is in some degree matured, to read any book that falls in their 
way’. 71 It was the effect of exposure upon the young mind that was in dispute. For this reviewer, 
exposure to a broad range of ideas could only be a corrupting force, but for Godwin, it trained the 
mind in its most vital task, discernment.  
Godwin’s principle of reading exposure in The Enquirer was designed to foster not only rational 
engagement, but also sympathetic engagement. Imaginative exposure was just as important to him as 
critical exposure. This was partly a continuation of Dissenting advice: Watts had described good 
reading as ‘Enter[ing] into the sense and argument of the authors you read’, a sort of penetration into 
the thought-worlds of others. Whilst it might be strategic initially to take a cursory overview of a text 
– skimming through in order to survey its contents or refresh one’s memory – serious reading was 
marked out by imaginative investment.72 In The Enquirer, however, Godwin made sympathetic 
immersion more explicit as a principle for would-be readers. Watts, like most Dissenters from earlier 
in the century, had often viewed the imagination with suspicion, sometimes portraying it as a threat to 
reason. In accordance with the elevation of the imagination in late-eighteenth-century thought, 
Godwin remedied this neglect, and presented a good relationship between an author and a reader as 
intense and absorptive.73 It was about investing in someone else’s thought-world; liberating the 
imagination in order to see the world through different eyes.  
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This principle is clearly seen in the essay ‘Of an Early Taste for Reading’, in which Godwin describes 
the powerful hold of texts over readers’ imaginations in positive terms: ‘When I read Thomson, I 
become Thomson; when I read Milton I become Milton’, he asserts. ‘I find myself a sort of 
intellectual camelion [sic], assuming the colour of the substances on which I rest’.74 Somewhat 
counterintuitively, the critically active reader must begin by suspending their faculties and submitting 
to the whims of their material, almost to the extent of self-effacement. A good reader must ‘become 
the creature of his author’; he ‘bends with all his caprices, [and] sympathises with all his sensations’.75 
Reading is imagined as a temporary possession, by which the reader becomes assimilated into the 
world of the book. Godwin argued elsewhere in The Enquirer that a good author will ‘pour their 
whole soul into mine […] raise my ambition, expand my faculties, invigorate my resolutions, and 
seem to double my existence’.76  
This idea that reading might ‘expand’ or ‘double’ the reader indicates the developmental purpose for 
which Godwin intended such immersive habits. He believed that the faculty of sympathy was vital to 
intellectual life, and that imaginatively invested reading was the key means of giving it exercise. It is 
‘This mode of reading, upon which we depend for the consummation of our improvement’, Godwin 
claimed; by practising imaginative empathy from an early age, the reader would learn to sympathise 
with the situations and viewpoints of others, and thus expand their range of understanding.77 As 
indicated by his phrase ‘intellectual camelion’, he saw this as integral to the mind’s task of judgment: 
feeling was essential to reason, not separable from it. Indeed, it is this immersive reading habit that 
has produced Godwin’s ‘man of talent’ described at the beginning of the ‘Early Taste for Reading’ 
essay, an idealised enquirer who possesses great analytic and creative powers. Godwin’s choice of 
Milton and Thomson as his example authors for this imaginative activity is not incidental, either; he 
considered poetry, drama and prose narrative (of both historical and fictional origins) especially 
important vehicles for the exercise of sympathy.78 
This imaginative exposure wasn’t only important for the development of reasoning powers. In 
Godwin’s view it was also central to morality. Just as he placed confidence in the connection between 
truth and the mind’s reasoning faculty, he figured a special relationship between moral goodness and 
the mind’s feeling capacity; this led to his advocacy of imaginative exposure from an early age as 
well as critical exposure. As Pamela Clemit notes, The Enquirer was a transitional work for Godwin, 
marking the point from which he consistently prioritised imaginative operation and explored its role 
in the development of sympathetic generosity, influenced by moral sense theory through thinkers such 
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as David Hume and Adam Smith.79 In fact, Godwin was interested in this before the 1790s, for 
literary sympathy is the hallmark of his early collection of published sermons (1784). His key strategy 
in these pieces was to encourage imaginative engagement with an exemplary Biblical figure (Aaron, 
for example, after the loss of his sons) in order to recruit interest in his subsequent analysis and 
application of the passage. 80 Godwin made this conviction particularly explicit in his work of the late 
1790s, however, after the first edition of Political Justice was criticised for being exclusively reason-
focussed. 81 He increasingly emphasised his belief that feeling and reason must operate in tandem, 
each modifying, directing and expanding the other. The Enquirer thus figures healthy reading as a 
dialectic between rationality and sensibility, possession and being possessed. The imaginatively 
exposed reader expands their faculties of understanding and of feeling, literally gaining mental 
substance and structure from their engagement with reading material.  
In accordance with this conviction, Godwin described imaginative exposure through reading as a 
preventative measure, as well as a developmental one. The reader who remained imaginatively 
disengaged was barred from the task of free enquiry; he ‘makes a superficial acquaintance with his 
author […] Stiffness and formality are always visible between them’. Godwin argued that lack of 
sympathy would mar a textual relationship in the same way that it would mar a face-to-face 
relationship. Reading of the unimaginative kind made ‘an unproductive pedant’, for since the nature 
of print as a long-distance medium tended towards the disengagement of the affections, readers who 
remained at arm’s length inevitably succumbed to the dangers of cold rationalism.82 The best readers 
were imaginatively and intellectually porous, like Godwin’s ‘man of talent’ in The Enquirer. In order 
for the mind to develop holistically, it must be fully exposed to the ideas and sentiments of others.  
Godwin’s principle of exposure was also manifest in his advocacy of simultaneous reading. In his 
‘Letter of Advice’, he advised the serious reader to have several books on the go at once:  
He should compare one authority with another, and not put himself under the guidance of 
any. This is the difference I make between reading and study. He that confines himself to one 
book at a time, may be amused, but is no student. 83 
These instructions reflect the ambivalent concept of the mind upon which the principle of reading 
exposure was based. Godwin was expressing caution about textual authority, reminding readers to 
exercise discrimination and not to entrust themselves to any one viewpoint or source. Reading one 
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work at a time would cloud one’s mental vision and promote an uncritical attitude towards the 
author’s views. Godwin thus exposes his fear of the mind’s darker aspects: its tendency to be 
undiscerning, to be lazy, to fall under the sway of the loudest voice. 
These dangers even led Godwin to apply the principle of exposure to the physical space in which one 
reads. In the ‘Letter of Advice’ he argued that readers should be ‘surrounded’ with books, so that they 
‘sit in some measure in the middle of a library’. Writing to Percy Shelley, he claimed that a ‘true’ 
reader should be ‘surrounded with a sort of intrenchment [sic] and breastwork of books’. This 
environment was important because it reminded them of their position within a dialogue, the material 
objects symbolising a circle of conversation.84 In other words, it encouraged readers to stay on the 
alert, to stay focussed on the ends for which intellectual exposure was intended: critical development. 
Yet Godwin’s military language, ‘intrenchment and breastwork’ (modes of fortification), also makes 
this a hostile setting, positioning the mind in danger of attack. Reading several works at once provided 
a sort of mental barricade, defending it from the assaults of error, prejudice and passivity. 
This sort of reading was accordingly an important statement of distinction for Godwin. It was a sign 
that the reader had resisted the intellectual vices of their age. Such conviction is evident in his ‘Letter 
of Advice’ comment about ‘the difference […] between reading and study’. Like Watts, he was 
presenting the activity of reading as fundamentally unprofitable when uncoupled from ‘meditation, or 
study’, and here he offers simultaneous reading as an indication that this mistake has been avoided. In 
a similar vein, the letter to Percy Shelley associates the reading of one book at a time with ‘boarding-
school misses’. To read several books at once, Godwin implies, is to separate oneself from immature, 
amusement-driven readers, who read only to experience pleasure and have no interest in the life of the 
mind.85 
Godwin also developed this principle of reading exposure to accommodate religious scepticism, and 
in this respect he departed from the advice and practice of his Academy days. After the collapse of his 
faith, Godwin resisted the interpretive authority that his educators had endowed upon the Christian 
Scriptures, arguing that they should be read in the same manner as any other book. As Isabel Rivers 
points out, the pedagogical methods of Dissenting academies were based upon theological 
assumptions about epistemic authority (the ‘perfection of scripture as a Christian’s only rule of faith 
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and practice’).86 Thus, whilst Isaac Watts could recommend that students ‘Deal freely with every 
Author you read’, he qualified his advice by adding that ‘I would be understood to speak only of 
human Authors, not of the sacred and inspired Writings’.87 The tension of authority evident here 
between reason and revelation was something Godwin felt keenly as a young man, and his eventual 
response to it was to erase the distinction entirely. He reflected upon his own education with 
frustration, writing of the Bible in 1818 that: 
happy shall that man be, who comes to its examination and study with a firm and impartial 
mind, and not, as I did in my early acquaintance with its contents, with a mind overlaid with 
religious awe, and tutored beforehand as to what spirit it was to be read with, what I must 
look for and what I must find it, what set of feelings, arising in its perusal, I must instantly 
check, and what set of feelings I must cherish with fervour and devotion.88 
Godwin aligns his experience here with that of his eponymous protagonist in Mandeville (1817) – a 
character whose environmental conditioning predisposes him to superstitious ‘tingling and horror’ 
upon his reading of the Book of Martyrs – thus contrasting the restrictions of Dissenting practice in 
his childhood with the free and impartial ideal upheld in its educational theory.89 The mind’s capacity 
for private judgment was ‘overlaid’ by prior instruction, compromising its independence.  
Overall, Godwin remediated the principle of reading exposure that he had inherited from rational 
Dissent in three ways: in his advocacy of extensive reading, imaginatively invested reading and 
simultaneous reading. He also developed the principle in various directions, sometimes pushing it 
beyond orthodox bounds. He placed a new emphasis upon critical exposure for very young readers, 
expanded upon the role of the imagination, and removed what he saw to be a hermeneutic bias 
towards the Christian Scriptures. Ultimately, however, Godwin’s emphasis upon exposure in reading 
reveals the ambivalence that he inherited concerning the mind’s innate tendencies. His instructions for 
extensive, intellectually porous reading practices suggest a high degree of confidence in the mind’s 
discriminating powers, yet his strategies for defending the reader against prejudice and passivity 
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Like Watts, Godwin presented ‘true’ reading as a temporal discipline. He believed that healthy habits 
of enquiry were formed by adhering to routine, and that the task of reading must thus be undertaken 
with regularity. He himself certainly lived up to this ideal: the records of his fifty-year diary show that 
a structured routine of reading, writing and conversation never left him. Godwin emphasised 
strategies for this sort of daily discipline throughout his educational writings: use your time most 
efficiently to its proper end, he urged, in the same way that you would for bodily exercise or a 
military drill. Once again, these instructions reflect two divergent perspectives on the human mind: a 
confident view of its innate capacities and a cautious view of its rebellious tendencies. Godwin 
became increasingly preoccupied with reading in relation to time as his career progressed, theorising 
the perceived threats to this mental activity more intentionally in the 1820s and 30s. 
In The Enquirer Godwin argued that methodical habits of reading should be instilled in children from 
a very young age. His essays ‘Of the Sources of Genius’ and ‘Of an Early Taste for Reading’ 
propounded this idea most directly, but throughout the collection he used the imagery of husbandry to 
underscore his point. Just as Watts had warned that ‘infinite errors will overspread the mind, which is 
utterly neglected and lies without any cultivation’, Godwin described the goal of education as ‘a 
cultivated intellect’.90 The point of quotidian discipline, Godwin contended, is that  
[The child’s] mind must not be suffered to lie idle. The preceptor in this respect is like the 
incloser of uncultivated land; his first crops are not valued for their intrinsic excellence; they 
are sown that the land may be brought into order.91 
The sheer fact of regular reading prepares the ground for intellectual life, Godwin claimed; it was an 
essential part of mental cultivation, whatever the initial ability of the student. Without this discipline, 
the soil of the mind would become hard and overgrown, unable to produce its crop of sound 
judgment. As if to reinforce this, Godwin depicted the fate of a young aristocrat who was indeed 
‘suffered to lie idle’ in his novel Fleetwood. Left to wander through literature at his will during 
childhood, Fleetwood develops an unhealthy mind – a ‘sick imagination’ – which condemns him to 
domestic misery.92 
Given such potentially disastrous outcomes, Godwin urged that the young be guided into rigorous 
reading strategies. ‘Let us not from a mistaken compassion to infant years, suffer the mind to grow up 
in habits of inattention and irresolution’, he exhorted in ‘Of the Study of the Classics’. This essay 
protested against the idea that the early reading of classical texts was unnecessary for a good 
education, arguing that engagement with the classics in their original languages was especially vital 
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for a child’s development. It was integral to producing ‘discipline of mind’, for the linguistic and 
logical skills thus developed would foster critical activity and protect against the ‘lethargic indolence’ 
of an under-exercised brain.93  
A disciplined approach to student reading had characterised Dissenting academy teaching, but 
Godwin was rechannelling its arguments towards a specific contemporary issue. Watts had resisted, in 
his educational work, the growing idea that intellectual ability could develop untutored, instructing 
would-be readers to ‘Presume not too much upon a bright genius’. The Enquirer attacked this more 
explicitly as a rival educational trend. In ‘Of Learning’, Godwin decried the state of those who have 
not ‘engaged in any methodical and persevering course of reading’, and particularly took issue with 
those who justified such a casual approach through a belief in innate, natural genius. ‘[L]earning is the 
ally, not the adversary of genius’, he argued; whilst children bring certain dispositions with them into 
the world, true genius is always generated subsequent to birth through structured immersion in the 
habits of enquiry.94 An early routine of reading, Godwin claimed, was essential for the creation of 
critical health.  
Godwin’s emphasis upon temporal discipline for the very young further reflected his conflicted 
assumptions about the child’s mind. His principle of exposure expressed great confidence in the 
mind’s innate propensity to reason, judge and identify truth, yet his principle of routine suggested that 
these propensities needed to be instilled from outside – indeed, it suggested that the young tended to 
forget or rebel against them. His agricultural imagery expressed this tension well: crop growth is both 
a power or potential innate to the seeds, and a condition that the farmer must labour towards. 
Accordingly, in ‘Of An Early Taste for Reading’, Godwin described the promise of talent in children 
as an ‘embryon seed’ which should be nurtured carefully lest it ‘suffer an untimely blight’.  
In fact, Godwin addressed the issue of innate tendencies directly both in The Enquirer and in 
Thoughts on Man, a continuity which suggests it troubled him throughout his career. In both 
collections he acknowledged differing, innate qualities in children at birth and yet simultaneously 
contended that education was the most powerful influence upon the mind.95 Godwin theorised the 
dark side of the mind more explicitly in Thoughts on Man: he devoted an essay to what he called the 
principle of ‘innate rebelliousness’, arguing that ‘It is the business of education to tame the wild ass, 
the restive and rebellious principle, in our nature’.96 Like Dissenting educators before him, Godwin 
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presented reading as a discipline in order to counter such omens of irrationality and stubbornness. His 
instructions for reading routine are at once a statement of fear toward intellectual corruption, and a 
statement of faith toward intellectual potential. 
Alongside his theorising of intellectual rebellion, Godwin increasingly theorised the reader’s use of 
time. In Thoughts on Man he explored the life of the mind from various different temporal 
perspectives, most notably in ‘Of the Duration of Human Life’, ‘Of Human Vegetation’ and ‘Of 
Leisure’. ‘Of the Duration of Human Life’ addresses the importance of using time effectively: 
Godwin details the ideal work patterns of a scholar, describing how temporal windows of mental 
efficiency should be exploited, but not exhausted.97 Like Watts in The Improvement of the Mind, he 
recommended strategies that would maximise one’s temporal opportunities and exercise one’s 
judgment to the greatest degree. In ‘Of Human Vegetation’, however, he claimed that this focus on 
mental activity was only part of the story. He even quoted and critiqued his own account of ‘the man 
of talent’ in The Enquirer, claiming that he had overlooked the pervasive presence and multiple uses 
of mental indolence. He went on to distinguish between four mental states that together constituted 
the sum total of intellectual life, and recommended reading to the state of most heightened attention 
rather than the partial ‘mental indolence’ that one experiences whilst lying in bed. He did, however, 
make a distinction between the demands of ‘books of instruction’ and ‘books of amusement’, noting 
that partial intellectual passivity was a great source of pleasure to readers of fiction and spectators of 
theatre. 98 The basis of both essays is Godwin’s contention that the ideal enquirer ‘disposes of his 
hours much in the same manner, as the commander of a company of men whom it is his business to 
train in the discipline of war’. Rather than a casual or haphazard occupation, reading is cast as an 
integral part of a military strategy.99 
Godwin’s warfare imagery reflected his belief that disciplined, intentional reading was something that 
needed to be campaigned for in current society. He particularly attacked the idea of reading solely for 
entertainment; locating its home within the highest sphere of mental engagement, he imagined reading 
as a kind of military exercise, a key part of humanity’s ultimate battle for critical autonomy. Since he 
considered the entire use of one’s time as analogous to ‘the discipline of war’, Godwin included under 
this heading the emerging category of ‘leisure hours’. In his essay ‘On Leisure’, he argued that this 
kind of time was just as much involved in the intellectual ‘warfare’ of life as the time of business.100 
Reading in leisure time was thus infinitely distinct from reading for leisure. Writing to Shelley in 
1812, he had claimed that a ‘true’ reader should be ‘surrounded with a sort of intrenchment and 
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breastwork of books. It is for boarding-school misses to read one book at a time’.101 In opposing the 
strategic bookishness of the serious reader, whose intellectual activities represent a structure of 
defence against the ideologically fraught environment, to the stereotypical schoolgirl who reads for 
entertainment, Godwin was dismissing casual, amusement-driven reading methods. His ‘true mode of 
reading’, in contrast to the leisure reader, was methodical and industrious.  
 
Skill 
A diligent routine of reading and an extensive reading scope were not enough on their own, however. 
Just like Watts, Godwin argued that ‘true’ reading involved specific skills of critical engagement. ‘He 
that is not initiated in the practice of close investigation, is constantly exposed to the danger of being 
deceived’, he cautioned.102 This reflected his conviction that skilled reading was a discipline, just as 
much as reading routine or exposure; techniques of textual engagement had to be learned, repeated 
and integrated into a way of life. In all his educational writings Godwin reaffirmed the emphases that 
Doddridge and Watts had placed upon close reading, slow reading and notation, allying these 
activities to the proper formation of private judgment. 
Godwin appropriated the familiar comparison of reading and digestion in order to argue, like Watts, 
that only the careful, critical reader would benefit from their materials. ‘True reading is investigation’, 
he wrote to Shelley, ‘not a passive reception of what our author has given us, but an active enquiry, 
appreciation and digestion of his subject’.103 In The Enquirer’s ‘Of Learning’ he presented a lengthy 
contrast between the shallow reader and the ‘true’ reader, using gustatory language to drive his point 
home. He began by presenting books as objects of dense ‘nutriment’; he then argued that ‘the true 
mode of reading’ was the mode that processed this effectively, turning it to profit. He refuted the 
popular argument that avid reading overloaded the mind with the thoughts of others and ‘prevent[ed] 
its digesting them’. ‘[I]f the systems we read, were always to remain in masses upon the mind, 
unconcocted and unaltered, undoubtedly in that case they would only deform it’, but the true reader 
will ‘mix’, ‘dissect, and ‘sift’ a work’s contents, ‘repassing in his thoughts the notions of which it 
consists’. Godwin claimed that it was only through this process that the ideas the reader encountered 
would be ‘render[ed] his own’, echoing Watts’s alliance of digestion and possession (reading 
‘concoct[s] our intellectual food, and turns it into a part of ourselves’).104 He thus portrayed 
disengaged reading practices as both unprofitable and unhealthy.  
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Critically rigorous reading was a two-edged process for Godwin: it involved both dismantling texts 
and remaking them. The passage about the ‘true mode of reading’ from The Enquirer makes this 
clear: 
if we read in a just spirit, perhaps we cannot read too much: in other words, if we mix our 
own reflections with what we read; if we dissect the ideas and arguments of our author; if, by 
having recourse to all subsidiary means, we endeavour to clear the recollection of him in our 
minds; if we compare part with part, detect his errors, new model his systems, adopt so much 
of him as is excellent, and explain within ourselves the reason of our disapprobation as to 
what is otherwise. A judicious reader will have a greater number of ideas that are his own 
passing through his mind, than of ideas presented to him by his author. He sifts his merits, 
and bolts his arguments.105 
Skilled reading was partly a process of breaking down: the reader must ‘dissect’, ‘compare part with 
part’, ‘sift’ and ‘bolt’ (used in the now uncommon sense of examining or separating by sifting, as 
through a bolting-cloth). Dissecting a text in this manner would bring many benefits. The reader 
would better grasp the structure and argument of their text, they would ward off their own propensity 
to erroneous judgment, and they would develop a healthy critical posture. Yet this deconstructive 
scrutiny was also closely allied to a creative process. Readers must ‘new model’ the text, adopting its 
worthy elements and combining them with their own ideas to form new material. Godwin wove the 
activities of dismantling and remaking together so tightly that they seem hard to distinguish from each 
other in this passage, the very structure of his description echoing the integrative reading process that 
he recommends. The point of such reading was to bring the ideas of the author into such intimate 
intercourse with those of the reader that, much like in the digestive process, they would be broken 
down in order to be remade and assimilated.  
Godwin recommended several practical things to aid this task of critical engagement, which built in 
many respects upon Watts’s advice. As discussed under the heading of exposure, he believed that 
reading several works simultaneously was crucial, because it would enable to reader to compare a 
broad range of ideas and bring them into conversation with each other. Of equal importance was to 
‘Learn to read slow’, as his ‘Letter of Advice’ instructs.106 This theme was expounded upon with most 
zeal in ‘Of the Duration of Human Life’ in Thoughts on Man: 
Be earnest in your application, but let your march be vigilant and slow. There is a doggrel 
couplet which I have met with in a book on elocution: 
      Learn to speak slow: all other graces 
      Will follow in their proper places. 
I could wish to recommend a similar process to the student in the course of his reading. […] 
Nothing is more easy than to gabble through a work replete with the profoundest elements of 
thinking, and to carry away almost nothing, when we have finished. 
   The book does not even deserve to be read, which does not impose upon us the duty of 
frequent pauses, much reflecting and inward debate, or require that we should often go back, 
compare one observation and statement with another, and does not call upon us to combine 
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and knit together the disjecta membra. 
   It is an observation which has often been repeated, that, when we come to read an excellent 
author a second and a third time, we find in him a multitude of things, that we did not in the 
slightest degree perceive in a first reading. A careful first reading would have a tendency in a 
considerable degree to anticipate this following crop.107  
This essay unites slow reading with critical activity. The process does not seem to be necessarily 
linear but transcends the written structure – Godwin suggests that readers must pause, back-track, and 
tease apart premises and statements in order to unfold the work’s scope within their mind. Slow 
reading would create the space and time necessary for dismembering (‘compare one observation and 
statement with another’) and remodelling (‘combine and knit together the disjecta membra’). Indeed, 
Godwin’s inclusion of the ‘doggrel couplet’ here perhaps exemplifies this instruction; extracting it 
from the rather unremarkable context in which it was ‘met’ during his reading, Godwin weaves it into 
his argument, imbuing it with new significance. 
The records of Godwin’s diary suggest that he practiced this kind of concentrated, non-linear reading 
himself. Entries show that he often did not read through works systematically; he dwelt closely upon a 
cluster of pages at a time, particularly when consulting philosophical or historical works. His diary 
entries for July 1794, for instance, record ‘Hume on Tragedy, 10 pp’, ‘Hume, Standard of Taste, 24 
pp’, and ‘Hume, Phil. Sects, p. 12’, rendering the question ‘When did Godwin read Hume?’ far from 
straightforward to answer. Godwin also appears to distinguish between two kinds of reading in his 
diary, using 'cala' to indicate his perusal through a text in a more piecemeal fashion, 'ca et la'.108 These 
habits perhaps reflected his belief that, rather than racing through one book at a time, readers should 
focus upon specific sections of various books and bring them into conversation with their own 
thoughts. This was one way of avoiding the tendency to ‘gabble’ through books, leaving them empty-
handed.  
Above all, Godwin argued that writing enabled this kind of digestive, skilled reading. The profitable 
reader was the one who ‘renders [ideas] his own’, and thus the pinnacle of Godwin’s reading advice 
was the formation of personal response on paper. Doddridge had advised the student ‘to read with a 
Pen in his Hand’, and Watts had recommended that readers marked, summarised and rewrote 
passages. Following their instructions, Godwin recommended specific practices of notation: 
I have practiced a manner [of reading] from my youth, to which in a considerable degree I 
ascribe my improvement, such as it is. This is, always to read with a pen in my hand, & to put 
down in the fewest words that can be made to convey a full & perspicuous meaning, such 
leading points of the author as strike me when they occur, points that I most wish to 
remember, & upon which his way of thinking principally turns; as well as such thoughts, 
properly my own, as suggest themselves in the perusal. This takes very little paper, frequently 
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not above three or four pages, half the size I am now writing, for each author. […] It must be 
of a sort that can be taken in almost at a glance, & consulted & reconsulted with facility.109  
Godwin presented the assembly of one’s own materials as an essential part of textual processing; to 
truly learn from the thoughts of a writer, readers must wield a pen themselves. This enabled them to 
judge accurately and remember these judgments when they revisited the text in the future (‘consulted 
& reconsulted’). It would thus enable that crucial process, the formation of private judgment: 
‘thoughts, properly my own’. This was the ultimate goal of reading for Godwin, as it was for 
Jennings, Doddridge and Watts. 
Yet Godwin expanded upon the role of writing to a greater degree than his Dissenting predecessors, 
insisting that more formal composition was integral to the proper process of reading. Something about 
good reading fostered good writing, and for Godwin the two should never be separated. In his 
discussion ‘Of Learning’ he observed that: ‘the industry which books demand, is of the same species 
as the industry requisite for the development of our own reflections; the study of other men’s writings, 
is strikingly analogous to the invention and arrangement of our own’.110 Later, he argued in his letter 
to Shelley that to read well ‘I must place myself in the situation of a man making a book, rather than 
reading books’.111 Whilst on one level the process of ‘true reading’ fostered the critical industry 
essential to writing skills, on another level the reader must already assume the position of an author to 
recruit this kind of industry in the first place. This relationship was aptly summarised in his letter to 
Martin: 
The great art perhaps of profitable reading is to have the mind, not passive, but active & at 
work during the whole sitting, composing, if I may so express it, for itself, even while 
studying the compositions of another. He that would read to purpose, should spend half as 
much time in writing compositions of his own, as in reading.112 
Godwin presented reading and composition as mutually reinforcing, their integration and 
collaboration essential to the formation of an autonomous critical posture. Any practice that alienated 
the two was not considered ‘profitable’ or ‘to purpose’. 
The formal process of writing mattered so much to Godwin because it was, in his estimation, 
intimately linked to the production of sound judgment in society. His comments participate in a 
growing emphasis upon the uses of writing in his social theory. Successive editions of Political 
Justice in the 1790s increasingly urged the communication of knowledge to be practised explicitly 
amidst a current climate of repression and timidity – ‘If every man today would tell all the truth he 
knew, it is impossible to predict how short would be the reign of usurpation and folly’ – and his 
novels across the following decades upheld the centrality of written ‘confession’ to social 
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advancement.113 Godwin believed that the creation of writer-readers would foster an environment of 
free communication, remedying the current lack of knowledge sharing amongst communities. 
Moreover, as Chapters Four and Five show, Godwin increasingly wove the book-object into his 
model of perfectibility, using its physical nature to defend and flesh out his theory of society’s 
necessary intellectual advancement.  
Thoughts on Man reflects this growing ideological investment in books and book-writing, for in it 
Godwin positioned textual production as the reader’s ultimate goal or end more overtly than he had 
done before. ‘The man who does not speak, is an unfledged thinker; and the man that does not write, 
is but half an investigator’, he claimed in an essay ‘Of Intellectual Abortion’.114 This essay laments 
the fate of minds that enjoy ‘the richest soil’ and yet fall prey to ‘indolence and irresolution’, writing 
nothing in return. Their ideas and plans terminate in ‘miscarriage’, because 
They skim away from one flower in the parterre of literature to another, like the bee, without, 
like the bee, gathering sweetness from each, to increase the public stock, and enrich the 
magazine of public thought.115  
Evoking Seneca’s much-appropriated image of the bee, Godwin contrasts half-committed readers 
with a neo-classical scholarly ideal: unlike those who harvest and reproduce truth, virtue and 
knowledge for the benefit of society, they flit aimlessly from flower to flower, contributing nothing. 
The reader who actively commits their responses to paper, however, he aligns with a long-running 
heritage of productive enquirers, scholarly harvesters whose activity benefits the public realm. 
Unproductive reading did not merit the name, for Godwin, and he believed that the making of minds 
was completed by the making of texts. 
In Godwin’s work, then, the marriage of reading and writing became the major skill of ‘true reading’. 
This focus departed from the reading advice of Watts and Doddridge, which ultimately considered 
reading’s end-goal as the personal knowledge of God-given truth; Godwin shifted the perspective 
more absolutely onto the process of knowledge exchange, or literary activity, itself. He constructed 
the textually productive reader as ‘the genuine hero’ in Thoughts on Man, a traveller who battled his 
way through a literary landscape against temptations to indolence and passivity: 
The man who merely wanders through the fields of knowledge in search of its gayest flowers 
and of whatever will afford him the most enviable amusement, will necessarily return home at 
night with a very slender collection. He that shall apply himself with self-denial and an 
unshrinking resolution to the improvement of his mind, will unquestionably be found more 
fortunate in the end. He is not deterred by the gulphs [sic] that yawn beneath his feet, or the 
mountains that may oppose themselves to his progress. He knows that the adventurer of timid 
mind, and that is infirm of purpose, will never make himself master of those points which it 
                                                      
113 Political Justice: Variants, p. 163; see Pamela Clemit, ‘Self-Analysis as Social Critique: The 
Autobiographical Writings of Godwin and Rousseau’. On the role of ‘confession’ in Godwin’s fiction, see 
Chapter Two.  
114 Thoughts on Man, p. 41; The Enquirer, pp. 232-33. 
115 Thoughts on Man, p. 73. 
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would be most honourable to him to subdue. But he who undertakes to commit to writing the 
result of his researches, and to communicate his discoveries to mankind, is the genuine 
hero.116  
Once again, his argument echoed that of Watts: 
In the pursuit of every valuable subject of knowledge keep the end always in your eye, and be 
not diverted from it by every pretty trifle you meet with in the way. Some persons have such a 
wandering genius, that they are ready to pursue every incident, theme or occasional idea, till 
they have lost sight of their original subject […] like a man who is sent in quest of some great 
treasure, but he steps aside to gather every flower he finds, or stands still to dig up every 
shining pebble he meets with in his way, till the treasure is forgotten and never found.117 
Both writers positioned the reader as a pilgrim along the lines of Bunyan’s Pilgrim’s Progress, 
arguing that a focus upon the end-goal of reading, the celestial city of knowledge, would enable them 
to withstand temptations of idleness and superficiality. Godwin thus associated his productive reader 
with a holy quest, distinguishing their journey from the profane loitering of inferior readers. Here the 
parallel ends, however. The goal for Watts’s traveller was to find the kingdom of heaven, emphasised 
here by the allusion to Jesus’s parable of the treasure in Matthew 13.44. Watts, in fact, had little to say 
about the activity of writing in The Improvement of the Mind, besides a caution against vanity in his 
final paragraph in the event that his student go on to the practice of criticism. Yet for Godwin, the 
reader’s goal was not a body of treasure, as it were, but the journey itself. He modified the tradition of 
Dissenting reading advice to prioritise individual creative assertion, making the ‘genuine hero’ the 
reader who conquered the literary landscape through their active contribution.  
 
Conclusion 
Godwin’s instructions for reading were conceived according to the principles of exposure, routine and 
skill that he had received from rational Dissenting culture. For all the educators discussed here, the 
practice of reading was important because it was understood to form the reader’s very nature as a 
person, shaping their understanding, feelings and actions. This conviction was reflected in the 
imagery that they used to describe reading: as they figured it in terms of eating, farming and walking, 
they cast it as essential to the health, growth and direction of human life. As he remediated advice 
from earlier in the eighteenth century, Godwin certainly made it his own. He resisted the hermeneutic 
claims of Christian Scripture, developed the principle of imaginative reading, and made composition 
integral to ‘true reading’. Yet despite these departures from his predecessors, he retained their overall 
conception of reading as a discipline. 
                                                      
116 Ibid., p. 74; cf. p. 225. 
117 Watts, Improvement of the Mind, p. 257. 
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Ultimately, Godwin’s reading advice reveals that he inherited the rational Dissenters’ ambivalence 
concerning the nature of the mind. He invested great hope in the mind’s innate ability to apprehend 
truth and to develop salutary habits, yet his overall tenor of discipline shows great fear of adverse 
intellectual principles: passivity, superficiality, rebellion. Emphasising the susceptibility of the human 
mind to corruption allowed him to diagnose the noetic ills of contemporary society. Yet he also 
sought to maintain that intellectual perfectibility was a necessary process, and so he simultaneously 
emphasised the capacity of the human mind to discern, develop and mature.  
Godwin’s educational writings thus expose a conflicted stance concerning the degree to which the 
human mind should be invested with epistemological authority. They are fuelled by an unanswered 
question: How reliable or competent is the mind in acquiring true beliefs, and which factors affect 
this? The following chapter, ‘Truth and Social Media’, directly explores this issue. As Godwin 
evaluated the social roles of different communications media, he was engaging with a longstanding 
debate about the relationship between the mind and truth, and he placed the printed codex at the heart 





Truth and Social Media: 
Books and Intellectual Regulation 
 
Introduction 
In 1796, John Thelwall accused William Godwin of ‘recommend[ing] the most extensive plan of 
freedom and innovation ever discussed’, yet simultaneously ‘reprobat[ing] every measure from which 
even the most moderate reform can rationally be expected’.1 By identifying ‘measure’ as the sticking 
point, Thelwall was not only responding to Godwin’s criticism of his own involvement in the cultural 
apparatus of political radicalism; he was also pinpointing an internal conflict that would pervade 
Godwin’s entire corpus. The fact of truth’s ‘irresistible advance’, throughout his writings, is flanked 
by anxious assessments of the means of this advance. Godwin was persistently troubled by the 
particular ways in which truth could be apprehended by the mind, and thus realised as human 
knowledge.2 
In Political Justice, for example, Godwin describes a hypothetical situation to his readers in which 
truth spreads throughout society. This happens through the activities of a chosen few, who acquire 
and communicate knowledge with relative ease: 
Let us imagine to ourselves a number of individuals, who, having first stored their minds with 
reading and reflection, proceed afterwards in candid and unreserved conversation to compare 
their ideas […] We shall then have an idea of knowledge as perpetually gaining ground, 
unaccompanied with peril in the means of its diffusion. Reason will spread itself, and not a 
brute and unintelligent sympathy.3  
Framed as it is by the language of imagination, this idealised picture of reading and speaking collides 
with a litany of warnings and qualifications concerning how it should be achieved in the here-and-
now. In the text surrounding this passage and throughout the treatise as a whole, it is the ‘peril’ that 
looms large: written and spoken words are untrustworthy vessels, hindering truth’s apprehension by 
the contexts of production and reception that they necessarily involve. Hard on the heels of its 
                                                      
1 John Thelwall, The Tribune, vol 2 (London: Symonds, Ridgway, and Smith, 1796), vii. In its immediate 
context, Thelwall’s complaint responds to Godwin’s recent ‘Considerations on Lord Grenville’s and Mr Pitt’s 
Bills’ (1795), in which the author condemns both the legislative proposals of government and the activities of 
London’s politically radical societies, such as the London Corresponding Society, which such legislation was 
designed to censor. For Godwin’s disagreement with Thelwall, see Mark Philp, ‘Godwin, Thelwall, and the 
Means of Progress’, pp. 59-82, and Jon Mee, ‘‘The Press and Danger of the Crowd’: Godwin, Thelwall, and the 
Counter-Public Sphere’, pp. 83-102, both in Godwinian Moments: From the Enlightenment to Romanticism, ed. 
by Robert Maniquis and Victoria Myers (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011). 
2 For ‘irresistible advance’ see Political Justice: Variants, p. 138. As this sentence implies, I use ‘knowledge’ to 
denote human apprehension of ‘truth’ (the concept of which this chapter investigates). 
3 Godwin, Political Justice, p. 121. Retained in all subsequent editions. 
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publication Godwin made such threats the overt focus of his novel Things as They Are; or, the 
Adventures of Caleb Williams (1794), in which truthful words are lost amongst a storm of communal 
bias, personal passion and manipulative rhetoric. Ensuing editions of Political Justice (1796, 1798) 
preserved the original version’s strange duality, however. The advance of truth was undoubtedly 
Godwin’s rallying cry, yet his preoccupation its dark counterpart, the ‘peril in the means of its 
diffusion’. 
This chapter examines Godwin’s direct depictions of those means and the peril that they pose to the 
spread of knowledge in society. I draw attention to the key places in which he assesses the printed 
codex as a ‘means of diffusion’ and contrasts its social work to that of conversation: ‘Of Revolutions’ 
in Political Justice (1793-8), ‘Of Learning’ in The Enquirer (1797) and ‘Of Belief’ in Thoughts on 
Man (1831). The comments they contain have often been recruited as evidence for a change in 
direction, by which Godwin’s enthusiasm for the conversational culture of London’s radical 
intellectuals in Political Justice gave way to his (perhaps less sanguine) investment in books.4 I argue 
here, in contrast, that they highlight more continuity of thought than discontinuity, for they are 
fundamentally united by a regulative concern. Godwin contends throughout that book-reading and 
conversation, properly conceived, should work in harmony to balance the speed of intellectual 
exchange, giving them complementary temporal roles in the social pursuit of knowledge. Intellectual 
‘commerce’ may be slowed or mobilised by reading or speaking respectively, thus preventing 
hastiness of mind on the one hand, and stagnancy of mind on the other.  
Yet Godwin was anxiously preoccupied by these temporal dynamics of knowledge exchange, and this 
reveals an internal conflict in his work about the degree to which such regulation was necessary to the 
intellectual progression of society. The roles he assigns to reading and conversation are ambiguous 
and qualified, raising questions about sources of epistemic authority: his descriptions hinge upon an 
uncertainty concerning which factors determine the knowing process and to what degree. At times 
truth is at the mercy of its mediation, and at others medial channels are subservient to truth as a self-
sufficient, self-manifesting force. In this way Godwin’s work uncovers and probes an historically 
resonant question: to what extent is truth dependent upon the activities, structures and mediation of 
social groups, and to what extent is it external to them? 
My argument is ultimately that, as Godwin discussed and depicted the social operation of different 
media, he exposed the crosscurrent of philosophical commitment that underlay his enduring 
                                                      
4 See, for example, Julie Carlson, England’s First Family of Writers, pp. 77-79; Jon Mee, Conversable Worlds, 
p. 148. Other works that assume this shift include: Garrett A. Sullivan, ‘“A Story to Be Hastily Gobbled Up”: 
Caleb Williams and Print Culture’, Studies in Romanticism, 32.3 (1993), 323-37; Kristen Leaver, ‘Pursuing 
Conversations: “Caleb Williams” and the Romantic Construction of the Reader’, Studies in Romanticism, 33.4 
(1994), 589-610; Gillian Russell and Clara Tuite, ‘Introducing Romantic Sociability’, in Romantic Sociability: 
Social Networks and Literary Culture in Britain, 1770-1840 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 
pp. 1-23 (p. 16). 
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preoccupation with the means of intellectual advance more generally. I trace his language of medial 
regulation to an ambivalent conception of truth in the religious Dissenting environment in which he 
was educated, according to which truth was both an omnipotent entity and a social product. Godwin’s 
struggle to conceptualise the nature and role of book-reading, I argue, distils a larger struggle to 
negotiate an inherited context of alethic ambiguity. This ambiguity was not simply a problem, 
however. I suggest that it also became a literary tool by which Godwin invested reformatory hopes in 
his media environment. 
 
Media and Temporality 
The most consistent feature of the book-object in Godwin’s writing is its tendency to slow intellectual 
exchange. In ‘Of Revolutions’ its social role is presented in terms that initially appear deprecatory: 
Books have by their very nature but a limited operation; though, on account of their 
permanence, their methodical disquisition, and their easiness of access, they are entitled to the 
foremost place. But their efficacy ought not to engross our confidence. The number of those 
by whom reading is neglected is exceedingly great. Books to those by whom they are read 
have a sort of constitutional coldness. We review the arguments of an “insolent innovator” 
with sullenness, and are unwilling to stretch our minds to take in all their force. It is with 
difficulty that we obtain the courage of striking into untrodden paths, and questioning tenets 
that have been generally received. But conversation accustoms us to hear a variety of 
sentiments, obliges us to exercise patience and attention, and gives freedom and elasticity to 
our mental disquisitions. A thinking man, if he will recollect his intellectual history, will find 
that he has derived inestimable advantage from the stimulus and surprise of colloquial 
suggestions; and, if he review the history of literature, will perceive that minds of great 
acuteness and ability have commonly existed in a cluster.5   
The ‘very nature’ of books here is ‘methodical’, ‘limited’ and ‘cold’; they impose restrictions and 
difficulties upon readers that conversational exchange does not. A book’s ‘efficacy’ as a vector is 
undermined by its rigid and uncompromising ‘constitution’, thus apparently counteracting the very 
mental flexibility which features in Political Justice as the gateway to social justice and human 
achievement. In fact, the language of books here echoes that used elsewhere in the Enquiry to 
condemn political institutions, which have ‘a tendency to suspend the elasticity, and put an end to the 
advancement of mind’.6 Conversation is the inverse, an activity defined by its promotion of such 
‘freedom and elasticity’. Its portrayal as an expansive and enabling activity seems to position it as 
unquestionably superior: it stretches, releases and strikes out into ‘untrodden paths’, whereas book-
reading limits, chills and discourages fresh enquiry. 
A manuscript version of this passage seems to take the contrast even further. The original draft reads: 
Every man, that will recollect the history of literature, will perceive that great intellectual 
penetration has commonly existed in a cluster. What is elicited in the commerce of mutual 
                                                      
5 Political Justice, p. 121 (kept in all subsequent editions). 
6 Ibid., p. 106. 
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friendship, in the actual contact of mind with mind, is incomparably more excellent than what 
we draw from the shelves of a library. It is by an experimental acquaintance with the sallies of 
mind, by that observation which resolves the compound, knowledge, into its constituent parts, 
by the sympathy that participates in friendly commerce [sic] the vigour of the inventor, that 
men are taught to feel the practicability of wisdom, are excited to generous emulation, and led 
forward by gradual steps to the summit of excellence. It is with difficulty that we obtain the 
courage of striking into untrodden paths, and questioning tenets that have been generally 
received; but example infuses into the mind both enterprise and firmness. We often read the 
arguments of an ‘insolent innovator’ with sullenness, and are unwilling to stretch our minds 
to take in all their force. But conversation obliges us to exercise a polite attention […]. – 
Familiar discussion therefore is an object next in importance to that of laying open our ideas 
to general examination, giving permanence to their form, and inviting public attention to the 
important topics to which they may relate, through the medium of the press.7 
This extract suggests that conversational friendship facilitates a kind of mental ‘commerce’ that book-
reading inhibits. The sympathy generated by ‘actual contact of mind with mind’ mobilises a joint 
venture in the realm of thought; a deleted word in Godwin’s manuscript reveals that ‘friendly 
commerce’ was originally ‘friendly shares’, underscoring the nature of the conversational task as 
mutual participation in an intellectual economy.8 A book is thus not simply a sluggish or less effective 
medium of truth, but is a disruption of this interpersonal circulation – by blocking the ‘actual contact 
of mind with mind’, it stands in the way of truth’s direct apprehension. 
Yet at the same time as he identifies this reticence in the book-form, Godwin takes for granted that it 
does not detract from its ‘foremost place’ in intellectual life. The manuscript draft likewise places 
familiar discussion as ‘an object next in importance’ to that of the dissemination and scrutiny of 
printed works. Indeed, it could be argued that they earn this place precisely because they are 
‘methodical’, stiff and stubborn; they foster habits of discipline that are necessary for mental 
independence, the ‘courage of striking into untrodden paths’. This idea had surfaced in the preface to 
the first edition to Political Justice, which described books as beneficial because they were ‘by [their] 
very nature an appeal to men of study and reflexion’.9 Whilst conversation, therefore, features in this 
passage as an essential lubricant for the mind, the ‘methodical’ pace of book-reading is implicitly 
presented as a stabilising counterbalance to its colloquial freedom.  
The surrounding context makes it explicit that such slowness was indeed conceived as an advantage. 
As suggested by the chapter title, ‘Of Revolutions’, Godwin’s argument about media was part of a 
larger argument about the appropriate means of political reform. The section preceding his discussion 
of books’ ‘limited operation’ in Political Justice launched a temporal argument against the activities 
of radical organisations, such as the London Corresponding Society, whose exploitation of large-scale 
oral appeal he deemed unconducive to private judgment. ‘Instead of informing the understanding of 
the hearer by a flow and regular progression, the orator must beware of detail, must render everything 
                                                      
7 Political Justice: Variants, pp. 151-52. 
8 Ibid., p. 151. 
9 Political Justice, p. v. 
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rapid’, he complained. ‘Truth can scarcely be acquired’, he argued, because ‘laborious enquiry’ is 
neglected, and participants bend instead to superficial rhetoric. The regularity and perseverance 
instilled into persons by book-reading is described as precisely what is missing in Society members: 
‘Strict disquisition, especially to persons not much in the habits of regular thinking, is difficult’.10 
This wider argument about the cultural apparatus of radicalism explains Godwin’s emphasis upon 
both the slowness of books and the merits of small-group conversation amongst friends (as opposed to 
that of larger meetings or formal associations). He reiterated the critique in his ‘Considerations on 
Lord Grenville’s and Mr Pitt’s Bills’ (1795), a treatise which described both heat and rapidity as the 
hallmarks of unreflective exchange – the ‘cauldron of civil contention simmers’ – reinforcing the fact 
that his ascription of ‘constitutional coldness’ to the codex was a counter-discourse to the perceived 
dangers of oratorical enthusiasm. For Godwin, a certain kind of conversation worked in harmony with 
book-reading as a remedy for rash conviction; together they shaped the enquiring mind and regulated 
its intellectual pace. 11  
Godwin restates this approach to book-reading in The Enquirer’s ‘Of Learning’, an essay that uses the 
idea of the book’s ‘methodical industry’ to argue for the importance of reading in early education. He 
elaborates upon the properties of the book at length, arguing that stately, moderate speed is something 
the codex ‘imposes upon’ its reader: 
Books undertake to treat of a subject regularly; to unfold it part by part till the whole is 
surveyed; they are entirely at our devotion, and may be turned backward and forward as we 
please; it is their express purpose to omit nothing that is essential to a complete delineation. 
They are written in tranquility, and in the bosom of meditation: they are revised again and 
again; their obscurities removed, and their defects supplied. Conversation on the other hand is 
fortuitous and runs wild; the life’s blood of truth is filtrated and diluted, till much of its 
essence is gone. The intellect that depends upon conversation for nutriment, may be 
compared to the man who should prefer the precarious existence of a beggar, to the 
possession of a regular and substantial income.12   
Here books order their readers: they encourage them to explore a subject regularly, ‘to unfold it part 
by part’, a process of intellection that mirrors the turning pages. Evoking Milton’s Areopagitica, 
which his diary suggests he consulted during The Enquirer’s composition, Godwin argues that books 
                                                      
10 ‘Considerations on Lord Grenville’s and Mr Pitt’s Bills’, p. 133 (emphasis mine). Studies of these politically 
radical cultures and their relationship to media include Kevin Gilmartin, Print Politics: The Press and Radical 
Opposition in Early Nineteenth-Century England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Stephen 
Behrendt, Romanticism, Radicalism, and the Press (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1997); Andrew 
McCann, Cultural Politics in the 1790s: Literature, Radicalism and the Public Sphere (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 
1999), and McCann, ‘William Godwin and the Pathological Public Sphere: Theorizing Communicative Action 
in the 1790s’, Prose Studies, 18.3 (1995), 199-222; John Barrell, The Spirit of Despotism: Invasions of Privacy 
in the 1790s (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); Jon Mee, Print, Publicity and Radicalism in the 1790s: 
The Laurel of Liberty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016). 
11 Political Justice: Variants, pp. 143-44; ‘Considerations on Lord Grenville’s and Mr Pitt’s Bills’, p. 133. For 
Godwin’s specific conversational ideal, see my discussion below. 
12 The Enquirer, p. 237.  
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have a concentrated potency that renders them more intellectually nutritious than the spoken word. A 
book, for Milton, is something distilled, ‘the pretious life-blood of a master spirit, imbalm’d and 
treasur’d up’, ‘preserv[ing] as in a violl the purest efficacie and extraction of that living intellect that 
bred them’. 13 Godwin’s essay ‘Of Learning’ contrasts this vision of the book to the qualities of 
conversation, which is ‘fortuitous and runs wild; the life’s blood of truth is filtrated and diluted, till 
much of its essence is gone’.  
The language of commerce features again here, too, but this time for opposite ends. The value gained 
from conversation is analogous to a beggar’s irregular and scanty income, whereas books establish a 
reliable system of profit. In direct contrast to Political Justice, it is the activity of reading which 
enables one mind to ‘collate itself with other minds’ in intimate commerce, providing the arena of 
‘actual contact’ that was previously reserved for familiar discussion. Conversation seems here to 
diffuse or destabilise the flow of knowledge-sharing, whereas book-reading enlarges and secures it. 
The dense, ‘methodical’ nature of book-reading works to secure and stabilise ideas precipitated by 
conversation, and in doing so respects the very nature (‘life’s blood’) of truth. 
In fact, despite its emphasis on method and regularity, this passage highlights the disruptive properties 
that Godwin ascribed to book-reading: books lend themselves to being ‘turned backward and forward 
as we please’, resisting the incessant linear flow of conversation and creating a space of concentrated 
reflection. As material media, they carve space out of time. This emphasis is part of Godwin’s 
response to the contention that books were an overrated aspect of education, because they tended to 
clog up the mind: ‘We have been told, that a persevering habit of reading […] overloads the intellect 
with the notions of others’.14 His response in ‘Of Learning’ is to theorise the book’s intrusive, weighty 
nature as an aid to intellectual health. He describes reading as a process by which the mind ‘collate[s] 
itself with other minds’, a verb that suggests thickening or fusion rather than flow, but which has 
positive connotations. Books stop readers in their tracks, Godwin argues, and the pause is enriching 
rather than inhibiting.  
This positive conception of the book’s disruptive nature resurfaced many years later in Godwin’s 
Thoughts on Man (1831). Although this essay collection reflects several interests that matured after 
his 1790s work, it sustains the temporal concern with media that emerged in Political Justice and The 
Enquirer. In fact, evidence suggests that temporality became of increasing interest to Godwin; in his 
diary he refers to several of the Thoughts on Man essays simply as ‘On Time’, and a footnote to the 
essay ‘On the Duration of Human Life’ indicates that he was rereading William Watson’s A Treatise 
on Time (1785), which he had originally consulted in 1792.15 In ‘Of the Durability of Human 
Achievements and Productions’, for example, he interrogates the book-object’s capacity for historical 
                                                      
13 See entry for 3 June 1796 in The Diary of William Godwin. Milton, Areopagitica, pp. 492-93. 
14 The Enquirer, p. 233. Cf. Carla Hesse, ‘Books in Time’, p. 27. 
15 Thoughts on Man, p. 114; see diary entries for 29-30 June 1792 in The Diary of William Godwin. 
 
109 
preservation (books ‘embalm’ bodies of human achievement), and presents book-reading as an 
activity that weighs an accumulated legacy of understanding against the current intellectual moment.16 
Most significant for our discussion, however, is the direct contrast between reading and speaking that 
appears in the essay ‘Of Belief’. Here Godwin investigates the power of conversational speed over 
participants’ mental faculties. He depicts the sudden conviction elicited by speech as a kind of 
intellectual ambush:  
[I]nestimable as is the benefit we derive from books, there is something more searching and 
soul-stirring in the impulse of oral communication. We cannot shut our ears, as we shut our 
books; we cannot escape from the appeal of the man who addresses us with the earnest speech 
and living conviction. […] Sudden and irresistible conviction is chiefly the offspring of living 
speech. We may arm ourselves against the arguments of an author; but the strength of 
reasoning in him who addresses us, takes us at unawares. It is in the reciprocation of answer 
and rejoinder that the power of conversation specially lies. A book is an abstraction. It is but 
imperfectly that we feel, that a real man addresses us in it, and that what he delivers is the 
entire and deep-wrought sentiment of a being of flesh and blood like ourselves, a being who 
claims our attention, and is entitled to our deference. The living human voice, with a 
countenance and manner corresponding, constrains us to weigh what is said, shoots through 
us like a stroke of electricity, will not away from our memory, and haunts our very dreams. It 
is by means of this peculiarity in the nature of mind, that it has been often observed that there 
is from time to time an Augustan age in the intellect of nations, that men of superior powers 
shock with each other, and that light is struck by the collision, which most probably no one of 
these men would have given birth to, if they had not been thrown into mutual society and 
communion. And even so, on a narrower scale, he that would aspire to do the most of which 
his faculties are susceptible, should seek the intercourse of his fellows, that his powers may 
be strengthened, and he may be kept free from that torpor and indolence of soul, which, 
without external excitement, are ever apt to take possession of us.17  
Amongst its many other interesting features, this passage revisits the idea of intellectual commerce 
through its language of ‘reciprocation’, ‘communion’ and ‘intercourse’: conversation once again 
becomes the realm of ‘actual contact’ through which the exchange of knowledge most naturally 
occurs. And once again, Godwin’s evaluations of both media – the human voice and the printed page 
– concern their relation to time. Discussion promotes a present speed: it stirs, shoots, shocks and 
excites. Books are ‘an abstraction’, and thus contribute to sluggishness or ‘torpor’. Godwin is 
ambivalent about the merits of conversation, however. Speech ‘takes us at unawares’, in contrast to 
the book’s less immediate effect. From this angle, ‘Of Belief’ affirms The Enquirer’s presentation of 
books as objects that ‘force us to reflect’ rather than manipulating belief. He was reiterating his 
argument that books bring pockets of order to bear against the dispersed energy of conversation; that 
they promote a regular, orderly, contemplative mode of intellectual life.18 
What emerges from this continuity in Godwin’s discussion of books – his focus upon flow, speed, and 
regulation – is a wider concern with an ideal or model of intellectual commerce. All the passages 
                                                      
16 Thoughts on Man, p. 88. Quotations below are from this source. 
17 Ibid., pp. 176-77. 
18 The Enquirer, p. 96. 
 
110 
quoted above seek to promote a specific version of community, one in which reading, speaking and 
writing play different but equally important roles. The concern is indicated by Godwin’s repetition of 
words such as ‘cluster’, ‘collate’ and ‘communion’, which he uses to stress the necessity of fellowship 
or participation in an economy of knowledge. This is the hinge upon which his judgments turn: in 
Thoughts on Man, conversation’s positive, energising role depends upon the fact that it induces 
‘reciprocation’, ‘communion’ and ‘intercourse’ amongst its participants in a way that books cannot. 
The Enquirer denounces educational reliance upon conversation by comparing it to beggarly means, 
and describing book-reading, in contrast, as a regular system of profit. Comments in Political Justice 
are concerned with easing a flow of knowledge: books tend to disrupt or stall intellectual exchange, 
which has positive functions, but also creates the need for the mobilising force of conversation, 
properly conceived.  
Godwin was using an idiom familiar to his readers. A shared language of movement, speed and 
regulation had been used by writers and philosophers throughout the preceding century to discuss the 
exchange of knowledge and its social ramifications – they assumed, in Robin Valenza’s words, an 
‘economic model of knowledge generation and transmission’.19 This concept of truth as a progressive 
flow or profitable movement of exchange emerged in conjunction with concerns about the kind of 
people, institutions or channels that mediated its movement (the things that orchestrated its 
apprehension and thus materialisation as knowledge). Godwin’s work exposes a connection between 
the temporal language of Romantic-period depictions of media – a phenomenon increasingly 
recognised – and these inherited anxieties about the social nature of knowledge.20 Two eighteenth-
century essays serve to illustrate this point, both of which contain important similarities to Godwin’s 
work: Samuel Johnson’s ‘On Studies’ (1753), and David Hume’s ‘Of Essay Writing’ (1742). 
Johnson’s ‘On Studies’ explores the difficulty encountered by the public intellectual or ‘man of 
letters’ in his stewardship of the intellectual economy. Taking its cue from Bacon’s famous aphorism 
– ‘Reading maketh a Full Man; Conference a Ready Man; And Writing an Exact Man’ – it articulates 
how practices of reading, speaking and writing should be used to facilitate an ordered flow of 
knowledge, yet also places them in a context of innate tendency towards disorder, disproportion and 
                                                      
19 Robin Valenza, Literature, Language, and the Rise of the Intellectual Disciplines in Britain, 1680-1820 
(Cambridge, 2009), chapters 1-2 (quotation is from p. 13); see also Christopher J. Berry, The Idea of 
Commercial Society in the Scottish Enlightenment (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013), especially 
chapters 1-2, and Stephen Copley, ‘Commerce, Conversation and Politeness in the Early Eighteenth-Century 
Periodical’, British Journal for Eighteenth-Century Studies, 18 (1995), 63-77. For the general fate of this 
discourse in Dissenting culture later in the century, see Isaac Kramnick, ‘Review of "Virtue, Commerce, and 
History" by J. G. A. Pocock’, The Journal of Modern History, 59.1 (1987), 161-65 (pp. 163-65). 
20 For this temporal interest see Piper, Dreaming in Books, pp. 11-12; Hesse, ‘Books in Time’; Christina Lupton, 
‘Immersing the Network in Time: From the Where to the When of Print Reading’, ELH, 83.2 (2016), 299-317, a 
forerunner of her forthcoming volume Reading and the Making of Time (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, August 2018). 
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confusion. 21 Johnson extolls the importance of books against the accusation that they are ‘useless 
lumber’, yet also warns against the dangers of book-learning: scholars easily become ‘overloaded’, 
‘entangled’ and inflexible, thus ineffective at communicating knowledge to the wider community. 
Conversation develops book-readers into ‘ready’, adaptable and effective communicators, yet it easily 
engenders sophism, ‘inaccuracy’ and ‘confusion’. This leads Johnson to posit the stabilising role of 
writing, something that fixes, contracts and scrutinises what conversation diffuses. His emphasis upon 
the ways in which different communicative forms counteract or balance each other finds more than an 
echo in Godwin’s essay ‘Of Learning’.  
Johnson finishes, however, by acknowledging the immense difficulty of holding these activities in 
harmony. He claims that ‘To read, write, and converse in due proportions is […] the business of a 
man of letters’, and yet he considers the conditions or opportunities that enable these proportions to be 
exceedingly rare. His closing remark encapsulates the consequent ambivalence of the man of letters’ 
mediatory task: ‘it is, however, reasonable, to have perfection in our eye; that we may always advance 
towards it, though we know it never can be reached’. Society’s intellectual economy always relies 
upon compromised communication, Johnson implies, a falling-short of ‘due proportions’. Yet 
progress towards perfection is possible – indeed, it is the human experience. His essay assumes 
something in the nature of truth to be tenacious and self-evident, enabling the studious person to 
‘always advance’ despite their many limitations.  
Similar assumptions about the nature of knowledge were explicit in the work of David Hume, whose 
Treatise of Human Nature (1739-40) upheld everyday faith in, or reliance upon, the ‘current of 
nature’ in response to the paralysing conclusions of sceptical empiricism. Hume’s career shift to essay 
writing after his Treatise indicates the importance he attached to the writer’s role in regulating and 
directing this social flow of knowledge. ‘Of Essay Writing’ describes the learned essayist as a 
mediating figure, who works to maintain a healthy ‘Correspondence’ between the Men of Letters and 
the Men of the World, between realms of books and of speech. Economic language becomes the 
extended conceit; the essayist initiates and maintains intellectual ‘Commerce’ or ‘Balance of Trade’. 
This balance matters because a harmonious society, for Hume, is not simply based upon reciprocal 
pleasure, but also upon the exchange of knowledge: ‘every one displays his Thoughts and 
Observations in the best Manner he is able, and mutually gives and receives Information, as well as 
Pleasure’. The essayist and their work thus become essential to the maintenance of a healthy society.22 
                                                      
21 Samuel Johnson, ‘On Studies’ [originally untitled], The Adventurer, 85 (28 August 1753), pp. 85-90; for the 
original aphorism see Francis Bacon, Essayes or Counsels, Civill and Morall (London: John Haviland, 1632), 
pp. 293-94. Cf. Robert DeMaria, Samuel Johnson and the Life of Reading (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1997). For the emerging concept of the ‘man of letters’ in the eighteenth century, see Valenza, Literature, 
Language, and the Rise of the Intellectual Disciplines, especially chapters 1-2. 
22 David Hume, 'Of Essay Writing', in Essays, Moral and Political, 2 vols (Edinburgh: printed for A. Kincaid, 
1741-42), II (1742), pp. 1-8. For the ‘current of nature’ see Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature: A Critical 
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Hume’s philosophical scepticism may have been unusual for his time, but as Fred Parker and others 
have shown, his work represents the ways in which implicit ambivalence towards the nature of 
knowledge was frequently translated into a confidence, or perhaps ideological investment, in 
particular forms of textual dissemination during the eighteenth century.23 His emphasis upon the role 
of the learned essayist also indicates that such confidence in the flow of knowledge went hand in hand 
with deep concerns about the kinds of people, institutions or channels that regulated it. In other words, 
as theories of knowledge were increasingly embedded in theories of sociality, the scope and means of 
sociality became a locus of anxiety. In different ways Hume and Johnson both assume that knowledge 
exists as a force or movement independent of the knower, and yet their work remains ambiguous 
about the extent to which social channels have power over it. 
 
Regulation and Authority 
Godwin’s assessments of media feature both this inherited discourse of intellectual economy, and its 
ambiguity concerning regulative authority. As he describes their social roles, reading and 
conversation disturb and encroach upon one another; both appear full of inherent dangers to truth’s 
progress, yet the very properties that cause this jeopardy are deemed essential for balancing the 
other’s defects. Conversation ‘runs wild’ into hasty conviction or shallow chatter, yet these problems 
of fluidity are necessary for dislodging the prejudice, torpor and seclusion that book-reading 
promotes. Books are slow, difficult and disengaging, yet these things counteract the facile slipperiness 
of the spoken word. The two activities are imagined in such intimate relations that they often seem to 
overlap: Godwin’s educational advice, for example, prescribes methods of conversational reading, by 
which numerous texts are brought into a circle of dialogue and the reader’s written responses enlist 
them in a network of critical exchange.24 His regulation of communicative activities becomes a 
Johnsonian balancing act. It reveals an anxious tension at the heart of his work, concerning the precise 
ways in which medial regulation affects the progress of truth in society. 
This tension is partly revealed through Godwin’s distinction between different kinds of conversation. 
He gives a certain kind of conversation an important social role, to instigate and mobilise intellectual 
exchange. Whilst books counteract a perceived social tendency towards rapidity, heat and 
superficiality, conversation counteracts an equally dangerous tendency towards stagnancy and 
lethargy of mind. In Thoughts On Man, Godwin recommends oral discussion on the basis that it keeps 
                                                      
Edition, ed. by David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 171-78, 
175.  
23 Fred Parker, Scepticism and Literature: An Essay on Pope, Hume, Sterne, and Johnson (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003); Cf. Timothy Milnes, ‘Trusting Experiments: Sociability and Transcendence in the 
Familiar Essay’, Romantic Circles: Praxis Series, 2017, n.p. 
<https://www.rc.umd.edu/praxis/prose/praxis.2016.prose.milnes.html> [accessed 24 May 2018]. 
24 See Chapter Three on reading advice. 
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the participant ‘free from that torpor and indolence of soul, which, without external excitement, are 
ever apt to take possession of us’, describing its work in terms of ‘electricity’, ‘shock’ and ‘collision’. 
In Political Justice its benefits are likewise ascribed to its ‘stimulus and surprise’; and even during 
The Enquirer’s critique of educational overreliance upon conversation, conversation is described as 
‘the more unlicensed and dignified sallies of the mind’, echoing the positive language that Godwin 
had used in his draft of the Political Justice passage (‘experimental acquaintance with the sallies of 
mind’). As many moral and educational theorists had done before him, Godwin places great value 
upon the sympathy generated by face-to-face contact: human presence acts as a mental stimulus by 
which imaginative empathy develops, a faculty involved in many different aspects of the 
understanding. In ‘Of Belief’ this is referred to as a ‘peculiarity in the nature of mind’, the cognitive 
investment that accompanies one’s experience of ‘voice […] countenance […] and manner’. 
Conversation is thus central to intellectual enquiry insofar as it actuates, inspires and exercises the 
organs of independent thought. 
Yet Godwin’s depiction of conversation as a positive, instigating force was also a response to a 
different sort of conversation – an inhibited and unfruitful sort associated with contemporary culture. 
Like many other dissenters, as Jon Mee has shown, Godwin wrote from a position of critique that 
considered mainstream conversational culture to be artificial and unhelpfully restrained by custom. 
The ideal of conversational candour – what Godwin sometimes calls ‘sincerity’ or ‘frankness’ – was 
about clearing away these cultural blockages to allow for truth to be clearly sought after and 
apprehended.25 Godwin argued in Political Justice that ‘dictates of worldly prudence and custom’ and 
‘artificial delicacy’ had produced an intellectual economy in which ‘everything is disfigured and 
distorted’, yet he maintained that if candid intellectual enquiry were to be pursued, ‘Conversation 
would speedily exchange its present character of listlessness and insignificance, for a Roman boldness 
and fervour’.26 As indicated by his reference to classical republican culture, this argument was 
inherently political. Godwin understood political institutions to be detrimental to such revitalised 
exchanges of ideas: ‘Whenever government assumes to deliver us from the trouble of thinking for 
ourselves, the only consequences it produces are those of torpor and imbecility’.27 Awareness of these 
political dimensions was heightened during the 1790s when Pitt’s government cracked down upon 
radical activity by introducing new measures of censorship and restrictions upon meetings. Godwin 
                                                      
25 See Jon Mee, Conversable Worlds, pp. 137-67; the Dissenting backdrop to this ideal is outlined in Tessa 
Whitehouse, The Textual Culture of English Protestant Dissent, and D. O. Thomas, The Honest Mind: the 
Thought and Work of Richard Price (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977). For differences in conversation culture 
between provincial and urban Dissenters, see Anne Janowitz, ‘Amiable and Radical Sociability: Anna 
Barbauld’s “free Familiar Conversation”’, in Romantic Sociability: Social Networks and Literary Culture in 
Britain, 1770-1840, ed. by Gillian Russell and Clara Tuite (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 
62-81. For the theory of conversation more generally in this period, see Peter Burke, The Art of Conversation 
(Cambridge: Polity, 1993), and The Concept and Practice of Conversation in the Long Eighteenth Century, 
1688-1848, ed. by Katie Halsey and Jane Slinn (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2008). 
26 Political Justice: Variants, pp. 161-62. 
27 Political Justice, pp. 320-21. 
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reflected upon these measures at length in ‘Considerations’, and his second edition of Political Justice 
included the following remark: 
What is it that, at this day, enables a thousand errors to keep their station in the world; 
priestcraft, tests, bribery, war, cabal and whatever else excites the disapprobation of the 
honest and enlightened mind? Cowardice; the timid reserve which makes men shrink from 
telling what they know; and the insidious policy that annexes persecution and punishment to 
an unrestrained and spirited discussion of the true interests of society.28  
This comment expresses the benefits of his conversational ideal: as something ‘unrestrained’ it breaks 
through the fetters of unexamined custom, and as something ‘spirited’ it animates minds that have 
been weakened by inertia. Godwin thus positions his positive version of conversation in reaction to 
social forces of mental restraint, oppression and indolence stemming from cultural habit and political 
environment. 
Godwin qualifies this idea of conversational inhibition throughout his work, however, careful to 
distinguish it from the kind of unrestraint that he associated with political societies and public 
oratory.29 Immediately after extolling the consequences of allowing truth ‘a plain and direct appeal’ to 
human understanding by removing the ‘obstacles’ to its discussion in cultural life, he adds: 
But these consequences are the property only of independent and impartial discussion. If once 
the unambitious and candid circles of enquiring men be swallowed up in the insatiate gulf of 
noisy assemblies, the opportunity of improvement is instantly annihilated. The happy 
varieties of sentiment which so eminently contribute to intellectual acuteness are lost.30  
This distinction draws attention to the difficult balance that Godwin attempts to negotiate: 
conversation must remain ‘independent’ and ‘impartial’, and yet its very benefits have been described 
as arising from its co-opting nature, its powerful current of sympathetic stimulation. Sheer numbers 
thus become the decisive factor, explaining Godwin’s assertion in Political Justice that ‘Discussion 
perhaps never exists with so much vigour and utility as in the conversation of two persons. It may be 
carried on with advantage in small and friendly societies’.31 The unruly potential of speech must be 
harnessed by a small group limit, a non-institutional context, and the practice of book-reading, which 
stabilises and enriches the conversational enquiry. 
These descriptions of different kinds of conversation are further complicated by different kinds of 
reading matter. Ephemeral printed forms, such as handbills and newspapers, are associated with the 
promiscuous immediacy of speech, a criticism which becomes a plot device in Caleb Williams (1794). 
Ever since Caleb passes the hawker selling his ‘paper’ of criminal adventures in the streets, ephemeral 
print becomes a disruptive presence, which follows him across the country and ruins the trusting 
                                                      
28 Political Justice: Variants, p. 163. 
29 For an exploration of the positive aspects of public speaking in Godwin’s work, see Victoria Myers, ‘William 
Godwin and the “Ars Rhetorica”’, Studies in Romanticism, 41.3 (2002), 415-44. 
30 Political Justice, p. 122. 
31 Ibid., p. 121. 
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relationships he tries to build. Godwin revisited the issue in his last novel, Deloraine (1833), in which 
newspapers exchange complicated truths for reductive and incendiary opinions (see Chapter Two). He 
was tapping into a widespread contemporary awareness of the temporal implications of ephemeral 
print. As Mark Turner records, newspapers and periodicals in this period encoded a particular sort of 
time in the social imagination: they ‘suggest[ed] and construct[ed] different socio-cultural 
understandings about time, in a period in which temporal shifts and disruptions were a sign of its 
modernity’.32 In 1814, the French philosopher Benjamin Constant spelled out the relevance of these 
temporal associations to political fears: 
All enlightened men seemed to be convinced that complete freedom and exemption from any 
form of censorship should be granted to longer works. Because writing them requires time, 
purchasing them requires affluence, and reading them requires attention, they are not able to 
produce the reaction in the populace that one fears of works of greater rapidity and violence. 
But pamphlets, and handbills, and newspapers, are produced quickly, you can buy them for 
little, and because their effect is immediate, they are believed to be more dangerous.33  
Constant describes a common connection between ephemeral print and the ‘rapidity and violence’ of 
the mob in the minds of the educated classes. Godwin’s depictions of handbills and newspapers 
appear to fall in with this view: he described them in his novels as inflammatory and manipulative, 
media which rushed past the truth and hunted down the innocent. They encourage mental passivity 
and uniformity in a similar fashion to the ‘rash and headstrong’ oratory of political societies.34 
In fact, despite Godwin’s generalized claims about the slowness of ‘books’ in his theoretical works, 
certain ‘books of narrative and romance’ also become a source of impetuous speed in Caleb Williams. 
Caleb’s childhood books are described in terms of the hastiness instigated by speech and ephemeral 
print: ‘I could not rest’, he records, ‘I panted for the unravelling of an adventure’. They shape him 
into an impetuous and irresolute character, whose actions are driven by ‘unremarked and involuntary 
sympathy’. These were dangerous effects that Godwin clearly did not attribute to his own novels (the 
express purpose of which he described as the instigation of ‘moral and political enquiry’).35 Other 
sorts of books, moreover, have different effects upon his protagonist. Godwin added an episode to the 
second edition of the novel, in which Caleb’s chance encounter with a dictionary prompts him to 
embark upon a careful study of language. This sort of reading marries both ‘industry and recreation’, 
                                                      
32 Mark Turner, ‘Time, Periodicals, and Literary Studies’, Victorian Periodicals Review, 39.4 (2006), 309-16 (p. 
312), and ‘Periodical Time in the Nineteenth Century’, Media History, 8.2 (2002): 183-96. See also Margaret 
Beetham, ‘Time: Periodicals and the Time of the Now’, Victorian Periodicals Review, 48.3 (2015), 323-42. 
33 Benjamin Constant, De La Liberte Des Brouchures, Des Pamphlets et Des Journaux (Paris: Chez H Nicolle, a 
la Librairie Stereotype, 1814), quoted in translation by Carla Hesse in ‘Books in Time’, p. 27. 
34 Political Justice, p. 123. Cf. Garrett A. Sullivan, ‘“Caleb Williams” and Print Culture’, pp. 332-33. 
35 Caleb Williams, pp. 280, 121. ‘Letter to the Editor of the British Critic’, 7 June 1795, The Letters of William 
Godwin, I, p. 117. 
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channelling his mind in a healthier direction. Unfortunately, it is soon disrupted by Falkland’s 
pursuit.36  
Godwin’s personal correspondence reveals a similarly conflicted assessment of epistolary writing. He 
made an irritable remark to Thomas Wedgwood in a letter of November 1795, concerning the need to 
clarify the content of his previous letter: ‘Do you not feel how very inadequately epistolary 
communication supplies the place of oral discussion?’ This prompted Wedgwood to respond that ‘on 
some accounts I prefer writing to conversation. But this preference is owing entirely to my want of a 
prompt & clear expression of my thoughts, which exercise alone can supply’.37 Godwin’s rejoinder 
reveals the centrality of the temporal to his thinking: 
Your preference of correspondence to conversation seems to be founded in part in 
suggestions of vanity. How intolerably creeping & tedious is this interchange? I am not 
inclined to doubt that my time is well spent in your society; but, in writing thus, I comply 
with my feelings, & run counter to the bias of my judgment. I believe correspondence ought 
scarcely in any case to be admitted, but when the parties are at a distance from each other.38  
Godwin assumes here that letters are intended as conversational substitutes (‘how very inadequately 
epistolary communication supplies the place of oral discussion’), and on these grounds dismisses 
them as unsatisfactory. The merits of conversation stem from the stimulating effect of personal 
presence, from the immediate ‘reciprocation of answer and rejoinder’, which is precluded by the 
‘intolerably creeping & tedious’ breaks between letters. Epistolary exchange thus occupies an 
uncertain territory between the personal force of speech and rigidity of books, yet participates in the 
temporal dynamics of neither medium.39  
Even reading spaces both enable and jeopardize the knowledge economy in Godwin’s work. A letter 
of 1805 to his acquaintance Joseph Planta, principal librarian at the British Museum, contends that 
public reading rooms can diffuse one’s mental powers, and thus counteract the beneficial fixity of 
books: 
But it is impossible for me to express, or for any person who has never been engaged in a 
work of patient & unintermitted investigation fully to conceive, the disadvantages that must 
attend an examination of authorities & documents in a public Reading Room. For this 
purpose passages must not only be read with a deep & concentrated attention, but the writer 
must also reason, weigh, & make inferences, as he reads. But a public Reading Room, 
however decorously managed conducted, must be attended with infinite distractions to such a 
writer a person so employed. The majority of the frequenters of such a room will always be 
                                                      
36 Caleb Williams, p. 328. 
37 To Thomas Wedgwood, 7 November 1795, The Letters of William Godwin, I, p. 132, and p. 135 n.7. 
38 To Thomas Wedgwood, 10 November 1795, The Letters of William Godwin, I, p. 134. 
39 For an overview of Godwin’s ambivalent relationship to letters, see Pamela Clemit, ‘Holding Proteus: 
William Godwin in his Letters’, in Repossessing the Romantic Past, ed. by Heather Glen and Paul Hamilton, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 98-115 (especially pp. 100-01). Cf. Judith Barbour, 
‘“Obliged to Make This Sort of Deposit of Our Minds”: William Godwin and the Sociable Contract of Writing’, 
in Romantic Sociability: Social Networks and Literary Culture in Britain, 1770-1840, ed. by Gillian Russell and 
Clara Tuite (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 166-85. 
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persons who read more from a spirit of vague curiosity, & that they may spend their time 
agreeably to themselves, than from any other motive.40 
The scholar’s activity here combines all the crucial elements of reading (‘deep & concentrated 
attention’), conversation (‘reason, weigh, & make inferences’) and writing (‘engaged in an elaborate 
work’), yet it is fundamentally undermined by the public nature of the Museum’s reading room. The 
very presence of other readers distracts the mind and promotes ‘a spirit of vague curiosity’, the 
antithesis of the concentrated attention that books require. Godwin had already expressed similar 
ideas in the preface to his Life of Chaucer, claiming that the Museum’s refusal to allow him to borrow 
books and consult them in his ‘own chamber’ was ‘productive of great loss of time and many 
disadvantages’.41  
If public libraries detract from the beneficial potential of book-reading, however, private libraries 
concentrate them into vices. In Fleetwood (1805), the protagonist’s personal ‘reading closet’ becomes 
a symbol of the character distortion engendered by bookish isolation. Ruffigny warns Fleetwood 
about his need to maintain a balance between private book-reading and social interaction:  
The furniture of these shelves constitutes an elaborate and invaluable commentary; but the 
objects beyond those windows, and the circles and communities of my contemporaries, are 
the text to which that commentary relates. 
Yet the reading space that Fleetwood frequented in his ancestral home has already proved too 
powerful: 
[H]ere it had ever since been my custom to retire with some favourite author, when I wished 
to feel my mind in its most happy state […] I entered it now, after a twelvemonth’s absence, 
with a full recollection of all the castles which I had sat there are builded in the air, the odes, 
the tragedies, and heroic poems which, in the days of visionary childhood, upon that spot I 
had sketched and imagined. […] how unalterably it had fixed its hold upon me as my 
favourite retreat.42  
The ‘hold’ of this particular reading space reflects and precipitates Fleetwood’s stubborn, antisocial 
adherence to his feelings, a character flaw that was fostered by his education: undisciplined, isolated 
reading habits lead him to privilege his sentiment above every other social demand, including his 
relational responsibilities. His wife’s unknowing appropriation of the reading space is doubly 
poignant, a threat to his material memories and his mental habits of castle-building, and it triggers a 
                                                      
40 Godwin to Joseph Planta, 12 June 1805, The Letters of William Godwin, II, pp. 354-56 (p. 355). 
41 Preface to Life of Geoffrey Chaucer, the early English poet: including memoirs of his near friend and 
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England in the fourteenth century, 2 vols (London: Richard Phillips, 1803), I, p. xvi. The letter to Planta was 
written during Godwin’s research for his History of the Commonwealth of England; from its commencement, to 
the restoration of Charles the Second, 4 vols (London: printed for Henry Colburn, 1824-28). 
42 Fleetwood, pp. 69, 194. 
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sequence of jealousy and passion.43 In what spatial context is truth best pursued? Godwin presents an 
ambiguous answer, a balance of public and private environments, of the sociality of books and people.  
As the example of the library from Fleetwood indicates, Godwin’s novels explore yet another factor 
that affects the social operation of book-reading: domestic context. The narrators of St Leon, 
Fleetwood and Deloraine all describe family reading as an essential element of life, an almost 
transcendent experience through which the mind’s thoughts and sentiments are properly shared and 
managed by participants. In St Leon (1799), the reading of husband and wife during their early 
married years is presented a process of ‘accord’ by which minds ‘meet and mingle’. Solitude is 
important – ‘Separation […] prepared us to enter with fresh ardour into society and conversation’ – 
yet it must be balanced by regular experiences of shared reading: 
Thus we added to each other's stores, and acquired a largeness of conception and liberality of 
judgment that neither of us would have arrived at, if separate. […] we rejoiced in this 
reciprocation of benefits, while each gave or received something that added to value of mind 
and worth of character.44 
Here domestic reading is explicitly portrayed as an activity of commerce: it mutually enriches, 
enlarges and regulates resources of mind. Indeed, as St Leon later mourns this period of his life, he 
uses the phrase ‘amicable commerce’ to name his loss.45 Godwin drew from the language that he had 
used to describe conversation in Political Justice – ‘the commerce of mutual friendship, […] the 
actual contact of mind with mind’ – in order to suggest that shared reading recruits the best aspects of 
both reading and speaking. 
In Fleetwood, the narrator likewise describes reading together within marriage as the promotion of 
mental ‘accord’ and correspondence: it is ‘a pleasure that should be husbanded. […] we are like 
instruments tuned to a correspondent pitch, and the accord that is produced is of the most delightful 
nature’.46 Godwin reiterated the principle in Deloraine (1833) and further applied it to father and 
daughter, depicting Catherine and Deloraine’s shared reading as an animating force that breathes life 
into rigid pages: 
To the solitary reader his books are indeed a dead letter. […] [Shared reading] makes the 
proposition, the fact, or the sentiment, leap as it were from the insensible page, and become 
impregnate with life.47  
In fact, the importance of communal reading in Deloraine stretches beyond the relations of blood or 
marriage, encompassing friendships too: Catherine and Margaret, and William and Travers, all 
                                                      
43 Ibid., p. 194. 
44 St Leon, pp. 43-45. 
45 Ibid., pp. 143-44. 
46 Fleetwood, p. 199. 
47 Deloriane, p. 236; for reading within marriage, see pp. 18-19. 
 
119 
experience this bookish mutuality as an essential feature of their intimacy.48 The hallmark of healthy 
families, friendships and communities is social engagement with books, Godwin seems to imply. 
Solitary reflection must be combined with the regulatory discipline of communal experience.  
Each of these novels, however, also depicts and explores the dysfunctional effect that domestic 
environments can have upon intellectual regulation. Their protagonists represent various imbalances 
in the social dynamics of knowledge exchange, and experience the tragic effects of their relational 
poverty. The ‘amicable commerce’ of St Leon’s family, for example, is ruined after his pact with the 
mysterious stranger condemns him to forever harbour a dark secret from his wife and children: ‘My 
domestic character was […] wholly destroyed. I had a subject of contemplation that did not admit of a 
partaker’.49 Just as he cannot reveal his source of gold, St Leon can no longer share the resources of 
his mind with those he loves, and the apparent blessing of alchemy becomes a curse. 
Fleetwood’s unchecked indulgence in solitary reading during childhood endows him with a stubborn 
attachment to his own sentiments, and this tarnishes his new marriage. He comes to believe that Mary 
has usurped his old reading closet, and her variety of interests and ‘elastic’ nature threaten his 
domineering control over their time spent reading together. This renders the idyllic description of 
shared reading that I quoted above highly ironic – far from being ‘instruments tuned to a 
correspondent pitch’, Fleetwood is only ever in tune with himself. When Mary leaves for a botanical 
expedition in the middle of their reading of Fletcher’s A Wife for a Month, Fleetwood declares:   
She has wounded me in a point, where I am most alive. Fletcher, my old friend, friend of my 
boyish days, whose flights I have taught the echoes of the mountains to repeat, whose pages I 
have meditated in my favourite closet, – she has affronted me in thee, Fletcher, and for thee, 
if not for myself, I will resent it.50  
His anger stems from the experience of his ‘boyish days’ and ‘favourite closet’, indicating that it is 
the unchecked solitariness of his education that constitutes the barrier to harmonious domestic life. 
One sees here the ugly potential of book-reading that Godwin addresses elsewhere, the intellectual 
disease of isolation: Fleetwood embodies the ‘desperate sort of firmness and inflexibility’ of The 
Enquirer’s isolated learner, and St Leon the ‘cold reserve’ criticised in Political Justice.51 When 
intellectual exchange is divorced from a healthy communal context it becomes a corrupting force, and 
domestic life itself disintegrates.  
Mandeville (1817) provides an even darker example of communal book-reading gone wrong. 
Although the protagonist has an isolated upbringing, his childhood reading is not undertaken alone: it 
is directed by ‘a formal, rigid, pedantic, pharisaical priest’, whose guidance ossifies Mandeville’s 
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50 Fleetwood, pp. 201-02. 
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mind into a position of hatred and paranoia. Mandeville thus succumbs to a version of the ‘torpor and 
indolence of soul’ that Thoughts on Man connects to unsociable book-reading. The closed religious 
environment of his household insinuates itself into his intellectual temperament, contrasting sharply 
with that of Beaulieu cottage, where his sister is raised. His instructor, his domestic environment, and 
the ‘tremendous volume’ of Fox’s Book of Martyrs all conspire to dictate his character and his fate, 
raising questions about the extent of individual agency in the midst of such intellectual directives.52  
In one respect of course, socially dysfunctional readers are a common trope in the fiction of this 
period, and Godwin’s characters participate in a literary trend. One thinks of how the protagonist’s 
‘desultory’ childhood reading in Waverley (1814) shapes his ‘wavering and unsettled’ character, or 
how Catherine’s private absorption in books of ‘all story and no reflection’ in Northanger Abbey 
(1817) results in social illiteracy and embarrassment.53 But Godwin’s examples are much darker, for 
the effects of his characters’ bad reading are less easily accommodated or corrected by subsequent 
social experience (as they are with Waverley, Catherine, or even Marianne in Sense and Sensibility). 
In fact, his readers probe and unsettle the very definition of functional society rather than being 
regulated by it. The importance, but immense difficulty, of knowledge being properly regulated 
through the activities and channels of social groups is underscored by the tangled nature of their 
media engagement and its powerful, often disturbing consequences. In this way, St Leon, Fleetwood 
and Mandeville unearth and embody the problem of authority addressed by Godwin’s educational and 
philosophical writings. They interrogate how decisive society’s different medial structures and 
channels are upon the apprehension of truth; they probe how reading, writing and speaking should 
best function in a domestic context; and they provide an ambivalent answer.  
Truth thus emerges from Godwin’s work hampered by regulative problems, which are found both in 
the means of exchange (text, speech) and the environments in which those exchanges occur (spatial, 
social, domestic). Behind all of these factors, however, is the movement of truth itself. Godwin’s 
wariness about the speed instigated by ephemeral print and oral appeal, for example, was not a 
response to immediacy per se, but involved the belief that this velocity did not correlate with truth’s 
own progress. Describing the work of a beneficial book in ‘Considerations’, he argued that 
If it undermine the received system, it will undermine it gradually and insensibly; it will 
merely fall in with that gradual principle of decay and renovation, which is perpetually at 
work in every part of the universe.54 
A truly revolutionary book, here, is not one that incites sudden action, but one that colludes in the 
organic advance of truth amongst society as a whole, ‘that gradual principle of decay and renovation’. 
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Godwin thus references an intellectual tempo that transcends the dynamics of reading or speaking, a 
spirit of change that is everywhere ‘perpetually at work’. This principle leads him to claim that 
‘Reform must come […] if we endeavour to keep it out too long, it will overwhelm us’.55  
It is important to recognise that the expression of this ‘gradual principle’ was integral to Godwin’s 
immediate political aims in ‘Considerations’. The pamphlet was designed to contribute to public 
debate about proposed legislation to limit the activities of radical societies by making their meetings 
illegal and by censoring the press (the so-called Gagging Act of 1795). Godwin wanted to make his 
own position clear, and it involved sharp critiques of both government officials and radical activists. 
By presenting truth as a self-manifesting force, he downplayed his radicalism and thus distanced 
himself from the political activism that was causing establishment alarm, casting himself as a non-
threatening gradualist. His depictions of oratory as a precipitate force reflect this strategy: ‘It is not 
[…] in crowded audiences, that truth is successfully investigated’, Godwin claims (here establishing 
his break with Thelwall). At the same time, the ‘gradual principle’ allowed Godwin to justify his 
reformist credentials to radicals: their hopes and desires were vindicated because ‘Reform must 
come’. By casting books as naturally reformatory objects, he presented the literary world of which he 
was a part as innately allied to the radical cause.56 In other words, by defending the social work of 
books according to the ‘gradual principle’, Godwin was appealing to a higher authority in order to 
deflect hostility from both poles of the debate. It was a political strategy that shaped much of his work 
in the 1790s, including his revisions to Political Justice throughout the decade.  
Yet Godwin’s description of the gradual principle also exposes an unstable relationship between truth 
and media that transcends this immediate context. Throughout ‘Considerations’, the cultural apparatus 
of print seems to threaten or confuse the force of truth, rather than simply ‘fall in’ with it as Godwin 
claims. An abstract version of the printing press is presented in competing terms to the ‘gradual 
principle’, as a transcendent force that cannot be withstood once set into motion. Godwin even uses a 
quote from the gospel of Luke to position it as the Messianic cornerstone (‘against which whosoever 
stumbles, shall be broken’). Crucially, as ‘Considerations’ involves a plea for the freedom of the 
press, both this power of print and its associated ‘principle’ of renovation appear at the mercy of 
human arbitration. ‘Lord Grenville’s bill is probably the most atrocious,’ he writes, ‘because writing 
and the publication of science, […] of all imaginable things, [are] the most essential to the welfare of 
mankind’. According to this argument, the bill places at risk ‘all that is dignified, all that is 
ennobling’. Godwin thus frequently appeals to a version of truth which is an unstoppable force, yet 
apparently considers it jeopardised from all sides by society’s medial structures – by the cultural 
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apparatus that orchestrates both the printed and the spoken word. Truth’s apprehension, Godwin 
acknowledges, is ‘a delicate and awful task’.57  
Godwin had already personified the vulnerability of this ‘gradual principle’ in the character of Clare 
in Caleb Williams. This novel delineates a dramatic battle for psychological ownership, fuelled by 
both eloquent oral appeals and inflammatory printed matter. Yet these intense exchanges are held in 
sober contrast to Clare, whose ‘unreserved’ conversation ‘flowed with […] ease’, whose ‘frankness’ 
was ‘tranquil’ and measured. Most significantly, his public speaking was orderly and appropriate: 
‘Every word was impressed with its true value, and none was brought forward with disproportioned 
and elaborate emphasis’.58 Clare embodies the intellectual benefits of speech, for Godwin, which 
obtained only insofar as it respected the proportioned advance of truth itself, something that freely 
‘flowed’ and yet retained a ‘mild’, stately caution. Clare is an authoritative figure whilst he lives, 
deeply respected by all, and Falkland listens with tears to his parting admonition. Yet he dies early, 
and his advice is ignored. The rest of the novel is a riotous distortion of the ‘true value’ that he 
represents: print, speech and even physical appearances are vehicles of deception, passion and 
confusion. Caleb describes how he is ‘hurried along I do not know how’, subject to ‘uncontrollable 
enthusiasm’, ‘irresistible force’ and ‘rapidity’. He is overtaken by the contagious warmth associated 
with political associations in Godwin’s Enquiry and ‘Considerations’, confessing, ‘I had no time to 
cool or to deliberate’.59 
 
Truth and Dissent 
For the first readers of Caleb Williams, however, Clare’s exemplary qualities had a further layer of 
significance. Terms such as ‘frankness’, ‘flow’ and ‘unreserve’ were watch-words of Dissenting 
culture and testify to the fact that Godwin’s concern about medial authority was partly inherited from 
his educational environment. ‘Free enquiry’ was the founding principle of the Academy he attended at 
Hoxton; whilst the phrase signified variously in eighteenth-century writing, it denoted a specific ideal 
in the Jennings-Doddridge tradition of Dissenting academies, of which Hoxton was a part. It 
referenced a perceived need to liberate and regulate intellectual exchange within society, and also 
promoted teaching methods that prioritized the process of ‘enquiry’ over and above its specific 
propositional content or doctrine (see Chapter Three).60 As Richard Price put it, the task of education 
‘should be to teach how to think, rather than what to think; or to lead into the best way of searching 
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for truth, rather than to instruct in truth itself’.61 At the same time, however, this principle 
encapsulated the alethic ambivalence undergirding such pursuits. It highlighted the two-fold 
understanding of truth that was emergent in Dissenting culture, and which came to fruition in 
Godwin’s writing.  
On one level, truth was understood in this tradition as an objective body of knowledge, accessed 
progressively by humankind to the extent that they engaged in this ‘free enquiry’. Truth was 
commonly described as self-evident to the impartial enquirer, because human rationality was a God-
given resource and truth itself was divine revelation. Joseph Priestley reflected this when he claimed 
that ‘Truth will always have an infinite advantage over error, if free scope be given to inquiry’.62 
Belief in this ‘advantage’ became the overt justification for theories of intellectual and moral 
perfectibility, and fuelled the vibrancy and confidence of Dissenting academy life. Because its 
apprehension was, in part, a soteriological issue (to do with salvation), presenting it as naturally self-
manifesting was profoundly consequential for theological doctrine.63 Truth was presented as both a 
fixed ideal and an unstoppable movement, and this depiction undergirded a general optimism in the 
human condition. 
This confidence, however, was held alongside sharp critiques of forces deemed to constrain or distort 
truth’s apprehension. Dissenting communities were keenly aware of their marginalised social status, 
and often characterised mainstream culture in terms of superficiality or prejudice, an environment in 
which the flow of truth was either dispersed by triviality or blocked by closed-mindedness.64 There 
were also theological disagreements over the extent to which human sin had noetic implications. 
Professions of truth as self-evident thus collided with images of a society in which truth was 
jeopardised, thwarted or elusive. The Dissenting ideal of ‘candour’ or ‘frankness’ in sociable 
exchange reflects these concerns, evoking a context in which Priestley’s ‘free scope’ was hard to 
come by. Indeed, thinkers such as Priestley and Horne Tooke began to give language itself a 
formative role in belief, sometimes complicating the Dissenting emphasis upon simple, ‘pure’ 
communication. Another version of truth was thus being addressed, one increasingly bound to the 
processes and means of its discovery. 
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This double vision of truth – at once self-evident and elusive, self-sufficient and dependent – was 
clearly illustrated by the scrutiny with which the tradition treated educational media. A good example 
is Isaac Watts’s Improvement of the Mind (1741), a treatise that sprung from the Jennings-Doddridge 
community yet enjoyed influence far beyond, going through several new editions in the later 
eighteenth century. This work upholds intellectual enquiry as a spiritual ideal, yet is dedicated to 
scrutinising the dangers of different communicative means, and advising the reader as to how their 
involvement with such means should be conducted. Book-reading is a case in point: whilst Watts 
evokes the familiar connection between print technology and spiritual-intellectual progress, and 
epitomises the central place given to reading in the sociable ideals of his Dissenting culture, the task 
seems problematic from the outset. After wading through decisions about what is necessary to read in 
the first place, Watts considers how the reader’s enquiry is threatened by the book’s own form. Its 
‘bulk’ or weighty nature can promote uncritical assent, on the one hand, leading to over-reliance upon 
an author’s opinions and thus a ‘dogmatical spirit’. Yet on the other hand, it can discourage 
investigation entirely, leading weaker readers to ‘hover always on the surface of things’ and remain 
irresolute. Both dangers involve superficiality, by which the book’s literal surfaces engender surface-
level thinking. To illustrate their social ramifications, an example is given: 
Subito is carried away by titles pages, so that he ventures to pronounce upon a large octavo at 
once, and to recommend it wonderfully when he had read half the preface. […] But Subito 
changes his opinion of men and books and things so often, that no body regards him.65  
Subito represents the person, or rather imagined social type, who tries to short-cut knowledge by 
speeding up the labour of intellectual enquiry. His name references a musical term (familiar to Watts 
the hymnodist) meaning ‘sudden’; it denotes temporal disruption, and contrasts with the language of 
order, regularity and tranquillity that characterises the instructions of the treatise at large. 
Significantly, Subito’s haste is connected to his status as a fickle, insubstantial conversationalist. His 
lack of reading discipline means that he thins and diffuses the flow of truth, rendering him a chatterer 
of no service to the knowledge economy at large. Ironically then, for Watts, the book’s ‘bulk’ can 
starve intellectual life; a large octavo can promote hasty, light-weight thinking. He argues that this 
danger must be counteracted by rigorous reading habits, about which he goes into great detail. 
What was at stake in such instructions about the pursuit of knowledge was regulative authority: the 
degree of epistemological weight one should ascribe to medial forms, as opposed to truth itself. 
Watts’s assessments of media draw attention to a latent ambiguity in Dissenting thought over the 
degree to which individual effort, medial environment or the supposed power of truth itself was 
decisive in engendering belief. For most religious believers, the implications of this internal tension 
were kept at bay, because they held to a theological doctrine of revelation that enabled them to have 
confidence in truth’s divinely ordained tenacity. Yet the approach laid foundations for a different 
                                                      
65 Isaac Watts, The Improvement of the Mind, pp. 190-91. 
 
125 
counterculture at the turn of the century, which came to fruition in Dissenting-educated thinkers such 
as Godwin. He inherited, on the one hand, a version of truth as an unstoppable force pertaining to 
salvific ends, and on the other, a version that was subordinate to the contemporary social 
environment, human faculties, and the very nature of medial channels. His education also sensitised 
him to a language that evaluated intellectual community in terms of temporal dynamic, and imbued 
this with immense social significance. 
Godwin’s assessments of reading and speaking, with their fraught dynamics of speed, weight and 
temperature, thus reflect and negotiate the authority problem of his educational inheritance. Although 
he abandoned revealed religion, he retained the double vision of truth that pervaded its culture. On 
one level, he appropriated its language to negotiate contemporary debates about the nature of socio-
political reform: he critiqued radical societies in the 1790s by positioning them at the extreme ends of 
scales measuring heat and cold, rapidity and stasis. On a more fundamental level, however, the 
discourse gestured to a conceptual ambiguity concerning how this intellectual system was regulated. 
Truth’s innate authority had to be asserted in order to theorise perfectibility, yet in order to diagnose 
the noetic ills of society its means of apprehension were endowed with great, often terrible, power.  
This view becomes even more explicit when one considers Godwin’s direct descriptions of ‘truth’. 
Throughout the 1790s he presented it as a force self-sufficient enough to make independent progress: 
in 1793 ‘truth is omnipotent’, in 1795 truth is a ‘resistless tide’, and in 1797 ‘Truth is powerful, and, 
[will] make good her possession’. The revised editions of Political Justice all continue to place hope 
for social reform in the ‘value and energy of truth’ itself.66 Yet alongside this portrayal is a vulnerable, 
dependent version of truth. The same pages that proclaim truth’s omnipotence contend that ‘if there 
be such a thing as truth, it must infallibly be struck out by the collision of mind with mind’. A later 
manuscript note confirms this idea, remarking that ‘Truth, […] arises from the relative character & 
disposition of two persons or things, the speaker & the hearer, the words uttered, & the temper of him 
by whom the words are received’.67 Godwin makes an uneasy combination of the two versions in his 
1797 essay ‘Of Scepticism’, in which he argues that the sceptical empiricist ‘is the genuine friend of 
truth’. Truth here is a self-evident body, like the sun: ‘The sceptic makes bare his own bosom to 
receive the beams of truth’. Yet it is also a means of direction or discovery, like the wind: the sceptic 
‘always holds himself ready for the gale of truth, and spreads his canvas that he may feel its lightest 
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breath. His voyage of discovery is never finished. His views perpetually vary, yet perpetually 
improve’.68  
The friction between all these concepts of truth is encapsulated in a comment from the Enquiry:  
The great cause of humanity, which is now pleading in the face of the universe, has but two 
enemies; those friends of antiquity, and those friends of innovation, who, impatient of 
suspense, are inclined violently to interrupt the calm, the incessant, the rapid and auspicious 
progress which thought and reflection appear to be making in the world. Happy would it be 
for mankind if those persons who interest themselves most zealously in these great questions 
would confine their exertions to the diffusing, in every possible mode, a spirit of enquiry 
[…]!69  
The movement of truth here is calm and gradual, yet rapid and incessant; it naturally manifests its 
progress through thought and reflection, yet is reliant upon the exertions and zeal of certain 
proponents; it is the unassailable telos of humanity, and yet is threatened both by those who value the 
past and those who hasten the future. The language of ‘diffusing’ and ‘spreading’ that Godwin 
frequently uses to describe truth’s advance suggests an intangible and uncontrollable force, yet truth 
also appears dependent, chaotic and material, ‘struck out’ by a process of collision. From this mixed 
portrayal flows the mixed instructions that Godwin gives to his readers: whilst he urges them to have 
serene confidence in truth’s authority, he also confronts them with qualified and often conservative 
social advice. Truth’s nature as a progressive force is constantly weighed against the contention that it 
must be properly stewarded by the structures and channels of society. It is both an assumption 
(transcending the activities of knowledge exchange) and a conclusion (produced only by their proper 
enactment).  
Godwin’s concerns about medial regulation thus feature a major legacy of Dissenting educational 
culture, this bifurcated concept of truth. In doing so they distil a broader philosophical development, 
an alethic crosscurrent in British empiricism that was integral to much Romantic-period writing. As 
Tim Milnes has shown, Coleridge, Keats and Shelley all exploited a recognized ‘tension between 
truth as ideal and truth as dialogue’. They explored, consciously or unconsciously, what it meant to be 
committed to truth as an intersubjective reality: something that was constituted by subjects in dialogue 
and yet, at the same time, was a presupposed condition that enabled and limited this dialogic 
activity.70 We might understand Godwin’s work as recruiting the same ambivalence, probing the 
extent to which truth is dependent upon the activities, structures and tools of social groups, and the 
extent to which it is external to them. Indeed, the tension was perhaps especially poignant for an ex-
minister like Godwin, who was tied to his inheritance closely enough to define truth as a forceful, 
teleological ideal, yet secularised enough to abandon belief in its personal divine origin and 
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emphasise its provisional, dependent nature at any given time.  
 
Conclusion 
Our opening quotation from Political Justice suggests that Godwin used this conceptual tension 
around ‘truth’ to make a statement of faith. ‘Let us imagine to ourselves’, it begins, presenting his 
ideal of intellectual community in terms of an imaginative summons by which the reader is exhorted 
to anticipate something as yet unrealised. The following two sentences reiterate this summons, 
beginning with the phrase ‘let us suppose’ and thus linking imagination to assumption. This group of 
enquirers figured in the mind’s eye read and speak in such a manner that true knowledge naturally 
gains ground: ‘Reason will spread itself’. And the ideal that they encapsulate should stimulate real 
attempts to ‘bring [truth] into daily use’, Godwin argues. Such an effort will inevitably gain social 
momentum: ‘[T]he beauty of the spectacle will soon render the example contagious’.71 
Such recruitment of readerly imagination features across Godwin’s corpus, undergirding both fiction 
and philosophy, educational and historical commentary. It is more than a rhetorical flourish. It is a 
literary strategy that trades upon competing perspectives on truth – it is both an appeal for faith in 
truth’s authoritative bearing and an invitation to initiate its realisation. The final words of Godwin’s 
last philosophical work reaffirm the centrality of this strategy to his corpus. After describing the 
wonderful capacities of human nature, and the heights to which it has soared at various points in 
history, Thoughts on Man concludes:  
And it is but just, that those by whom these things are fairly considered, should anticipate the 
progress of our nature, and believe that human understanding and human virtue will hereafter 
accomplish such things as the heart of man has never yet been daring enough to conceive.72  
This closing sentence entices the reader into an imaginative task: to consider, anticipate and believe. 
Human understanding will advance only through its courage (‘daring’) to conceive itself advancing; 
conviction in truth and its progress is necessary for the task of its discovery. Thoughts on Man thus 
ends by implicitly evoking its ‘very nature’ as a book-object, according to Godwin. Its inherently 
demanding, disruptive material form lends itself to this imaginative pursuit, in which the paused mind 
‘strikes out’ beyond the confines of its usual channels.  
As we have seen, Godwin’s assessments of reading and conversation reflect an historical moment in 
which the social operation of media was highly politicised. The spatial and temporal dynamics of 
intellectual life were debated as matters of controversy, and Godwin’s appropriation of the discourse 
of regulation was in part an attempt to publicly negotiate his own position as a gradualist reformer. 
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Yet his contribution also shows that these debates were conditioned and enlivened by a context of 
philosophical turbulence. Godwin recruited the media environment of Romantic-period London in 
order to ‘anticipate the progress of our nature’ – to invest in truth’s ideal whilst simultaneously 
grappling with the problems of its apprehension, the ‘peril in the means of its diffusion’. His writing 
exposes an alliance between the period’s literary consciousness of medial form and the shifting alethic 
commitments of its writers. 
I have indicated throughout this chapter that Godwin gave the book ‘the foremost place’ in his 
evaluations of media. As the passage from Political Justice shows, he linked this position from the 
beginning of his career to ‘its permanence’. The essay ‘Of the Durability of Human Achievements 
and Productions’ in Thoughts on Man revisited this idea through its description of printed volumes 
‘embalmed in collections’, presenting the book-object as not simply a temporal regulator, but a 
temporal survivor. My next and final chapter argues that Godwin increasingly wrote about books in 
this way. His essays from the first decade of the nineteenth century explicitly presented books as 





Books, Bodies and Monuments: 
Print and Perfectibility in the 1800s 
 
Introduction 
In 1809 William Godwin published his Essay on Sepulchres, a proposal for a system of national 
monuments in which commemorative priority would be given to writers rather than fighters. He 
justified this arrangement by describing authors as persons who were not fully dead: 
Military and naval achievements are of temporary operation: the victories of Cimon and 
Scipio are passed away; these great heroes have dwindled into a name; but whole Plato, and 
Xenophon, and Virgil have descended to us, undefaced, undismembered, and complete. I can 
dwell upon them for days and for weeks: I am acquainted with their peculiarities; their inmost 
thoughts are familiar to me; they appear before me with all the attributes of individuality; I 
can ruminate upon their lessons and sentiments at leisure, till my whole soul is lighted up 
with the spirit of these authors.1 
Such dismissal of military claims to historical tenacity was a bold move, especially as it appeared 
during Britain’s long and expensive conflict in Europe (1803-15). Even more striking, however, are 
the terms in which Godwin makes his counterclaim for literary achievement. The classical authors he 
mentions should be commemorated, not because they are in danger of being forgotten, but because 
they remain cultural participants. They deliver ‘lessons’, exchange ‘sentiments’, and thus contribute 
towards social enlightenment (‘my whole soul is lighted up’). Unlike the wounded battle heroes of the 
British military, they remain ‘whole’ and ‘undismembered’, present to the living in corporeal terms. 
Godwin blurs the boundary here between authors and their books, describing printed volumes as 
compounds of body and mind, matter and spirit. Yet these books have done what human persons 
cannot do: they have defied the power of death. 
This passage represents a pervasive aspect of Godwin’s nineteenth-century work, according to which 
he expressed the social power of the book in terms of its ability to preserve and to transform the 
human nature of its author. In this chapter, I show that his writing of the early 1800s repeatedly 
figured books in terms of bodies and commemorative monuments, casting them as the ongoing 
legacies of passed lives. My argument is that, faced with challenges to his theory of intellectual 
perfectibility, Godwin was refining his longstanding contention that print technology was key to the 
unleashing of human intellect by claiming that the book gave durable form to various aspects of the 
mind that would otherwise be destroyed by death. In other words, books were a way of harnessing the 
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progress made by individual thinkers and staging it as cultural memory. I show that Godwin was 
responding to public debates about political economy, national identity and religious belief, which all 
in various ways brought the reality of death to bear upon his central conviction about the necessity of 
intellectual perfectibility. As he defended this conviction against its critics, Godwin exploited the 
symbolic power of the book-object in order to cast death as a means of intellectual advance.  
I begin with Godwin’s biographies, focussing upon his Memoirs of the Author of A Vindication of the 
Rights of Woman (1798) and his Life of Geoffrey Chaucer (1803). Through these works, he tapped 
into a growing public and personal interest in literary biography in order to articulate the idea that a 
true ‘self’ or ‘life’ could be invested in a book, enabling that person to influence future communities. 
Godwin’s correspondence with his publisher around the production of his Life of Geoffrey Chaucer 
reveals that he associated such personal presence not simply with textual content, but also with the 
material form of the book-object itself. The book acquired a vividly corporeal form in his 
imagination, and the identity of the embodied subject became an anxious conflation of persons both 
living and dead. 
I then turn to the essays Godwin composed at the end of the decade, which changed the idiom from 
book/body to book/monument. In his Essay on Sepulchres Godwin clarified and publicised his 
contention that books were substitutes for past minds, drawing from contemporary debates about 
national identity and cultural memory in order to argue that certain book-objects had unique social 
presence and authority. His manuscript essay ‘On Death’ (1810) brought this argument to its climax, 
claiming that ‘great’ books didn’t simply perpetuate human minds but transformed them, enabling 
them to transcend the limitations of human nature. Taken together, these writings claim the printed 
codex as both the guarantee and the structuring force of a universal process of intellectual perfection. 
 
Bodies: The Life of Geoffrey Chaucer 
Godwin was one of the first writers to theorise the social power of biography. He began at the turn of 
the nineteenth century, just as literary biography was developing into an independent and highly 
popular genre and was itself aiding the development of a national literary canon and the concept of 
literary celebrity.2 Capitalising on this growing cultural interest in the relationship between texts and 
lives, Godwin blurred the boundary between authors, their works and their biographies, using the 
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dynamic to argue that printed books could become living participants in a universal process of social 
reform. He described his literary biographies as works that mediated personal presence: a good 
biography embodied a mind, he argued, which functioned as on ongoing member of intellectual 
community and thus had the power to instigate social change. As he reflected in 1815, ‘I never felt 
within me the power to disjoin a great author from his work’.3 
Godwin articulated this conviction in germinal form in 1798 through his Memoirs of the Author of A 
Vindication of the Rights of Woman, a biography of his late wife Mary Wollstonecraft. The Memoirs 
prioritise the intellectual dimensions of Wollstonecraft’s life: Godwin expresses his interest in the 
‘features of her mind’ and the growth of ‘her understanding’, and he ends the first edition with the 
reflection, ‘I believe I have put down the leading traits of her intellectual character’. He also 
repeatedly presents this mind in embodied terms. He describes his biographical task as a compilation 
of Wollstonecraft’s ‘materials’, recounts her physical demise in detail, and even transcribes her 
gravestone into the text: ‘HERE LIES MARY’.4 In his preface, Godwin had highlighted the connection 
that he envisaged between this materialised mind created through biography and his project to 
instigate social reform. He anticipates that ‘The justice which is thus done to the illustrious dead, 
converts into the fairest source of animation and encouragement to those who would follow them into 
the same carreer [sic]’. He owns himself convinced that, 
the more fully we are presented with the picture and story of such persons as the subject of 
the following narrative, the more generally we shall feel in ourselves an attachment to their 
fate, and a sympathy in their excellencies. There are not many individuals with whose 
character the public welfare and improvement are more intimately connected, than the author 
of A Vindication of the Rights of Woman.5  
Drawing from his draft essay of the previous year, ‘Of History and Romance’, Godwin links vivid 
characterisation to the recruitment of moral sense and the instigation of intellectual enquiry.6 He 
assumes that Wollstonecraft’s ‘picture and story’ will incite sympathetic attachment in its readers, a 
process which will produce, in turn, ‘public welfare and improvement’. The biography, in other words 
– the textual rendering of Wollstonecraft’s ‘character’ – will enable readers to apprehend and benefit 
from the ‘excellencies’ of her life, including her efforts towards social reform. There is, moreover, a 
second aspect to this sort of textual life. By substituting her name for her printed works (‘the author of 
A Vindication’, as in the title of the Memoirs), Godwin presents Wollstonecraft’s own authorial 
                                                      
3 Lives of Edward and John Philips, Nephews and Pupils of Milton (London: Printed for Longman, Hurst, Rees, 
Orme, and Brown, Paternoster-Row: by S. Hamilton, Weybridge, Surrey, 1815), p. vi. 
4 Memoirs of the Author of A Vindication of the Rights of Woman, in Collected Novels and Memoirs, I, pp. 85-
142 (pp. 88, 127, 141, 139-40). For more on the corporeal aspect of this text, see Angela Monsam, ‘Biography 
as Autopsy in William Godwin’s “Memoirs of the Author of A Vindication of the Rights of Woman”’, 
Eighteenth Century Fiction, 21.1 (2008), 109-30. 
5 Memoirs of the Author of A Vindication of the Rights of Woman, p. 87. The second edition has ‘a sympathy in 
their fate, and an attachment to their excellencies’, which makes even more clear the connection between 
sympathetic identification with a subject’s life (‘fate’), and the development of virtuous character (p. 147).  
6 See Chapter Two for further discussion of this essay. 
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achievements as a form of embodiment. His publication of her edited posthumous works alongside 
the biography reinforces such a conception. By means of the texts written by and about her, he 
implies, Wollstonecraft herself will be present to readers, and thus continue her impact upon the 
minds and hearts of members of society.7  
Somewhat ironically, this association of print with personal knowledge became the focal point of the 
abusive reviews that Godwin’s Memoirs received. One writer for the Anti-Jacobin Review and 
Magazine mocked Godwin for ‘Thinking her whoredoms were not known enough, | Till fairly printed 
off in black and white’, connecting his textual dissemination of Wollstonecraft’s life to a scandalous, 
rather than inspirational, form of personal knowledge.8 The Anti-Jacobin’s poem exposes a gendered 
aspect to the idea of literary intimacy in this period through its exploitation of the familiar connection 
between women writers and sexual laxity. Yet it also highlights more generally how contentious the 
concept of personal knowledge through print had become at the turn of the century. By bringing the 
relationship between intimacy and publicity under scrutiny, printed biographies or ‘lives’ unearthed 
disagreements on a philosophical level about the relationship between attachment and judgment. Once 
‘printed off in black and white’, Wollstonecraft’s social deviancy was construed as a force of moral 
corruption by critics of the Memoirs, rather than a stimulus to intellectual enquiry. Her written life 
was thus found offensive, rather than inspiring.  
Despite this hostile reaction, Godwin continued to develop the link he had made in the Memoirs 
between authorial embodiment and social reform, and it became explicit in 1803 through his Life of 
Geoffrey Chaucer. In the preface to this work, Godwin described the biographer as a necromancer, 
able to rescue deceased persons from oblivion and bring them into contact with readers of the present 
day:  
It was my wish […] to carry the workings of fancy and the spirit of philosophy into the 
investigation of ages past. I was anxious to rescue for a moment the illustrious dead from the 
jaws of the grave, to make them pass in review before me, to question their spirits and record 
their answers. I wished to make myself their master of the ceremonies, to introduce my reader 
to their familiar speech, and to enable him to feel for the instant as if he had lived with 
Chaucer.9  
This preface casts the biography as a site of personal presence. The biographer (Godwin) obtains 
personal knowledge of his subject (Chaucer), embodies this in textual form, and thus connects the 
reader’s life to Chaucer’s life. It is an image of sociability, according to which the reader gains access 
to the ‘familiar speech’ of former times. This counteracts one of the key effects of human death, the 
                                                      
7 Tilottama Rajan explores Godwin’s concept of personal ‘tendency’ in the Memoirs and posthumous works at 
length, from a slightly different critical perspective; see especially ‘Framing the Corpus: Godwin’s “Editing” of 
Wollstonecraft in 1798’, Studies in Romanticism, 39.4 (2000), 511-31. 
8 [C. Kirkpatrick Sharpe], ‘The Vision of Liberty: Written in the Manner of Spencer [sic]’, Anti-Jacobin Review 
and Magazine, 9.38 (August 1801), pp. 515-20 (p. 518). 
9 Life of Geoffrey Chaucer, I, p. xi. 
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separation of past generations from present ones: the reader feels ‘as if he had lived with Chaucer’ in 
the fourteenth century. Through Godwin’s book, he can form attachments and exchange ideas with 
dead thinkers. Echoing the language of his Memoirs of Wollstonecraft, Godwin states his desire to ‘do 
justice to’ the person of Chaucer, presenting his Life as a locus for the spread of knowledge between 
past and present communities.10 
Once again, Godwin made the mind central to this picture. Chaucer must be resurrected intellectually, 
he claimed, if he was to be brought to ‘full and complete life’: 
The full and complete life of a poet would include an extensive survey of the manners, the 
opinions, the arts and the literature, of the age in which the poet lived. This is the only way in 
which we can become truly acquainted with the history of his mind, and the causes which 
made him what he was.11 
Godwin argues that to truly know Chaucer, to apprehend the things ‘which made him what he was’, 
one must investigate ‘the history of his mind’. This involves looking beyond the literary works that he 
produced, and beyond bare historical facts and dates, to his formative environment – to the 
intellectual and literary tenor of fourteenth-century England. This is an important object for Godwin 
because, as the preface makes clear elsewhere, Chaucer is a representative figure for the nation’s 
intellectual improvement at large. ‘No one man in the history of human intellect ever did more, than 
was effected by the single mind of Chaucer’, Godwin claims; he is ‘the father of our language’ and 
fountainhead of ‘poetry in our island’.12 By presenting Chaucer’s ‘full and complete’ intellectual life 
to a new generation of readers, the biography sets out to capture something of this unique mind, 
extending its power into the contemporary social world.  
This approach to literary biography attracted ridicule, particularly from those sympathetic to the 
British antiquarian movement. Walter Scott produced a scathing summary for the Edinburgh Review: 
‘The authenticated passages of Chaucer’s life may be comprised in half a dozen pages; and behold 
two voluminous quartos!’13 Scott’s assessment hinges upon a disagreement with Godwin over the 
nature and bounds of Chaucer’s life, which for Scott was lost amidst digression and speculation. His 
reference to ‘authenticated passages’ reveals the importance of documentation to his conception of 
historiography, a priority that had been precipitated amongst antiquarians by the ballad collections of 
Thomas Percy and Joseph Ritson.14 What to Godwin contains the very essence of Chaucer’s life – ‘the 
causes which made him what he was’ – are to Scott extraneous and spurious matters, and the work is 
dismissed as a history ‘not so much of what Chaucer actually did do, as of what he and all his 
                                                      
10 Ibid., pp. vii-viii. 
11 Ibid., p. viii. 
12 Ibid., p. vii. 
13 Sir Walter Scott, ‘Review of Godwin’s “Life of Chaucer”’, Edinburgh Review, 3 (January 1804), pp. 437-52. 
14 See Maureen N. McLane, Balladeering, Minstrelsy, and the Making of British Romantic Poetry (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008), and Penny Fielding, Writing and Orality: Nationality, Culture, and 
Nineteenth-Century Scottish Fiction (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996). 
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contemporaries might, could, would, or should have done’. Rather insightfully, Scott links this 
dynamic to Godwin’s fiction-writing: 
[Chaucer’s] biographer might with equal plausibility have grafted upon his story a supposed 
attempt to escape, and given us a Newgate calendar chapter from the horrors of Caleb 
Williams, or the langours of St Leon.  
This comment unintentionally reinforces the connection that Godwin himself had made between 
history and romance in 1797. The things that diminished the Life of Chaucer for Scott – cultural 
commentary, imaginative speculation, intellectual context – were the very things that, for Godwin, 
brought Chaucer to life.15 
Godwin’s correspondence surrounding the production of his Life of Chaucer reveals a more complex 
picture of the sort of life that he imagined his work to embody or to mediate, however. The Life’s 
preface briefly references a dispute with his publisher, Richard Phillips: Godwin recalls that in the 
midst of his composition, when ‘I saw my materials growing under my hand’, Phillips assured him 
that the work would not be commercially viable beyond the length they had originally agreed upon, 
‘two volumes in quarto’.16 Godwin suggests that he submitted rather peacefully to the decision to 
keep his work within these limits, but personal correspondence shows otherwise. He had passionately 
argued against the curtailing of his project, appealing to an ethic of personal encounter in order to 
make a case for the Life’s social significance (and thus special treatment). This argument resembles 
that of the preface, yet the corporeal imagery Godwin used in his letters was far more graphic than 
anything in print: 
I have thought a thousand times, since our conversation of Tuesday, with great earnestness & 
anxiety, of this unhappy question that has arisen about the Chaucer. […]  
    What horrible confusion! What monstrous disproportion! What an entire dislocation of all 
the members of a well-arranged work! 
    A thousand times I have said to myself, I will give up the point. Yet, why should I ruin the 
best book I ever undertook? Why should I be myself the man to put an extinguisher over my 
literary character? I am now in the best & maturest part of my existence; I have taken 
incredible pains in collecting & arranging the materials of this book: must all this be made a 
sacrifice to erroneous calculations? […] 
    The public is not so blind & stupid as you imagine. They will see the ridiculousness of a 
book pretending to be a standard-book & then changing its plan in the middle; & will despise 
the author as he ought to be despised. The main characteristics of the great literary works of 
man, beyond all flights of genius & original sallies of thought, are the proportion of parts & 
the symmetry of a whole. 
    You are most fundamentally mistaken in your pecuniary calculation. Two volumes patched 
up in the manner you recommend will sell perhaps better in the first month: fools will not 
know the difference: but in a very short time the men of sense & taste will be heard, & the 
book will be consigned to contempt & oblivion. With what face shall a work claim to be 
                                                      
15 Godwin’s response to Scott’s review, a letter to the editor of the Edinburgh Review, survives only in part. See 
The Letters of William Godwin, II, pp. 302-03. The extant section echoes the language of his letter to Phillips 
(see analysis below), claiming that the reviewer has ‘confounded the two main orders of human minds, the man 
of genius, & the blockhead’. 
16 Life of Geoffrey Chaucer, I, pp. xiii-xiv. 
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regarded as a standard-work, thus crampt, & cribbed, & mangled in its most essential 
members; a figure with a well looking head and trunk, but shrivelled & blasted in its lower 
extremities? […] 
    I conclude with urging again upon your consideration, that there are books of genius, & 
there are books that are otherwise. If you think my book is of the vulgar & every day class, 
you do well in your present proposition. But, if it is in its constituent nature what I suppose 
we both hope it is, you do not act the part of a bookseller (understanding by a bookseller a 
man dealing in books, & capable of feeling his true interests, even when the case should not 
be of the sort that every day brings before him), but of a murderer & a suicide in one.17  
This is fundamentally an argument about material production: Godwin claims that ‘the materials of 
this book’ demand proportion, symmetry and proper arrangement, encapsulating such ideals in the 
term ‘standard-work’ or ‘standard-book’. The Life’s social impact will be jeopardised, Godwin 
implies, if its content does not correlate with its formal appearance. He had already raised this sort of 
concern with Phillips during the previous year, as shown by a string of letters which accuse the 
publisher of a ‘shabby mode of printing’ and argue that a higher aesthetic standard of production ‘best 
brings out an author’s meaning’.18 Yet this subsequent letter makes the argument intensely personal, 
envisaging the results of Phillips’s proposal as a tortured, abortive form: it will cause ‘entire 
dislocation’, a figure ‘crampt & cribbed, & mangled in its most essential members; […] a well 
looking head and trunk, but shrivelled & blasted in its lower extremities’. The book itself is something 
living, a creation whose development should be respected like human development. Evoking Psalm 
139 – ‘Thine eyes did see my substance, yet being unperfect; and in thy book all my members were 
written’ – Godwin contrasts the care of divine synthesis to this enforced ‘dislocation of […] 
members’, presenting Phillips’s requirement as a premature birth. His accusation of murder also 
echoes the anthropomorphism of Milton’s Areopagitica, in which ‘hee who destroyes a good Booke, 
[…] kills the Image of God, as it were in the eye’. The reference associates Phillips with political 
censorship, positioning his demands as oppressive, unreasonable and damaging to national intellectual 
life.19 
Given the argument about necromancy in the Life’s preface, one might associate the identity of this 
book-body with that of Chaucer himself. Indeed, Godwin refers to the dispute as a question about ‘the 
Chaucer’, eliding his textual subject with the book’s material dimensions. It is Chaucer whose ‘face’ 
will be mismatched by a ‘monstrous’ appearance, incompletely fleshed out by the book’s contents. It 
is Chaucer’s life thus at stake, should Phillips choose to make himself ‘a murderer’. Godwin also 
claims that the book’s curtailed length will maim ‘my literary character’, however. Just as the work 
itself will be considered repulsive for ‘changing its plan in the middle’, its author will be despised as 
someone who falls short in the middle of his career: ‘I am now in the best & maturest part of my 
                                                      
17 Godwin to Richard Phillips, 31 March 1803, The Letters of William Godwin, II, pp. 276-78. 
18 Godwin to Richard Phillips, 18 July 1802, 19 July 1802 and 21 July 1802, in The Letters of William Godwin, 
II, pp. 252-56 (pp. 253, 255). 
19 John Milton, Areopagitica, p. 492. 
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existence’. The victim of the murder may thus also be interpreted as Godwin, ‘shrivelled and blasted’ 
in the climax of his authorial efforts. In fact, Godwin aligns his own vocation with ‘the great literary 
works of man’, casting his own figure, in turn, as representative. Just as his preface to the Life would 
make Chaucer a synecdoche for national intellectual pursuit, Godwin’s letter conflates his own work 
with cultural work more generally, presenting Phillips’s proposal as an injury against all ‘books of 
genius’.  
Godwin thus associates his material book-object with various kinds of vitality: that of its textual 
subject, his own authorial person, and the mind of a collective ideal, Man. He considers the Life of 
Chaucer valuable for what he calls ‘its constituent nature’, a suggestive phrase that refers to a 
physical collection of pages, an enclosed subject (Chaucer), an invested author (Godwin), and the 
shared essence of all ‘books of genius’. In Godwin’s imagination, all these lives intersected in the 
book-object. He used the language of the body in order to articulate his conception that books could 
encapsulate and perpetuate some of the most valuable elements of human persons. 
Ironically, even though Godwin submitted to Phillips’s two-volume scheme, most reviews of the Life 
of Chaucer considered it too long.20 Godwin hinted at plans for a third, supplementary volume, yet 
never managed to expand it, and its second edition was issued with only minor revisions.21 His 
conception of his book’s inherent social authority, however, was developed and enriched over the 
ensuing years to form an ambitious defence of the role of the printed codex in society’s progress 
towards intellectual perfection. 
 
Monuments: Essays on Sepulchres and Death 
As the first decade of the nineteenth century drew to a close, Godwin wrote two essays that directly 
addressed the subject of death. This was also a time during which Godwin showed renewed interest in 
the power of the printed word, persistently probing in his writings ‘the degree to which books are 
dead or alive’, in Julie Carlson’s words. This dual interest in lifespans and books, Carlson suggests, 
was precipitated by Godwin’s disintegrating social network and his newly hostile encounters with the 
print market (which entailed stark financial and emotional challenges).22 We might also note the death 
of several reformist acquaintances: Holcroft, Paine and the publisher Joseph Johnson all died in 1809, 
and Godwin wrote Johnson’s obituary notice for the Morning Chronicle.23 However, as indicated 
                                                      
20 For a summary, see Graham, William Godwin Reviewed, pp. 214-15, 221-22. Scott’s review is representative 
in this regard: ‘behold two voluminous quartos!’. 
21 For this projected ‘future volume’ see Godwin’s letter to Phillips on 5 April 1803, in The Letters of William 
Godwin, II, pp. 278-79. For the second edition, the original two quarto volumes were made four octavo, but the 
text was not lengthened (see entry for 17 February 1804 in The Diary of William Godwin). 
22 Carlson, England’s First Family of Writers, pp. 78-80. 
23 Obituary notice for Joseph Johnson, Morning Chronicle, 21 December 1809, p. 3 (published anonymously). 
Cf. Philp, ‘Introduction’ to Political and Philosophical Writings, pp. 23-24. 
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above and by previous chapters, Godwin’s interest in the relationship between books and death was 
not simply reactionary but was also an outworking of his long-standing belief in the ability of books 
to generate social reform. Throughout his educational, historiographical and biographical writings to 
date, Godwin had been developing the idea that books could mediate real, personal encounters and 
thus be considered in themselves active agents of intellectual improvement.  
Essay on Sepulchres, as its subtitle explains, is ‘a proposal for erecting some memorial of the 
illustrious dead in all ages on the spot where their remains have been interred’. In order to understand 
the nature and purpose of this scheme, we must understand the view of death that Godwin sets out in 
the Essay’s opening pages. Death is depicted here as a problem for the mind, first and foremost. It is 
at its most devastating, Godwin argues, in the loss that it entails for the intellectual progress of human 
societies. ‘It is impossible to calculate how much of good perishes, when a great and excellent man 
dies’, he exclaims. ‘It is owing to this […] that the world for ever is, and in some degree for ever must 
be, in its infancy’. In other words, when a ‘great’ person perishes, all their advances in moral and 
political thought are lost, their contribution to social good ceases, and this stalls the improvement of 
the world at large. Referring back to this concept of infancy later in the essay, Godwin writes that 
‘The world is much like a school; […] the studies that are entered on, and the instruction that is given, 
are perpetually beginning’.24 It is as though society is subject to a constant haemorrhage of mind, by 
which collective striving towards truth and justice is thwarted. 
In addressing this topic, Godwin was partly responding to the criticism that his belief in human 
perfectibility had received over the past few years. He had been ridiculed for whitewashing the reality 
of death in Political Justice, which had finished by confidently painting a picture of a future in which 
death would be surpassed as the human mind improved. Perhaps the most infamous of these attacks 
was from Thomas Robert Malthus, whose Essay on the Principle of Population (1798) argued that 
misery, vice and death were necessary to the survival of the species, because they kept population size 
and food supply in equilibrium. Godwin had already responded to Malthus in his ‘Thoughts 
Occasioned by […] Dr Parr’s Spital Sermon’ (1801), but he continued to feel the pressure of the 
criticism, eventually publishing a book-length reply in 1820 entitled Of Population. Essay on 
Sepulchres appeared between these two ripostes and formed part of their justification of his 
confidence in intellectual progress. He used it to address the problem of death directly, and in order to 
do so he conceded that it was indeed the major setback for human perfectibility. It rendered human 
societies like infant schools, which constantly lost their most advanced members and constantly 
gained new, ignorant ones.25 
                                                      
24 Essay on Sepulchres, pp. 8, 14.  
25 See my Introduction for further detail about the Godwin-Malthus dispute. This interpretation of the intention 
behind Essay on Sepulchres is reinforced by Godwin’s own reference to it in his preface to Mandeville: it was 
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Godwin insists from the beginning of his Essay on Sepulchres, however, that minds are not wholly 
lost through death. He identifies a material aspect to intellect, and claims that a remnant of this has a 
posthumous existence. Although he confesses himself ‘more inclined to the opinion of the 
immaterialists; than of the materialists’ when it comes to defining the nature of thought itself, he 
considers it important that ‘my acquaintance with the thoughts and the virtues of my friend, has been 
made through my eyes and my ears’. Knowledge is always embodied, and to love someone’s intellect 
is to love their whole person. Such love spills over into the objects and places associated with them, 
and these gain, he argues, ‘an empire over my mind’. He was drawing from a growing interest in the 
ability of memory to forge connections between places, objects and persons, prominent in the literary 
work of Robert Southey and William Wordsworth (the latter’s own ‘Essay on Epitaphs’ was 
published in 1810).26 Godwin argues that it is not only unavoidable, but reasonable to become 
attached to the physical spot of a friend’s interment, because this ‘is our only reality’. It is the material 
locus through which we can recall ‘the thoughts and the virtues’ of the deceased person.27 Through 
tangible places of mourning, the living can reclaim something of the dead. 
This insistence on the material embeddedness of knowledge leads Godwin to present an initial 
critique of the commemorative practices of current society. He argues that British citizens do not 
make the most of the real intellectual solidity of dead persons available to them, and thus they miss an 
opportunity to counteract some of the social loss inflicted by death. ‘We remarked some way back, 
that ‘the world was for ever in its infancy’’, Godwin recalls; ‘It is indeed so: we cut ourselves off 
from the inheritance of our ancestors’. He implies that his readers deliberately neglect the material 
reality of dead minds. He argues later that the British inhabit an ‘old country’, literally composed of 
the remains of great thinkers and thus full of sites of potential knowledge recovery. Yet they spurn its 
advantages: ‘They do not husband their inheritance’.28 Godwin connects the intellectual loss of dead 
persons to a neglect of husbandry amongst the living, who have a duty to tend to their physical 
remains. Exactly what Godwin means by ‘husbandry’ at this stage remains mysterious. Yet he clearly 
suggests that British society does nothing to prevent a process of dismembering: the material parts of 
dead minds are being forgotten, left to dissolve into oblivion.  
These observations about the nature of death pave the way to Godwin’s solution: a national effort to 
memorialise the greatest minds. He exhorts his readers to ‘seize on what we can. Let us mark the spot 
[…] let us visit their tombs; let us indulge all the reality we can now have, of a sort of conference with 
                                                      
something written from a uniquely ‘private sentiment’, produced in order ‘to try whether, as Marmontel says, 
they valued me for myself’ (Mandeville, p. 8). 
26 See Philp, ‘Introduction’ to Political and Philosophical Writings, p. 23. Cf. Wordsworth, ‘Essay on Epitaphs’, 
in The Prose Works of William Wordsworth, ed. by W. J. B. Owen and Jane Worthington Smyser, 3 vols 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1974), II, pp. 43-119. 
27 Essay on Sepulchres, pp. 8, 10. 
28 Ibid., pp. 14, 19. 
 
139 
these men’.29 Dead people can continue as social beings, for Godwin – they can still participate in 
intellectual life – yet this only happens when the living ‘seize’ upon something of their material 
remains. The appeal is later rendered as a personal demand: 
I wish to live in intercourse with the Illustrious Dead of All Ages. I demand the friendship of 
Zoroaster. […] I would say, with Ezekiel, the Hebrew, in his Vision, ‘Let these dry bones 
live!’ Let them not live merely in cold generalities and idle homilies of morality; but let them 
live, as my friends, my philosophers, my instructors, and my guides! I would say with the 
moralist of old, ‘Let me act, as I would wish to have acted, if Socrates or Cato were the 
spectators of what I did!’ And I am not satisfied only to call them up by a strong effort of the 
imagination, but I would have them, and men like them, “around my path, and around my 
bed,” and not allow myself to hold a more frequent intercourse with the living than with the 
good departed.30  
This idea of conversing with the dead through tokens of remembrance was commonplace, but Godwin 
redirects it into unusually literal territory. The materiality of commemorative monuments is his great 
preoccupation in the Essay; he does not allow his readers to settle for an ‘effort of the imagination’ 
alone, but locates the reality of dead thinkers in their remaining ‘solidity’, the hic jacet of a 
sepulchre.31 Considering how busts or portraits can bring historical figures to life in the mind of their 
contemplators, he elevates tombs to a higher level, arguing that ‘the dust that is covered by his tomb, 
is simply and literally the great man himself’.32 It is a physical reality that works in partnership with a 
psychological reality – the imaginative nature of man, who is ‘a creature “looking before and after”’ – 
and creates a real meeting of past and present minds. Godwin asks of the dead, ‘Had their thoughts 
less of sinew and substance […] than ours?’, encapsulating the strange alliance of material and 
immaterial that he propounds. Intellectual exchange is incarnate, given ‘sinew and substance’, 
through the monument itself. Godwin’s sepulchres are the loci of material-spiritual encounters, sites 
that foster appropriate sentiment towards ‘Illustrious’ thinkers and thus embody real relationships.33 In 
this manner, they counteract the loss to collective intellectual improvement that death entails. 
Godwin’s emphasis upon location indicates that his Essay on Sepulchres is also an argument about a 
nation. He describes the proposal as ‘a scheme for Great Britain’, although he mentions his hope that 
it will take root in other countries, whose leaders will follow the British example. The importance of 
national landscape is made clear by Godwin’s proposition that a map be produced, showing the 
British Isles in its tomb-studded aspect, alongside a ‘Catalogue’ or directory of those interred in its 
                                                      
29 Ibid., p. 12. 
30 Ibid., p. 22. 
31 Ibid., p. 10. 
32 Ibid., p. 20 (emphasis in the original). 
33 Ibid., p. 23. On the connection between Godwin’s Essay on Sepulchres and associationism, see Mark Salber 
Phillips, Society and Sentiment: Genres of Historical Writing in Britain, 1740-1820 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2000), pp. 322-41, and Rowland Weston, ‘History, Memory, and Moral Knowledge: William 
Godwin’s “Essay on Sepulchres”’, The European Legacy, 14.6 (2009), 651-65. 
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soil.34 Forging a link between national thinkers and the earth upon which they trod – even reminding 
his readers that an ‘old country’ such as Britain is literally composed of clods of great men – Godwin 
positions his countrymen as inheritors of a starkly material legacy. They are unified, not simply 
around a land mass, but a land ‘of the most admirable fertility’; a land in which the material remains 
of the ‘Illustrious Dead’ are ‘fruitful of sentiments and virtues’ that ‘elevate [man] to a God’.35 
Godwin thus presents the British nation as the collective heir of an inheritance of intellectual 
production, and propounds a message of unity around this shared past. Citizens of the present day ‘do 
not husband their inheritance’, he argues, because they do not understand how integral it is to their 
national make-up. In fact, this British heritage includes writers from ancient Greece and Rome – 
Godwin lists Shakespeare and Milton in the same line as Plato and Virgil – which advocates the 
importance of living British thinkers by giving them an ancient lineage, and subtly aligns them with 
an idealised republican past.36  
At first reading, this seems rather a departure from the Godwin of Political Justice, who had argued 
fiercely against the prejudicial sentiment engendered by national governments. The Monthly Review 
certainly felt so, commending Essay on Sepulchres for being ‘more in the style of antient piety than of 
modern philosophy’.37 Godwin’s exhortation that British readers should ‘husband their inheritance’ 
seems especially Burkean, perhaps part the wider ‘reconceptualization of the literary past as a form of 
collective cultural patrimony’ that Philip Connell identifies as a more general and salient feature of 
society in this period.38 Yet Godwin’s concern with monuments to the intellect is also deliberately 
subversive of his immediate political context. He wrote during a time of unprecedented investment in 
military monuments, which had been precipitated by the Napoleonic wars and particularly by the 
death of Nelson in 1805. His Essay challenges the idea that British military victories in Europe were 
fundamental to the nation’s identity – that the national inheritance of future generations should be 
understood in terms of a tradition of physical prowess or Protestant loyalty.39 ‘Military and naval 
achievements are of temporary operation’, he argues, ‘but whole Plato, and Xenophon, and Virgil 
                                                      
34 Essay on Sepulchres, pp. 24, 29-30. For more on Essay on Sepulchres and location, see Paul Westover, 
‘William Godwin, Literary Tourism, and the Work of Necromanticism’, Studies in Romanticism, 48.2 (2009), 
299-319, later incorporated into his Necromanticism: Traveling to Meet the Dead, 1750-1860 (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). 
35 Essay on Sepulchres, pp. 18-19. 
36 Godwin summarized his idealized view of classical culture in a letter to Mary Shelley at the end of his life: 
‘The species has, I believe, for the last fifteen or eighteen hundred years, been grievously depressed below the 
standard which is set before us in the ancient republics of Greece and Rome’ (transcribed in Political and 
Philosophical Writings, VII, p. 79). On the general significance of classical literature and history in Godwin’s 
life and career, see Philp, ‘Introduction’ to Political and Philosophical Writings, pp. 22-23. 
37 [Anon.], ‘Review of “Essay on Sepulchres”’, Monthly Review, 61 (1810), Art. 44, p. 111. 
38 Philip Connell, ‘Bibliomania: Book Collecting, Cultural Politics, and the Rise of Literary Heritage in 
Romantic Britain’, Representations, 71 (Summer 2000), 24-47 (p. 30). 
39 On the context of military monuments, see Alison Yarrington, ‘Nelson the Citizen Hero: State and Public 
Patronage of Monumental Sculpture 1805-18’, Art History, 6.3 (September 1983), 315-29. On the formation of 
national identity in opposition to European powers in this period, see Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation, 
1707-1837 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992). 
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have descended to us, undefaced, undismembered, and complete’. He evokes the literal dismembering 
of Nelson, who had famously lost his arm at the Battle of Santa Cruz de Teneriffe, implying that 
books have greater resilience and worth than the battle heroes of popular commemoration. He argues 
for the cultivation of a different sort of national identity, one constituted by a legacy of intellectual 
and literary achievement.  
Godwin’s intellectual monuments are in fact subtly presented as a sort of usurpation of national 
cultural memory. He proposes that his directory of monuments should replace the ‘Catalogue of 
Gentlemen’s Seats’ that were commonly included in travellers’ guides.40 Visionary thinkers and 
writers should become the national landmarks, he implies, rather than the landed estates of noble 
families. He constructs a vision of the British nation that is marked (literally) by intellectual merit, 
embodied by symbols of the virtues of the mind, rather than of aristocratic authority or political 
power. Indeed, throughout the essay Godwin attacks cultural links between monuments and wealth, 
explicitly rejecting the ornamental style of burial associated with those in socio-political power. The 
erection and maintenance of tombs at Westminster Abbey, he contends, have no correlation to 
genuine merit, only to fortune. The sepulchre of his proposal, by contrast, is ‘A very slight and cheap 
memorial, a white cross of wood’; he will ‘leave the rest to the mind of the spectator’.41 Perhaps 
Godwin’s appeal to private subscription for the financing of his project was also a response to the 
contention over the funding of Westminster Abbey’s literary ‘pantheon’, a suggestion that those with 
the means to patronise commemorative schemes should disown private interests, and devote 
themselves instead to this public ideal.42  
Contemporary reviews show that no one was really sure what Godwin’s concrete objective was in his 
Essay on Sepulchres; some directly assessed the shortcomings of his monument scheme, others 
understood it ‘rather as a play of genius than as a serious proposal’.43 Yet whatever his intentions 
were concerning the wooden crosses, it is clear that Godwin invited his readers to consider books as 
such monuments. While at one point in the essay books work in tandem with monuments – reading an 
author’s work in a particular location helps to bring the text to life – at many other points books are 
clearly positioned as monumental materials themselves. Great thinkers ‘are still with us in their 
stories, in their words, in their writings’; a deceased friend can survive only ‘in his memory, and his 
                                                      
40 Essay on Sepulchres, pp. 28-30. 
41 Ibid., pp. 12-13, 7, 18. 
42 See Philip Connell, ‘Death and the Author: Westminster Abbey and the Meanings of the Literary Monument’, 
Eighteenth-Century Studies, 38.4 (2005), 557-85 (p. 563), and Matthew Craske, ‘Westminster Abbey 1720-70: 
A Public Pantheon Built upon Private Interest’, in Pantheons: Transformations of a Monumental Idea, ed. by 
Richard Wrigley and Matthew Craske (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), pp. 57-79. 
43 [Anon.], ‘Review of “Essay on Sepulchres”’, Monthly Review, 61 (1810), Art. 44, p. 111. For a summary of 
the reviews of Godwin’s Essay, see Graham, William Godwin Reviewed, pp. 299-302. 
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works’.44 As seen in the quotation that opened this chapter, Godwin sometimes elides this concept of 
book-monument with that of book-body: 
Military and naval achievements are of temporary operation: the victories of Cimon and 
Scipio are passed away; these great heroes have dwindled into a name; but whole Plato, and 
Xenophon, and Virgil have descended to us, undefaced, undismembered, and complete. I can 
dwell upon them for days and for weeks: I am acquainted with their peculiarities; their inmost 
thoughts are familiar to me; they appear before me with all the attributes of individuality; I 
can ruminate upon their lessons and sentiments at leisure, till my whole soul is lighted up 
with the spirit of these authors.45 
The material legacies of these classical writers are strikingly corporeal: ‘whole’ Plato have descended, 
‘complete’, like preserved bodies. Godwin’s use of negatives – ‘undefaced, undismembered’ – evokes 
an image of time as a brutaliser, destroying faces and limbs, and yet simultaneously asserts that this 
process is defied by the book form. His reference to battle injury adds another layer of meaning, 
implying that these particular books have emerged victorious from a process of intellectual warfare. 
He echoes the language of his letter to Phillips, which had lamented the ‘entire dislocation of all the 
members’ of his work, and connects the idea to that of survival through history. A good book is here a 
re-membering of its author.  
In fact, Godwin applies this principle to Essay on Sepulchres as a book-object itself. In the preface, 
anticipating the question ‘If your proposal is impracticable, why then is it published?’, he uses the 
same language that appears later to describe the sentiment produced by monument contemplation. The 
book is not to be ‘considered as complete’ in itself, but will work in partnership with the ‘intellectual 
eye’, resulting in an ‘elevation of mind’. There is something in the act of reading the text of Essay on 
Sepulchres itself, Godwin suggests, which makes its project ‘a reality’: 
For just so much time as any one shall spend in reading and meditating on the suggestions of 
these pages, provided it be done in a serious frame, the project is a reality, and is as if it were 
executed.46  
This conditional clause – ‘provided it be done in a serious frame’ – echoes that of his later instructions 
for visiting book-monuments. Locating the presence of the Illustrious Dead ‘in their stories, in their 
words, in their writings’, Godwin describes these materials as ‘their place, […] where, if we dwell in a 
composed and a quiet spirit, we shall not fail to be conscious of their presence’.47 Books and 
monuments are conflated in this self-referential turn. Both are presented as the material loci of 
immaterial presence, and thus as potential sites of relationship, attachment and personal knowledge.  
This assimilation of monuments and literary works is reinforced by Godwin’s intriguing comment 
about literary characters. ‘Yet to an imaginary person I do not refuse the semblance of a tomb’, he 
                                                      
44 Essay on Sepulchres, pp. 23, 8 (emphasis mine). 
45 Ibid., pp. 28-29. 
46 Ibid., pp. 5-6. 
47 Ibid., p. 23. 
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states, observing that ‘I should be delighted to visit the spot where Cervantes imagined Don Quixote 
to be buried, or the fabulous tomb of Clarissa Harlowe’.48 This comment seems to undermine, at first 
glance, Godwin’s previous insistence upon the importance of physical remains (‘the dust that is 
covered by his tomb, is simply and literally the great man himself’). Yet if we imagine books as such 
physical remains, as Godwin encourages us to do, it is easier to understand how this material potency 
might function as a monument to a character as much as to an author. Godwin’s own fictional 
characters use the language of ‘monument’ to frame their projected legacy; St Leon and Mandeville 
both describe themselves in such terms.49 In the manuscript ending of Caleb Williams, the protagonist 
declares: ‘I am a stone – a GRAVE-STONE! – an obelisk to tell you, HERE LIES WHAT WAS ONCE A 
MAN!’50 This conflation of subject and sepulchre is important, for it reflects Godwin’s interest in the 
ways in which materialisation made voices durable. He changed the ending of Caleb Williams 
because it appeared too bleak to his reformist contemporaries, but Caleb’s turning to stone in the 
original version articulates his monumentalising vision in germinal form. Just as he printed 
Wollstonecraft’s grave into her biography, Godwin’s monumental presentation of his fictional 
characters was a gesture of faith in reform. He was embodying the subject, marking the site of its 
presence, that the reader might be moved towards ‘a sort of conference with these men’. 
This concept of the book, moreover, is presented as an explicitly secular version of immortality. 
Godwin used his Essay on Sepulchres partly as a riposte to the pious conclusions of Sir Thomas 
Browne’s Hydriotaphia, Urne-Buriall, or, a Discourse of the Sepulchrall Urnes Lately Found in 
Norfolk (1658), which he records reading in 1804 and consulting again in 1808 about six months 
before he started writing the essay.51 On an immediate level, Godwin’s Essay shares Browne’s 
concern with the social significance of commemorative monuments, and draws from his mournful 
contemplation of human frailty against the ravages of time. Browne describes the work of the 
archaeologist in terms not dissimilar from those Godwin uses to describe his sepulchre project: ‘to 
preserve the living, and make the dead to live, to keep men out of their urns, […] is not impertinent 
unto our profession’.52 Yet Godwin overtly resists Browne’s argument that monuments are a 
testament to human futility, which should prompt the living to invest in the traditional Christian 
conception of an afterlife. Urne-Buriall becomes an eloquent sermon: 
                                                      
48 Ibid., p. 24. 
49 St Leon, p. 31; Mandeville, pp. 146, 217-18, 309. 
50 Caleb Williams, p. 340. 
51 See entries for 17-19 April 1804 and 15-16 March 1808 in The Diary of William Godwin. A copy of 
Browne’s work was listed amongst Godwin’s posthumous book sales: see ‘The Catalogue of the Curious 
Library of that Very Eminent and Distinguished Author William Godwin (1836), compiled by Sotheby and 
Son’, printed in Sale Catalogues of Libraries of Eminent Persons, ed. by A. N. L. Munby, 12 vols (London: 
Mansell with Sotheby Parke Bernet Publications, 1971-74), VIII (1973), pp. 283-318. 
52 Sir Thomas Browne, Hydriotaphia, Urne-Buriall, or, a Discourse of the Sepulchrall Urnes Lately Found in 
Norfolk. Together with the garden of Cyrus, or the quincunciall, lozenge, or net-work plantations of the 
ancients, artificially, naturally, mystically considered. With sundry observations. (London: Printed for Hen. 
Brome, 1658), p. 5. 
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Pyramids, arches, obelisks, were but the irregularities of vain-glory, and wild enormities of 
ancient magnanimity. But the most magnanimous resolution rests in the Christian religion, 
which trampleth upon pride and sits on the neck of ambition, humbly pursuing that infallible 
perpetuity, unto which all others must diminish their diameters, and be poorly seen in angles 
of contingency. […] 
    To subsist in lasting monuments, to live in their productions, to exist in their names and 
predicament of chimeras, was large satisfaction unto old expectations, and made one part of 
their Elysiums. But all this is nothing in the metaphysicks of true belief. To live indeed, is to 
be again ourselves, which being not only an hope, but an evidence in noble believers, 'tis all 
one to lie in St Innocent's church-yard as in the sands of Egypt. Ready to be anything, in the 
ecstasy of being ever, and as content with six foot as the moles of Adrianus.53  
For Browne, the ancients’ hope that they might ‘live in their productions’ was vainglory, part of an 
outdated superstition that has been surpassed by ‘the metaphysicks of true belief’. For Godwin, by 
contrast, the only subjects who survive are those commemorated in books: ‘They are not dead. They 
are still with us in their stories, in their words, in their writings’. In Godwin’s secular vision of the 
human race – that of perfectible beings, yet with no Christian heaven or hell awaiting them after death 
– hope for longevity lies precisely in what Browne declaims. The dead do indeed ‘subsist in lasting 
monuments’ and ‘live in their productions’.  
This mattered for Godwin because the perspective taken by Urne-Buriall encapsulated what he 
considered to be one of the most pernicious aspects of Christian religion, its claim that real 
improvement to moral and intellectual life would be achieved only after death, in a heavenly realm. 
He reiterated this criticism in his manuscript essay ‘Of Religion’ (1818), and later in his final and 
unfinished work, The Genius of Christianity Unveiled (1836).54 For centuries, he argued, this 
Christian emphasis upon the celestial realm had suppressed the true potential of the human mind to 
improve in the terrestrial realm, in part by causing believers to doubt its capacities in the here-and-
now. ‘Christianity is the nightmare that has pressed down all [the mind’s] exertions, and paralysed its 
articulations’, he claimed.55 Essay on Sepulchres contributed to this argument by setting itself overtly 
against Browne’s text, presenting perfectibility as an earthly reality, and claiming that books testify to 
this ongoing intellectual vitality that human persons can achieve. In this respect, it is perhaps more 
radical than its critics have allowed it to be; it certainly seems ironic that the Monthly Review praised 
it for its ‘style of antient piety’.56  
Godwin thus used his Essay on Sepulchres to claim that books represented and facilitated a process of 
universal intellectual progress: they preserved the best minds of the past (the ‘Illustrious Dead’) in 
order to nourish the minds of the living. The Essay owes a debt to John Milton’s Areopagitica (1644), 
seen most clearly in Godwin’s depiction of books as objects containing a special sort of life, the best 
                                                      
53 Browne, Urne-Buriall, pp. 82-84. 
54 See ‘Of Religion’, p. 67, and The Genius of Christianity Unveiled: In A Series of Essays, in Political and 
Philosophical Writings, VII, pp. 75-240. 
55 The Genius of Christianity Unveiled, p. 199. 
56 [Anon.], ‘Review of “Essay on Sepulchres”’, Monthly Review, 61 (1810), Art. 44, p. 111. 
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of which survive a process of intellectual warfare. Milton’s famous argument against the licensing 
and censorship of the printing press involved the claim that ‘a good Booke is the pretious life-blood of 
a master spirit, imbalm’d and treasur’d up on purpose to a life beyond life’. The value of these book-
lives was associated, not simply with the personal merits of their authors, but with the universal power 
of truth and reason: great books contain ‘the breath of reason it selfe, […] an immortality rather than a 
life’.57 This conception of certain books being inherently authoritative and vital undergirds Godwin’s 
Essay, surfacing most noticeably in his claim that ‘great’ books always survive the challenges of time 
and changing fashion by a process of natural selection:  
It is with the memories of men, as it is with books. Those will always be the most numerous, 
which are of the freshest date. But this is all accident. The books and the memories of men in 
the eighteenth century, at present overrun our libraries, and clog up our faculties. But the time 
is hastening on, when this shall not longer be the case, when they shall be reduced to their 
true standard, and brought down to their genuine numbers. The tomb, the view of which 
awakens no sentiment, and that has no history annexed to it, must perish, and ought to perish. 
The description of the fate of mortal writings, so admirably given by Swift in his Dedication 
to Posterity, is not less applicable to the present subject.58 
True to his Dissenting educational background, Godwin assumes that Truth has self-evident value and 
uses this to argue that only ‘Illustrious’ minds survive through print in the long-term (see Chapter 
Four). He evokes Milton’s association of truth and life in order to envision a process by which, in 
spite of the contemporary proliferation of printed works, only the most able minds could survive and 
thrive in book-form across generations. The mere materiality of printed pages is not enough in itself; 
the tomb ‘which awakens no sentiment’ will perish.  
This aspect of Godwin’s Essay on Sepulchres at once echoes and subverts the many jeremiads of 
modern print culture that featured in the writing of his contemporaries.59 He employs a well-aired 
notion, that the modern literary marketplace promotes quantity over quality, yet he resists the 
inference of social degeneration which many others were inclined to draw from it. One gloomy satire 
for the Monthly Expositor actually recruited the contemporary print market as evidence to refute 
Godwin’s particular belief in perfectibility, conjuring up a Dunciad-inspired image of ‘scribblers who 
cannot write a verse’ in order to imply that ‘the world degenerates from age to age’.60 Godwin draws 
from the same tradition of Scriblerian satire in the section from his Essay quoted above, yet he comes 
to a very different conclusion to that of his critic. He references Jonathan Swift’s dedication to ‘His 
                                                      
57 Milton, Areopagitica, pp. 492-93. 
58 Essay on Sepulchres, p. 26.  
59 On the ubiquity of corruption narratives in Romantic-period discussions of print see Paula McDowell, 
‘Towards a Genealogy of ‘Print Culture’ and ‘Oral Tradition’’, and Andrew Piper, Dreaming in Books, pp. 5-6. 
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146 
Royal Highness Prince Posterity’ in A Tale of a Tub (1704), which had mocked the vast numbers of 
writers who claimed literary immortality in their prefaces, and traced the journey of their works to 
their final use in ovens, brothels, and toilets: ‘I inquired after them among readers and booksellers, but 
I inquired in vain; the memorial of them was lost among men, their place was no more to be found’.61 
Just as Swift’s dedication identifies a body of intellectually vacuous works that forfeit 
memorialization and become waste matter, Godwin’s Essay on Sepulchres identifies a class of ‘mortal 
writings’, which lack the immaterial power required for longevity. Yet Godwin uses this idea to 
advance a principle of natural selection: he uses Milton’s alliance of truth and life to argue that book-
monuments survive in their ‘genuine numbers’, that the earth will ultimately absorb the flood of 
unworthy modern print. In this way, he argues in his Essay on Sepulchres, books testify to the 
possibility and reality of intellectual progress. They show the power of truth through ‘Illustrious’ 
minds, who have made and continue to make headway in the human struggle towards intellectual 
perfection. 
The following year, Godwin drafted an essay ‘On Death’ (1810) that refined this concept of the book-
object’s special kind of life. His Essay on Sepulchres had considered books as modes of presence, by 
which dead minds were preserved and made manifest. ‘On Death’ develops the connection he had 
forged between books and social authority, but from a contrary perspective – by exploring books as 
modes of absence. Hitherto unpublished, ‘On Death’ describes how a book can endow its author with 
a divine-like existence through its function as a distance medium. In other words, Godwin claims that 
books do something more than simply preserving or distilling great minds; they transform them, 
enabling them to transcend the limitations of human nature.62 
‘On Death’ considers the book-object as a disembodiment, a site of authorial absence. Godwin begins 
by observing that bodily absence lent authority to ancient Eastern monarchs, and argues that their 
practice was based upon an acute perception of the human heart: ‘That which we clearly understand, 
& can define in all its bearings, we do not contemplate with reverence’. He then applies this principle 
to books, portraying ‘the author & the friend’ in sharp contrast to each other: 
The man that I admire most at a distance, if I fall into unrestrained & often intercourse with 
him, will lose much of my reverence. […] I see he is a man, I perceive that in many ways he 
is ever such a one as my-self, I find in him human infirmities, & know that he cannot always 
be great; my eye becomes fatigued with continually looking up; & having repeatedly 
contemplated him in his elevations, I come at last to survey him in his littlenesses. There is 
another thing beside this: if he is an author, & I take him in his works, I can never read him 
                                                      
61 Jonathan Swift, A Tale of a Tub: To which is added The Battle of the Books and the Mechanical Operation of 
the Spirit, ed. by A. C. Guthkelch and David Nichol Smith, 2nd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 
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Durability of Human Achievements and Productions’ in Thoughts on Man (p. 83). 
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36-39. The following transcriptions are my own. Godwin recorded the composition date of this essay as 6 
October 1810 in The Diary of William Godwin. 
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through – no, I can never read him through. Let us suppose that I am thoroughly master of his 
writings; yet he has written, it may be, only upon one, or upon two subjects; I cannot tell how 
he would have expressed himself, or how he thought, upon others. An author, when he 
purposes to write, retires himself into his treasury, and unlocks all his hoards. But he does not 
use them all: he selects only such as are to his present purpose. When he has composed a 
book, he closes the door of his sanctuary, & comes forth. It is perhaps a splendid assemblage 
of beauties that he exposes before me. But I cannot tell what there is still accumulated in the 
magazine he has quitted. It is for his unknown wealth, as I may say principally, that I worship 
him. I do not love to gauge the dimensions of his mind. I love to guess & wonder, & guess & 
wonder still. But, if I am his familiar acquaintance, I then can read him through. It is no 
longer in his power […] to play the miser or the politician with me. He does not now bring 
forth a certain arrangement of magnificent materials, & close the door of the magazine upon 
all the rest. We talk on all subjects; I propose to him upon one occasion or another all 
questions, & he supplies to me with the frankness of a manly mind; I can almost tell what he 
thinks, & how he would express himself, on every subject. The differences between the 
author & the friend is nearly as great as between a scriptory evidencer or affidavit, where a 
man says just the things his judgment suggests & arranges them to his mind, & an evidencer, 
placed up in the witness box, who is questioned, & sifted, & exposed as a laughing-stock to 
all the bystanders. 
The book has social authority, here, because it represents something that is fundamentally absent. It 
provokes continuous intellectual pursuit, and commands respect, because its content is only ever 
partial: it signifies ‘unknown wealth’. Yet it is not only the content that trades upon such virtual 
capital. The book-object also holds its author forever out of reach, preventing any sense of personal 
familiarity in its readers. Face-to-face meetings promote frankness and friendship, but they sacrifice 
reverence, because they confront the participants with ‘human infirmities’. In conversation, the 
dimensions of the mind can be gauged. Authors are immune to such measurement, however, because 
their material works distance them from their audience. Books represent what cannot be gauged, and 
thus possess that unfathomable element that Burke ascribed to the sublime. By the mystery of 
removal, they endow the author with transcendent authority – ‘I cannot read him through’ – and thus 
keep the eyes ‘continually looking up’, elevated above the mortal realm. They exalt their authors into 
objects of ‘worship’, something beyond the human. Books thus function here as idols rather than 
monuments, for they represent and iconise sacred beings. 
Godwin goes on to develop this idea of deification, arguing that books endow their authors with god-
like attributes, and thus with unique social power: 
[W]e studiously plant the in-evitable season of death with exaggerated terrors, & render it 
formidable to our deluded imaginations. It is to destroy this view of the subject, that these 
pages are written: & I assert, in opposition to this statement, that death is to the genuine 
votary of fame the hour of his triumph. […]  
Death is to the great man a real apotheosis. There is a deeper truth than the vulgar customarily 
imagine, in the Greek and Roman idea, that death turns a man into a God. It undoubtedly 
heaps upon him some of the characteristic privileges of a God. It renders him invisible, a 
being whose influence may powerfully be felt, but whose power no eye can see. It renders 
him incomprehensible, a being that discloses of himself as much as he thinks proper to 
disclose, but of whom no one knows more than he chooses to reveal, & whose secrets cannot 
be found out. It renders him impassible: we may conceive towards him any idle resentment; 
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but all our wrath and all our artillery will be directed against him in vain. It clothes him with a 
character supernatural & divine: the man who speaks to us, & the man who from his closet 
addresses to us a letter, acts according to the known laws of the material universe: but the 
man who for a thousand years has ceased to occupy a place in any corner of the globe, & yet 
who exercises over us his omnipotence undiminished, is surely after a certain fashion a God. 
Let therefore him who aspires to be truly great, no longer look upon death with repugnance; 
let him think it his choicest & most unvalued privilege; let him regard it as that sacred & 
much desired moment, when he shall divest him of every thing extraneous, degrading & 
vulgar, when he shall become simply & entirely himself, & enter now & for ever into his 
genuine inheritance. 
Decades before it appeared, Godwin preempts Gustave Flaubert’s famous picture of the author, who 
‘like the God of the creation, remains within or behind or beyond or above his handiwork’.63 He lists 
several of the so-called incommunicable attributes traditionally ascribed to the Christian God and 
applies them to the author of books: they obtain omnipresence, inscrutability, impassibility, and thus a 
unique power over the minds of their readers. The crucial point here is that the author escapes ‘the 
known laws of the material universe’. Their capacity to contribute to the intellectual improvement of 
society is no longer confined to their mortal person, with all the spatial limits, emotional vulnerability 
and sheer ordinariness that it entails. Most significant is their escape from intellectual transparency 
and finitude: the author becomes ‘a being that discloses of himself as much as he thinks proper to 
disclose, but of whom no one knows more than he chooses to reveal’. In making this statement, 
Godwin was appropriating a key element of John Calvin’s theology, according to which the pious 
know God only insofar as he gives himself to be known – i.e., that God is sovereign over the creature-
Creator knowledge encounter.64 For Godwin, the truly great obtain this divine prerogative of 
‘incomprehensibility’ through the book-object, which endows them with authority over the knowing 
process. Books transform dead human minds into divine minds, he argues, which direct and govern 
the intellectual pursuits of the living. 
‘On Death’ thus seems to overturn many of Godwin’s conclusions in Essay on Sepulchres. Rather 
than fleshing out authors, rendering them familiar, corporeal and accessible, books disembody and de-
familiarise them. The value of particular locations in Essay on Sepulchres is replaced by an ideal of 
omnipresence; great authors are those who have ‘ceased to occupy a place in any corner of the globe’ 
and thus assume ‘a character supernatural & divine’. Whereas in Essay on Sepulchres books embody 
life, here books are death-objects, exploiting all the social advantages of personal absence and 
                                                      
63 As translated by James Joyce in Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, ed. by Jacqueline Belanger (Ware: 
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be as he manifests himself’. John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, ed. by John T McNeill, trans. by 
Ford Lewis Battles, 2 vols (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1960), I, p. 42. This aspect of Calvin’s work 
formed a major tenet of the religious sect of Sandemanianism in which Godwin was raised (see Chapter Three). 
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remove. In 1809 death was ‘The greatest of earthly calamities’, yet in 1810 death is ‘that sacred & 
much desired moment’. Rather than depriving the earth of illustrious thinkers, death is ‘the hour of 
[their] triumph’, a ‘privilege’, for it invests them with a cultural power that is unfettered by material 
finitude. By embodying death, in a curious paradox, books overcome the terrors traditionally annexed 
to its power.  
In an important respect, however, Godwin’s Essay on Sepulchres and ‘On Death’ are united. Both 
essays are anxious to show that books transpose authorial life into a higher plane of existence. They 
both argue that books are a life-in-death, tokens of victory over the forces of loss and silence that 
human history entails. They both contend that the book-form is continually powerful: whether 
considered as a site of presence or of absence, it renders death ‘a real apotheosis’ for the great thinker, 
for it renders him ‘simply & entirely himself’. Essay on Sepulchres is perhaps more in keeping with 
Godwin’s previous work through its association of books with attachment, friendship and personal 
presence. It reads in some ways as the climax of his biographies of Wollstonecraft and Chaucer, for it 
is devoted to the fusion of books and lives. Yet ‘On Death’ brings to the foreground a strand of 
thinking that had been present in all these works, the author’s power as an ideal or an icon. In making 
his case for Chaucer’s ‘full and complete life’, Godwin not only used the language of incarnation and 
embodiment, but also that of paradigm and symbol: Chaucer was powerful because he represented a 
legacy of intellectual awakening. Likewise in Essay on Sepulchres, the names of individual worthies 
are referred to less often than their collective abstraction, ‘the Illustrious Dead of All Ages’. Readers 
are instructed to approach literary monuments with religious reverence, a disposition that echoes that 
used to describe book-reading in ‘On Death’: they must be viewed ‘with the intellectual eye’, 
‘spiritually’. In fact, Godwin’s entire sepulchre project is designed to refute what he describes as a 
modern tendency to consider dead ancestors ‘too poorly and literally’. It depends upon a national 
‘spirit of propagation’, a shared understanding of literature as an inheritance with transcendent 
value.65  
Through his essays at the end of the decade, then, Godwin was exploiting two images of the 
canonised author, that of the friend and the icon. These tropes were widespread in the writings of his 
time, as Dierdre Lynch has recorded; their prevalence bears witness to a shared need to represent the 
value of literary works both in terms of an intimate, affective relationship and an authoritative ideal.66 
Yet while in one sense representative of a wider cultural interest, Godwin is distinctive in his way of 
constructing and upholding these idealized qualities of authorship – the way that he persistently 
anchors them in the material properties of the book-object itself. The author functions as both friend 
                                                      
65 Essay on Sepulchres, pp. 6-7, 18. 
66 See Lynch, Loving Literature, pp. 35, 92 and passim. Paul Westover argues that both Godwin and Hazlitt 
sought to uphold the author as an icon and incarnate the author as a friend in this way: see Westover, ‘William 
Godwin, Literary Tourism, and the Work of Necromanticism’, p. 307. 
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and icon because the book as a distance medium makes this tension possible, in the sense that it is at 
once a site of presence (potently material and immanent) and a site of absence (defined by lack and 
deferral). Godwin’s attention to the book as an object was thus central to his elevation of authorship’s 
social role, which is the ultimate strategy behind all the writings discussed in this chapter. By 
describing literary works in terms of continuous cultural (cultivating) power, and presenting the logic 
for this power in the book’s material form, Godwin gave a secular justification for the significance of 
his authorial career.67  
In fact, by presenting the book as a meeting point of material and immaterial realms, Godwin aligned 
it with his conception of ‘thought’ itself, which he understood as neither physical mechanism nor 
supernatural process but a mysterious combination of both (see Chapter One). The human mind ‘is 
not less a system of mechanism, according to the doctrine of necessity, than the [body], but it is a 
mechanism of a totally different kind’, he had claimed in Political Justice. He was still appealing to 
this conception in 1831, describing the mind as the ‘stranger at home’: ‘Where it resides we cannot 
tell, not can authoritatively pronounce, as the apostle says, relatively to a particular phenomenon 
‘whether it is in the body, or out of the body.’’68 Perhaps Godwin’s most striking move in his Essay 
on Sepulchres and ‘On Death’ is his suggestion that the book-object encapsulates thought’s equivocal 
nature and channels its power for social good. As both a presence and an absence, an object and a 
subject, a somewhere and a nowhere, the book gives unique cultural power to great minds. Godwin 
insisted that human thought was re-membered and perfected in the book-form, remaining live and 
active after an author’s death.  
These sentiments are reiterated in a somewhat macabre manuscript note from 1819, in which Godwin 
reflects on his personal feeling of impending death: 
I feel the pen dropping from my hand. The fingers that trace these lines will very speedily be 
void of sense & motion. The mind that dictates to the fingers will soon cease to animate my 
frame, & will live only in the speculations I am now delivering to my fellow beings. Other 
[minds] will read them, will weigh, consider & examine their justness & their use; but the 
author who first digested them, will have finished his task, and rested from his labours.69 
                                                      
67 By contending that these book-focused concerns were about literature’s cultural power, I use the term culture 
first and foremost in its eighteenth-century sense of cultivating, or tending natural growth, as Godwin and his 
contemporaries would have primarily understood it. For Godwin, the specific power of the book’s form lay in 
its continual provocation towards intellectual communion – a productive sharing of intellect by which society 
progresses towards truth and justice – and its efficacy was conceptualised as cultural in this teleological sense. 
For a useful gloss upon the meanings and evolution of the term culture during Godwin’s lifetime, see Raymond 
Williams, Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 54. 
68 Political Justice, pp. 176-7, Thoughts on Man, pp. 42-46. See Chapter One for Godwin on matter and thought. 
Godwin’s remarks about ‘thinking matter’ accord in a large part with the views of Joseph Priestley, whose 
influence was felt at Hoxton Academy; see, for example, his Disquisitions Relating to Matter and Spirit 
(London: J. Johnson, 1777). 
69 ‘Untitled [on feeling close to death]’, dated 9 May 1819, Oxford, Bodleian Library, Abinger Collection, MS. 
Abinger c. 32, Fol. 32. The transcription is my own. 
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In this note Godwin locates the afterlife of his mind, specifically, in his writing. The apprehension of 
death suggests to him both the finishing of bodily life (‘sense & motion’, ‘frame’), and a beginning of 
a new life, in which his mind continues to interact with other minds ‘in the speculations I am now 
delivering’. As in both his Essay on Sepulchres and ‘On Death’, Godwin acknowledges the power of 
death and yet at the same time refuses to give it the last word. 
Neither this manuscript nor his essay ‘On Death’ were published, but Godwin incorporated the 
argument of ‘On Death’ into a later collection of essays, Thoughts on Man (1831). He wove its claims 
about divinity into the opening essay ‘Of Body and Mind’, which contends that ‘the man of great 
literary and original endowments’ achieves a god-like status, transcending the confines of his mortal 
body.70 Later, in a discussion ‘Of Imitation and Invention’, Godwin introduces the connection he had 
made between such divinisation and the progress of the human mind at large. This essay’s founding 
question, ‘Is there indeed nothing new under the sun?’, fuels an enquiry into literature and history, 
which culminates in the claim that ‘the poet is immortal’. As he addresses the subject of death, 
Godwin argues that an author’s ability to transcend the grave is integral to the intellectual 
improvement of humankind:  
If, as the beast dies, so died man, then indeed we should be without hope. But it is his 
distinguishing faculty, that he can leave something behind, to testify that he has lived. And 
this is not only true of the pyramids of Egypt, and certain other works of human industry, that 
time seems to have no force to destroy. It is often true of a single sentence, a single word, 
which the multitudinous sea is incapable of washing away. […] It is the characteristic of the 
mind and the heart of man, that they are progressive. One word, happily interposed, reaching 
to the inmost soul, may ‘take away the heart of stone, and introduce a heart of flesh.’ And, if 
an individual may be thus changed, then his children, and his connections, to the latest page 
of unborn history.71 
The works of great writers, down to their individual sentences and words, are here summoned as 
evidence for the ‘progressive’ nature of ‘the mind and the heart of man’. The beneficial power that 
such works have over the mind extends beyond the scope of individual readers to their families, 
friends, and generations yet to come. This is so much the case that history itself is encompassed by the 
metaphor of the codex at the end of the passage (‘latest page’). Godwin’s closing plea in this essay is 
against ‘Presumptuous innovators’ who have adapted the writings of Chaucer and Spenser into 
modernised English: ‘you may as well attempt to preserve the man when you have deprived him of all 
his members; as think to preserve the poet when you have taken away the words that he spoke’.72 
Echoing the corporeal language of his letter to Phillips almost twenty years earlier, Godwin figures 
the words of a great writer as his limbs. Only the reproduction of these same words can continue his 
                                                      
70 Thoughts on Man, pp. 46-47. 
71 Ibid., pp. 149; 142-43. 
72 Ibid., p. 150. Cf. Lives of Edward and John Philips, p. 325, in which an abridgement is described as akin to a 
‘naked skeleton’, and the essay ‘Of the Study of the Classics’ in The Enquirer, which attacks both abridgements 
and translations as a ‘waste of time’ (p. 100-01). 
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Through his writings of the early nineteenth century, Godwin came to express the book as an object 
that not simply preserved but transformed the human mind. He formulated his ideas in a context of 
personal and public loss, and during a period in which his central belief in the perfectible nature of 
human society was subject to intense criticism. Tapping into public debates about history, theology 
and national identity, Godwin figured the book as a body, a monument and even an idol in order to 
defend and uphold this belief. His Essay on Sepulchres and ‘On Death’ gave particular attention to the 
formal aspects of the book-object in order to defend his conviction that intellectual exchange was a 
vital, durable and progressive activity. In its representation of the dead mind, he argued, a book not 
only extended its thinking presence among the living but gave it a new sort of thinking presence that 
transcended the limitations of human life.  
It is clear that the material power of the codex was not, in Godwin’s understanding, the only active 
cause of truth’s social apprehension through print. As the chapters of this thesis have shown, he 
argued in various ways throughout his corpus that readers must be of a certain kind; that literature 
itself may be more or less conducive to ‘true enquiry’ through its content and style; and that truth 
itself had an independent force or weight manifested (to some extent) through all these things. 
Godwin’s concern with ‘Illustrious’ thinkers in his Essay on Sepulchres reflects some of these 
complications, for it involves two claims that sit uneasily alongside each other: that certain writers 
have historical traction due to the intrinsic value of their ideas, and that the vitality of these writers 
also depends upon the activity of readers, who have a duty to ‘husband’ their particular inheritance. 
The materiality of print was thus not sufficient for intellectual survival, in Godwin’s estimation, but it 
was necessary. He assigned real power to material media, a strategy which enabled him to write 
confidently about the reforming capacity of print. 
This strategy is perhaps shown most starkly by Godwin’s late essay ‘On the Durability of Human 
Achievements and Productions’ (1831), in which he explicitly connects the properties of the book-
form to the collective improvement of human minds. The most astonishing and unique feature of 
human life, he argues, is ‘the faculty we possess of giving a permanent record to our thoughts’. As he 
considers death’s pervasive power, he claims that books are the only true survivors of history: 
Books have the advantage of all other productions of the human head or hand. Copies of them 
may be multiplied forever […] The Iliad flourishes as green now, as on the day that 
Pisistratus is said first to have stamped upon it its present order. The songs of the Rhapsodists, 
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the Scalds, and the Minstrels, which once seemed as fugitive as the breath of him who 
chaunted them [sic], repose in libraries, and are embalmed in collections.73 
The ‘fugitive’ nature of human life is counteracted, Godwin argues here, by the printed book. He 
creates a sense of stasis – ‘stamped’, ‘embalmed’ – to represent the longevity enabled by the book-
form, whose fixity and uniformity counteracts powers of loss and decay. Yet he also gives books 
vitality and agency, describing them as things that multiply and flourish like living organisms. The 
dead continue to sing and to speak, communicating with the living communities who preserve them. 
Like his Essay on Sepulchres, Godwin’s essay ‘On the Durability of Human Achievements’ upholds 
the book-form as the linchpin of long-term social progress, a site of re-membering that works against 
the tendency of human civilization to function like a perpetual infant school. Its conclusion is that 
‘Knowledge, in its most considerable branches shall endure, as long as books shall exist to hand it 
down to successive generations’.74 
 
                                                      
73 Thoughts on Man, pp. 80, 88. 





In 1793, when William Godwin first published an argument for belief in intellectual progressivism, he 
used the global development of speech, writing and reading as his foremost piece of evidence. 
Echoing the Marquis de Condorcet, he argued that ‘in the invention of printing is contained the 
embryo, which in its maturity and vigour is destined to annihilate the slavery of the human race’.1 In 
1801, as he defended this belief against its critics, he appealed to and refined the same principle. 
‘Thoughts occasioned by the perusal of Dr Parr’s Spital Sermon’ refutes the idea that ‘vice and 
misery, as my antagonists so earnestly maintain, [are] entailed on us for ever’, by describing the 
power of literary works to prefigure and elicit the highest capacities of human nature.2 At the very end 
of his life in 1836, Godwin was still employing a narrative about communications media in order to 
uphold the idea of intellectual perfectibility. As he anticipated the diminishing hold of Christian 
religion over the life of the mind, he noted that ‘Writing and reading are becoming almost universal. 
[…] Natural knowledge has made a perpetual progress. Arts of every kind have been eternally 
improving’.3 Throughout his career, Godwin cherished and developed a deep conviction that print 
technology was a beneficent force that steered humankind towards their future. 
My dissertation has examined how and why Godwin used the book-object in his writings, and has 
traced its presence to this enduring faith in the necessary perfection of human minds. I have argued 
that Godwin participated in the media consciousness of Romantic-period Britain by using depictions 
and discussions of book-reading to examine, justify and publicise his core belief in intellectual 
progressivism. As he engaged with debates about materialism, ethics, pedagogy, truth and death, and 
as he attempted to negotiate the volatile political climate of his day, he used the book-object as a 
literary presence and a conceptual tool by which he expressed and defended his most foundational 
conviction. It is my contention that this consistent and powerful element of Godwin’s corpus must be 
recognised if we are to fully understand and appreciate his place in cultural history.  
Godwin’s literary use of print technology resonates beyond his individual career, however. We have 
seen that books became a means to navigate the intellectual crossfire of his time and place – perhaps 
ultimately to diffuse tensions between the rationalism, humanism and scepticism that had animated 
the developments of philosophy, theology and the physical sciences during his upbringing in 
eighteenth-century Britain. In this respect his work goes some way to contextualising the more 
widespread ‘media consciousness’ of Romantic-period culture to which I drew attention in my 
Introduction. It indicates some of the ways in which writers appropriated print media as symbols, 
                                                      
1 Political Justice, pp. 27-31, 141. 
2 ‘Thoughts occasioned by the perusal of Dr Parr’s Spital Sermon’, pp. 207-08. 
3 The Genius of Christianity Unveiled, p. 235. This is a repetition from an earlier section: see p. 132. 
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concepts and stories in order to participate in a period of intellectual ferment – a period, in Marilyn 
Butler’s words, ‘when controversy was at its most intense, and art became one of its outlets’.4 
Godwin’s complex literary investment in the book is a reminder that the ubiquity of media ‘discourse’ 
in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century culture was not simply, as Paula McDowell supposes, a 
response to the technology of ‘media shift’ itself.5 It was also an active part of other cultural shifts, 
which involved changing assumptions about the very nature and ends of human life. 
In fact, this aspect of Godwin’s work finds an echo in many discussions and depictions of media in 
the present day. Our contemporary ‘digital revolution’ has fostered unprecedented interest in the 
history of communications media, reflected in the proliferation of research projects, textbooks and 
university courses which revolve around it.6 Yet this field of interest does not simply bear witness to a 
desire to understand the material and socio-economic factors that condition our media environment – 
it also continues to ‘mediate media’ (in McDowell’s phrase). Researchers and theorists still exploit 
the symbolic and narrative dimensions of the book, and still use its history to make arguments about 
the nature and ends of human life. Amongst recent of histories of reading, for example, are accounts 
that attempt to further particular concepts of gender identity, political change and social morality.7 
The author of one recent ‘history of communications’ tells a story about the book in order to magnify 
the limits of human agency – ‘to explain what media do to the way we live and what we believe’ – 
and to advance the conclusion that ‘[a] new world of signs has taken control of us’.8 For all these 
writers, books and their histories ultimately have something to say about social life – about what it 
means for objects, ideas and stories to be produced, exchanged and put to use – and how this could or 
should be done better. 
One aim of this dissertation, then, is to offer Godwin as a foregoing and potent example of this 
contemporary practice. His work encourages us to recognise and examine the commitments that 
necessarily underlie our own attempts to describe, narrate and understand the communications 
cultures of the past and the present. In this respect, my study of Godwin’s writing confirms Leah 
Price’s contention that ‘the history of books is centrally about ourselves’.9 It bears witness to the fact 
that books, as manifested within literary, artistic and scholarly culture, have a track record of 
representing and furthering our deepest hopes, anxieties and beliefs. Godwin shows us a literary 
                                                      
4 Marilyn Butler, Romantics, Rebels and Reactionaries: English Literature and its Background 1760-1830 
(Oxford University Press, 1981), p. 187. 
5 Paula McDowell, ‘Towards a Genealogy of ‘Print Culture’ and ‘Oral Tradition’’, p. 411. 
6 Textbook publications in book history in the last five years, for example, have included Routledge’s 
Introduction to Book History (2013), the Cambridge Companion to the History of the Book (2014), Broadview’s 
Reader in Book History (2015) and Broadview’s Introduction to Book History (2017). 
7 E.g., Kate Flint, The Woman Reader 1837-1914; Roger Chartier, The Cultural Origins of the French 
Revolution, trans. by Lydia Cochrane (Durham, N.C: Duke University Press, 1991); Frank Furedi, Power of 
Reading: From Socrates to Twitter (London: Bloomsbury, 2015). 
8 Marshall T. Poe, A History of Communications: Media and Society from the Evolution of Speech to the 
Internet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 25, 275 (emphasis mine). 
9 Leah Price, ‘Reading: the State of the Discipline’, p. 318. 
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precedent for using the book’s cultural power to exchange ideas about the nature, ends and 
possibilities of human life. 
Godwin’s particular use of the book-object remained as much a personal interest as a public strategy 
or philosophical proposition. As he represented books in reformatory terms, he was in part justifying 
his own choice to pursue a literary career after leaving his role as a Christian minister in the 1780s. A 
letter to Mary Shelley dated 15 April 1830 expresses this concern succinctly. Giving instructions 
about how she should describe his latest book, Thoughts on Man (1831), to the publisher John 
Murray, he wrote: 
Whether it is published during my life, or after my death, it is a light that cannot be 
extinguished – “the precious life-blood of a discerning spirit, embalmed and treasured up on 
purpose to a life beyond life”.10 
Here Godwin reiterates the connection between books and bodies that he had exploited in his early-
nineteenth-century work, translating it into a statement of confidence in his own literary life. He 
quotes Milton’s Areopagitica, using its portrayal of books as agents of reform in order to invest the 
fruit of his labours with active power, something that transcends his biological lifespan. The ‘master 
spirit’ of Milton’s original is changed to ‘discerning spirit’, which subtly reflects Godwin’s concern to 
emphasise the thinking power of his ‘embalmed’ legacy.11 Whether he lives or dies, Godwin argues, 
the published book will be indestructible. It thus extends his very being, transposing it onto a new 
level of existence.  
This is of course a specific claim about the merits of Thoughts on Man, which Godwin describes with 
typical immodesty as ‘very far from being merely one book more, adding to the numbers of books 
already existing in English Literature’. Yet this letter also epitomises the confidence that he placed in 
the cultural power of the book across his writing, and once again situates the source of this power in 
its capacity to perfect the human mind. For unlike Milton, Godwin positioned books as the only 
immortality available to humankind, the only means of ‘life beyond life’. This move enabled him to 
imbue the authorial vocation – his vocation – with tremendous civic responsibility. Throughout his 
work Godwin gave the literary person a death-defying task, making him or her the linchpin of social 
progress towards truth and justice.  
 
                                                      
10 Godwin to Mary Shelley, 15 April 1830, Oxford, Bodleian Library, Abinger Collection, MS. Abinger c. 48, 
Fol. 68. The transcription is my own. 
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